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Accidents · NTSB ERA15LA218 · Final report

Bell 206L-3 accident near Kearny, New Jersey, May 20, 2015

On May 20, 2015 at about 2:30 pm local time, a 1990 Bell 206L-3 (helicopter), registered N210MH, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering (hover) near Kearny, New Jersey (Helo Kearny Heliport airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The deliberate concealment and reuse of an unairworthy tail rotor driveshaft by unknown personnel, which resulted in an overstress separation at a bonded flange adapter as a result of driveshaft imbalance.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 20, 2015 · about 2:30 pm local time
Place
Kearny, New Jersey · Helo Kearny Heliport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Bell 206L-3, built 1990 · all 206L-3s on the register
Registration
N210MH · registry record · serial 51379
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported that, during a 20-ft hover, the helicopter spun right. The pilot made left pedal inputs; however, the helicopter then rotated three times to the right. The pilot decreased the throttle and increased the collective before the helicopter landed hard. Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed that the No. 5 tail rotor driveshaft tube had separated from its bonded flange adapter, where it had been secured by adhesive. The driveshaft tube had been freshly painted. When some of the paint was removed, hand written markings in red ink reading "X," ".004," and ".024" were noted on the tube. The numbers were on either end of the tube and were likely measured runout values for the shaft, and, because they exceeded the maximum runout requirement of .003 inch, the "X" mark was made to indicate that the tail rotor shaft was unairworthy. However, at some point after the red markings were made, the unairworthy shaft was repainted by unknown personnel, which obscured the markings. It is likely that the driveshaft became imbalanced because it was beyond its runout tolerance, which led to the overstress separation of the tube from the bonded flange adapter. A representative of the current owner reported that the owner had recently purchased the helicopter. About 5 years before the purchase, the helicopter had experienced a hard landing, and it had not been flown during the subsequent 5 years. The current owner received the helicopter with the driveshaft freshly painted. When he inquired about the fresh paint, the previous owner told him that the driveshaft was purchased at auction. The current owner did not receive serviceable tags with the driveshaft but did receive an auction invoice; however, no serial numbers were listed on the invoice. The serial number format found etched on the driveshaft did not match any known records. Therefore, the investigation could not determine if the separated driveshaft was the same driveshaft that was installed on the helicopter when it experienced the hard landing. As a result of the accident examination, the helicopter manufacturer submitted a suspected unapproved parts report to the Federal Aviation Administration.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during maneuvering (hover) defining event
  2. Loss of control in flight during maneuvering (hover)
  3. Hard landing during landing

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Tail rotor drive system › Tail rotor drive shaft › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Other/unknown
  • cause Personnel issues › Miscellaneous › Intentional act › (general) › Other/unknown

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 1,050 hours in all; 20 in this make and model; 230 in the last 90 days; 150 in the last 30 days; 1,000 as pilot in command; 723 on instruments
  • Last flight review: January 6, 2014
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,976.1 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, April 30, 2015; 26 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 4,150 lb
  • Seats: 7
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Allison 250-C30P (turboshaft); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: 65NJ Kearny NJ at 2:30 pm
  • Destination: JRB New York NY
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 300° at 16 knots, gusting 20
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 4,100 ft
  • Temperature: 63°F (17°C), dew point 41°F (5°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.90 inHg
  • Observation at 2:51 pm from EWR, 4 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

9 documents, released by the NTSB on October 23, 2015. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.