Cessna 172 accident near Lake Worth, Florida, May 26, 2023
On May 26, 2023 at about 3:18 pm local time, a 1981 Cessna 172, registered N3KV, was destroyed in an accident during initial climb near Lake Worth, Florida (Palm Beach County Park airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Maintenance personnel’s failure to detect the corroded aileron cable during recent inspections, which resulted in the separation of the aileron control cable and a subsequent loss of airplane control during takeoff.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 26, 2023 · about 3:18 pm local time
- Place
- Lake Worth, Florida · Palm Beach County Park · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 172 P, built 1981 · all 172s on the register
- Registration
- N3KV · registry record · serial 17274768
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
Airport security video recorded the accident takeoff and captured the airplane rolling right until it was in an approximate 90° right bank, then continued a right descending turn until it impacted the ground. A witness reported that the engine sounded like it was at full power from the time the airplane departed until it impacted the ground. Examination of the wreckage revealed that there was a break in the aileron control cable system in the vicinity of the left upper door post right direct aileron cable pulley. A metallurgical examination of the break in the aileron control cable revealed that the mating fracture surfaces exhibited a woody appearance, shedding material, and pockmarks consistent with a corrosive attack. The angled fractured surfaces exhibited the same layered woody appearance, which indicated that those wires likely fractured in tension due to embrittlement and weakening from corrosive attack. If the cable was shedding material and becoming weaker, this process would have resulted in shedding material wire-by-wire and strand-by-strand over time. The remaining wires would have fractured from tensile overstress when there were no longer enough intact wires to carry the stress. It is likely that the overstress fracture occurred during the takeoff, which was consistent with the right roll as seen in the surveillance video. According to maintenance records, the airplane was inspected in accordance with the manufacturer’s maintenance manual and with Part 43 appendix D two times during the eight months before the accident. According to both inspection checklists the aileron control cable should have been inspected. The condition and degradation of the cables should have been apparent during those inspections. Therefore, it is likely that maintenance personnel overlooked the corroded aileron control cable during the most recent inspections.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Flight control sys malf/fail during initial climb defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Aileron control system › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Aileron control system › Inadequate inspection
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Scheduled/routine inspection › Maintenance personnel
Flight instructor
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot, flight engineer
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 17,755 hours in all; 205.8 in the last 90 days; 70.6 in the last 30 days; 8,950 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: September 30, 2021
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
Dual student
- Certificate: student
- Flight time: 48.4 hours in all; 19.4 in the last 90 days
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 5,025.5 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, September 22, 2022; 55.1 hours since
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-360-A4M (piston); 699 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: Airmax Charters, LLC
The flight
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 04, 3,256 ft by 75 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 080° at 6 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 25,000 ft; scat at 2,100 ft
- Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
- Altimeter: 29.83 inHg
- Observation at 10:53 am from PBI, 6 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KPBI 261453Z 08006KT 10SM SCT021 SCT026 BKN250 28/22 A2983 RMK AO2 SLP102 T02780217 51015 $
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
16 documents, released by the NTSB on June 20, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
Other NTSB records under N3KV the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.