Beech 95-C55 accident near Ulysses, Pennsylvania, November 17, 2011
On November 17, 2011 at about 9:19 pm local time, a Beech 95-C55, registered N54552, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (change of cruise level) near Ulysses, Pennsylvania. It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 4 people were seriously injured. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The total loss of left engine power due to fuel starvation, and the pilot’s improper configuration of the fuel system during remedial actions, which resulted in fuel starvation of the right engine. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s incomplete preflight inspection and the pilot’s operation of the airplane with a known faulty fuel quantity indicating system.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 17, 2011 · about 9:19 pm local time
- Place
- Ulysses, Pennsylvania · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 4 people were seriously injured.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Beech 95-C55 · all 95-C55s on the register
- Registration
- N54552 · registry record · serial TE-37
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airplane departed on a cross-country flight with an unknown quantity of fuel. Although the pilot had asked for the main tanks to be filled, it is likely that the fueler did not add enough fuel. According to the pilot, the left main fuel gauge read inaccurately, but the pilot did not check the fuel level during his preflight inspection. Given the flight times since the airplane’s last complete fuel service, its subsequent partial fuel service, and the fuel consumption rates provided by the airplane’s owner, it is likely that the fuel supply in the left main tank was nearly exhausted during the climb after takeoff from the departure airport on the accident flight. The airplane completed the cruise portion of the flight on the auxiliary tanks, and when the fuel selectors were placed back in the main positions, the left engine stopped producing power due to fuel starvation. According to the pilot’s operating manual, the left fuel selector should have been in the main or auxiliary position, and the right fuel selector should have been in the crossfeed position. However, during the left-engine restart attempt, the pilot configured the left fuel selector to crossfeed position and the right fuel selector to the auxiliary position; such a configuration starved the right engine of fuel. When the right engine “surged,” the pilot abandoned the restart and feathered the left propeller. Restart of the right engine was also unsuccessful, and the pilot completed a power-off forced landing. The airplane’s emergency procedures and fuel system schematics revealed that, had the left engine been feathered and the fuel system configured properly by the published procedure, the right engine would have continued to operate on the fuel that remained in the right main fuel tank.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (change of cruise level) defining event
- Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Incorrect use/operation
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Preflight inspection › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Pilot
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel indication system › Damaged/degraded
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 12,200 hours in all; 1,100 in this make and model; 33 in the last 90 days; 8 in the last 30 days; 8,800 as pilot in command; 3,100 on instruments
- Last flight review: April 20, 2011
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: serious injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 6,027 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, September 5, 2011
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Cont Motor IO 520 SERIES (piston); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Cont Motor IO 520 SERIES (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: Ekl Leasing Corporation
The flight
- Departed from: ILG Wilmington DE at 8:03 pm
- Destination: 9G0 Buffalo NY
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 290° at 9 knots, gusting 15
- Visibility: 2 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 2,300 ft
- Temperature: 30°F (-1°C), dew point 25°F (-4°C)
- Altimeter: 29.90 inHg
- Observation at 9:33 pm from ELZ, 18 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 3 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Other NTSB records under N54552 the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.