The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB ERA22LA379 · Final report

Boeing A75N1 and Boeing A75N1 accident near Bealeton, Virginia, August 20, 2022

On August 20, 2022 at about 1:07 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Boeing A75N1 (N55267) and Boeing A75N1 (N52652), were involved in the same accident near Bealeton, Virginia (Flying Circus Aerodrome airport). 2 people had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot of the departing airplane’s failure to see and avoid the landing airplane before takeoff, resulting in a collision with the landing airplane. Contributing was the airport’s failure to encourage pilots to use radios for traffic deconfliction when equipped.
The pilot of the departing airplane’s failure to see and avoid the landing airplane before takeoff, resulting in a collision with the landing airplane. Contributing was the airport’s failure to encourage pilots to use radios for traffic deconfliction when equipped.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 20, 2022 · about 1:07 pm local time
Place
Bealeton, Virginia · Flying Circus Aerodrome · map
Type
Accident · collision on the ground
Injuries
2 people had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft 1
Boeing A75N1, built 1940 · all A75N1s on the register
Registration
N55267 · no longer on the register · serial 75-2310
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
Aircraft 2
Boeing A75N1, built 1942 · all A75N1s on the register
Registration
N52652 · registry record · serial 75-4328
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative for the Boeing A75N1 final · quoted from the NTSB record

The vintage biplanes were operating at a private airport that provided airshows and airplane rides to the public. The pilot of the departing airplane taxied for takeoff and was number two behind another airplane that was taxiing ahead of him. At the same time, the pilot of the landing airplane was in the traffic pattern, preparing for landing. Local procedures required landing airplanes to make a low approach to signal airplanes taking off that a landing was imminent; the procedure was implemented because some airplanes at the airport were not equipped with radios. Landing aircraft had the right-of-way over aircraft taking off. The pilot of the landing airplane reported that he performed the required low approach, completed the traffic pattern, and proceeded onto final approach for landing. At the same time, the pilot of the departing airplane taxied onto the runway for takeoff and did not see the low approach by the landing airplane or his subsequent pattern. The pilot of the landing airplane did not see the departing airplane on the runway and landed on top of the departing airplane before the departing airplane became airborne. Both airplanes sustained substantial damage, the two pilots had minor injuries, and two passengers were not injured. Although both airplanes were equipped with radios, neither pilot was making radio calls; instead, they relied on the established visual traffic separation procedures only. A review of the airport’s standard operating procedures revealed that they did not address the use of radios or encourage pilots to use them if equipped. Following the accident, the airport made several modifications to their local procedures including recommending that all pilots of aircraft equipped with radios use them while in the traffic pattern; and moving the holding area short of the runway to another location that afforded better visibility of the traffic pattern.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Boeing A75N1 final · quoted from the NTSB record

The vintage biplanes were operating at a private airport that provided airshows and airplane rides to the public. The pilot of the departing airplane taxied for takeoff and was number two behind another airplane that was taxiing ahead of him. At the same time, the pilot of the landing airplane was in the traffic pattern, preparing for landing. Local procedures required landing airplanes to make a low approach to signal airplanes taking off that a landing was imminent; the procedure was implemented because some airplanes at the airport were not equipped with radios. Landing aircraft had the right-of-way over aircraft taking off. The pilot of the landing airplane reported that he performed the required low approach, completed the traffic pattern, and proceeded onto final approach for landing. At the same time, the pilot of the departing airplane taxied onto the runway for takeoff and did not see the low approach by the landing airplane or his subsequent pattern. The pilot of the landing airplane did not see the departing airplane on the runway and landed on top of the departing airplane before the departing airplane became airborne. Both airplanes sustained substantial damage, the two pilots had minor injuries, and two passengers were not injured. Although both airplanes were equipped with radios, neither pilot was making radio calls; instead, they relied on the established visual traffic separation procedures only. A review of the airport’s standard operating procedures revealed that they did not address the use of radios or encourage pilots to use them if equipped. Following the accident, the airport made several modifications to their local procedures including recommending that all pilots of aircraft equipped with radios use them while in the traffic pattern; and moving the holding area short of the runway to another location that afforded better visibility of the traffic pattern.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the Boeing A75N1 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Collision during takeoff/land during landing (flare/touchdown) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot of other aircraft
  • Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Availability of policy/proc › Airport

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 5,904 hours in all; 3,730 in this make and model; 100 in the last 90 days; 30 in the last 30 days; 5,864 as pilot in command; 867 on instruments
  • Last flight review: October 13, 2020
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rear
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,487 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, March 20, 2022; 60 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,950 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental W670-6A (piston); 2,550 hours total

The flight

  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 20, 2,000 ft by 150 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: scat at 500 ft
  • Temperature: 72°F (22°C), dew point 70°F (21°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.18 inHg
  • Observation at 8:55 am from KHWY, 2 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KHWY 201255Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM SCT005 SCT090 22/21 A3018 RMK AO2 T02210206

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

The factual record for the Boeing A75N1 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Collision during takeoff/land during takeoff defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
  • Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Availability of policy/proc › Airport

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land
  • Flight time: 5,900 hours in all; 1,100 in this make and model; 20 in the last 90 days; 6 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: March 26, 2022
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rear
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,895 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, April 15, 2022; 9 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,950 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming R680-13 (piston); 2,009 hours total

The flight

  • Flight plan: none

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

6 documents, released by the NTSB on January 31, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Other NTSB records under N55267 the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

2006-05-29NYC06CA158 · accident near South Hill, VA · substantial damage · no injuries

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.