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Accidents · NTSB LAX04FA150 · Final report

Ercoupe 415-C accident near Oakdale, California, March 9, 2004

On March 9, 2004 at about 10:10 pm local time, a Ercoupe 415-C, registered N93707, was destroyed in an accident near Oakdale, California. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

the in-flight separation of the main spar due to corrosion in the wing center section not detectable by inspection methods described in manufacturer's service bulletins and FAA Airworthiness Directives.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
March 9, 2004 · about 10:10 pm local time
Place
Oakdale, California · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Ercoupe 415-C · all 415-Cs on the register
Registration
N93707 · registry record · serial 1030
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The airplane broke apart in flight while maneuvering. The pilot and a passenger were on a local flight and did not return. The wreckage was located strewn over an area of grassy hills. The wings and empennage sections were found separate from the main fuselage. The owner of the airplane had flown with the pilot just prior to the accident flight and reported that the pilot had been doing aileron rolls. The airplane had flown about 4 hours since its annual inspection. Prior to that time, the airplane was damaged during a hard landing and sat, unrepaired, for 2 years. Post accident examination of the airframe revealed extensive corrosion through the wing walk areas and wing spar center section, with corrosion affecting at least 20 rivets that secure the web to the upper spar cap. A Safety Board metallurgist determined that the area of the wing spar center section corrosion could not have been detected through current inspection methods and procedures. The critical buckling stress on the upper spar cap was several times as high as the estimated stress carried by the upper spar cap in straight and level flight, which indicates the failure most likely occurred in a steep turn or other high load maneuver. The collapse of the spar could only occur when enough rivets had corroded to allow the disconnected part of the spar cap to reach its critical buckling strength. Ercoupe Service Bulletin (SB) No. 18 was issued for the reinforcement of the center section belly skin as a direct result of cracks occurring in the center section belly skin at the rearmost rivet attachment in the center section belly skin outer stiffeners. Service Bulletin 31 was issued in July 2000, and required inspection within the next 5 hours of operation or at the next 100-hour or annual inspection, whichever occurred first. The SB was intended to detect corrosion and prescribed certain visual methods of inspection. AD 2002-26-02 was intended to detect and correct corrosion in the wing center section, which could result in failure of the wing center section structure during flight. The AD contained three methods of accomplishing the inspection: install inspection openings; use a scope and a light source; or remove outer wing panels to gain visual access to the wing walkway box structure. AD 2003-21-01 was issued in response to additional reports of corrosion on airplanes found during compliance with AD 94-18-04 R1. The actions of the AD were intended to prevent wing damage caused by a corroded wing outer panel structural component. The AD called for installation of inspection openings in the outer wing panels and inspection of the area for corrosion and corrosion damage. It also called for repetitive inspections every 12 months. Comparison of the inspection requirements in the Service Bulletins and AD's to the area where the corrosion was present in the accident aircraft revealed that none of the inspection methods would likely have found the corrosion. All of the current inspection methods are done visually and there is no requirement for nondestructive inspection (NDI) or nondestructive testing (NDT).

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,133 hours in all; 4 in this make and model; 700 on instruments
  • Last flight review: December 1, 2002
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 1,600.9 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, December 1, 2003; 4 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,260 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental C-85-12F (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: 027 Oakdale CA at 10:00 pm
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 310° at 13 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 77°F (25°C), dew point 57°F (14°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.06 inHg
  • Observation at 9:53 pm from MOD, 17 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.