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Accidents · NTSB ERA24LA079 · Final report

Robinson Helicopter R44 and DJI MAVIC 2 mid-air collision near Daytona Beach, Florida, December 30, 2023

On December 30, 2023 at about 7:04 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Robinson Helicopter R44 (N828AK) and DJI MAVIC 2 (FA3XNWMRAN), were involved in a mid-air collision near Daytona Beach, Florida (Daytona Beach International airport). No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The UAS operator’s failure to operate within the limitations of the COA that he was using to operate inside class C airspace, which resulted in a collision between the UAS and the helicopter.
The UAS operator’s failure to operate within the limitations of the COA that he was using to operate inside class C airspace, which resulted in a collision between the UAS and the helicopter.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 30, 2023 · about 7:04 pm local time · cases in 2023
Place
Daytona Beach, Florida · Daytona Beach International · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident · mid-air collision
Injuries
No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft 1
Robinson Helicopter R44, built 2007 · all R44s on the register
Registration
N828AK · registry record · serial 1689
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Other work-use flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
Aircraft 2
DJI MAVIC 2 PRO · all MAVIC 2s on the register
Registration
FA3XNWMRAN · registered outside the United States · serial 163DF81001N020
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Other work-use flight · small-drone rules (Part 107)

The NTSB's narrative for the Robinson Helicopter R44 final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot of the helicopter reported that while flying at an indicated altitude around 200 to 300 ft, while on approach to land at an off-airport landing zone, he saw a black “drone” [unmanned aerial system (UAS)] in front of his windscreen. He attempted to avoid the UAS but was unable and the UAS impacted the main rotor resulting in substantial damage to a main rotor blade. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation. The UAS operator reported that he was conducting operations over a construction site. The area was inside of the class C airspace of a nearby airport and the UAS operator was using a Federal Aviation Administration Certificate of wavier or authorization (COA) that had been previously obtained by the construction company who hired him. The UAS operator reported that he was flying at an altitude of 180 ft, and that before the flight he had not realized that this altitude was above the maximum altitude of 150 ft imposed by the COA. The COA also required the UAS operator to notify the air traffic control tower at the nearby airport at least 15 minutes prior to the proposed start time of any operations. The UAS operator stated, and a review of contact records by the air traffic control tower confirmed, that no call was received from the UAS operator notifying them of the operation. Additionally, the drone operations manager for the construction company who contracted the UAS operator reported that the operator was supposed to check in with the on-site supervisor before conducting operations and stated that this did not happen on the day of the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the DJI MAVIC 2 final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot of the helicopter reported that while flying at an indicated altitude around 200 to 300 ft, while on approach to land at an off-airport landing zone, he saw a black “drone” [unmanned aerial system (UAS)] in front of his windscreen. He attempted to avoid the UAS but was unable and the UAS impacted the main rotor resulting in substantial damage to a main rotor blade. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation. The UAS operator reported that he was conducting operations over a construction site. The area was inside of the class C airspace of a nearby airport and the UAS operator was using a Federal Aviation Administration Certificate of wavier or authorization (COA) that had been previously obtained by the construction company who hired him. The UAS operator reported that he was flying at an altitude of 180 ft, and that before the flight he had not realized that this altitude was above the maximum altitude of 150 ft imposed by the COA. The COA also required the UAS operator to notify the air traffic control tower at the nearby airport at least 15 minutes prior to the proposed start time of any operations. The UAS operator stated, and a review of contact records by the air traffic control tower confirmed, that no call was received from the UAS operator notifying them of the operation. Additionally, the drone operations manager for the construction company who contracted the UAS operator reported that the operator was supposed to check in with the on-site supervisor before conducting operations and stated that this did not happen on the day of the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the Robinson Helicopter R44 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Midair collision during approach defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot of other aircraft
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of procedures › Pilot of other aircraft

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 342.5 hours in all; 203.9 in this make and model; 121.7 in the last 90 days; 30.3 in the last 30 days; 298 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: May 19, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 4,964 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, December 11, 2023; 5 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,400 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-540-F1B5 (piston); 567 hours total
  • Operator: Tunica Helicopters LLC

The flight

  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 250° at 14 knots, gusting 19
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 5,000 ft
  • Temperature: 59°F (15°C), dew point 39°F (4°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.11 inHg
  • Observation at 1:53 pm from DAB, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KDAB 301853Z 25014G19KT 10SM FEW050 15/04 A3011 RMK AO2 SLP195 T01500044

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers2

The factual record for the DJI MAVIC 2 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Midair collision during maneuvering

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of procedures › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: remote
  • Ratings: rotorcraft: unmanned (suas)
  • Flight time: 450 hours in all; 450 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: August 1, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Unknown
  • Seat: none
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Seats: 0
  • Landing gear: fixed

Photographs from the investigation 2 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

8 documents, released by the NTSB on January 25, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA24LA079.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.

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