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Accidents · NTSB ENG24LA012 · Final report

British Aerospace BAE 146 SERIES 200A and Mcdonnell Douglas DC-9-87 incident near Missoula, Montana, March 1, 2024

On March 1, 2024 at about 4:00 pm local time, 2 aircraft, British Aerospace BAE 146 SERIES 200A (N474NA) and Mcdonnell Douglas DC-9-87 (N296EA), were involved in the same incident near Missoula, Montana (Missoula Montana airport). No one was hurt. The weather was conditions the NTSB did not record.

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The use of a new long term fire retardant with a chemical composition incompatible with the retardant previously in use for the integration-operational field evaluation without adequate testing and qualification.
The use of a new long term fire retardant with a chemical composition incompatible with the retardant previously in use for the integration-operational field evaluation without adequate testing and qualification.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
March 1, 2024 · about 4:00 pm local time
Place
Missoula, Montana · Missoula Montana · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
No one was hurt.
Weather
conditions the NTSB did not record
Aircraft 1
British Aerospace BAE 146 SERIES 200A, built 1987 · all BAE 146 SERIES 200As on the register
Registration
N474NA · registry record · serial E2084
Damage
Minor damage
Flight
Aerial application (crop spraying) flight · public-use (government) rules
Aircraft 2
Mcdonnell Douglas DC-9-87, built 1991 · all DC-9-87s on the register
Registration
N296EA · registry record · serial 53212
Damage
Minor damage
Flight
Firefighting flight · public-use (government) rules

The NTSB's narrative for the British Aerospace BAE 146 SERIES 200A final · quoted from the NTSB record

The United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service (USFS) had been using long term fire retardants (LTFRs) for many decades with no significant corrosion issues noted on their contract aircraft. Since at least 2006, the USFS had a single source supplier for LTFRs that provided retardants with monoammonium phosphate (MAP), diammonium phosphate (DAP), and/or ammonium polyphosphate (APP) used as the retardant salt. Beginning in 2020, the USFS allowed LTFRs to be submitted for qualification that contained retardant salts different from the historic phosphate-based retardants. The USFS granted conditional qualification to Fortress FR-100, a magnesium chloride-based (MgCl) dry powder concentrate, and Fortress FR-200, a MgCl-based liquid powder concentrate in May 2021 and August 2021, respectively, after they successfully completed uniform corrosion testing in accordance with USFS Specification 5100-304d, Long-Term Retardant, Wildland Firefighting at the USFS National Technology and Development Program (NTDP). The specified corrosion testing, which only examined the corrosive effects of a single retardant on one aluminum alloy, one steel alloy, one brass alloy, and one magnesium alloy, had been unchanged for many years. Beginning in June 2021, the first operational field evaluation (OFE) of FR-100 (MgCl-based) retardant began to show there was an incompatibility between MgCl-based and phosphate-based retardants when they were comingled in service. Increased corrosion was present on some aircraft components, and subsequent laboratory testing by NTDP confirmed the incompatibility between certain retardants. Test reports, USFS documents, and information received from operators and vendors suggested that the use of any new retardant should be delayed until further corrosion testing, more appropriate comingling studies, and updated operational procedures were completed. Additional testing by NTDP completed in July 2023 showed that alternating between phosphate-based and MgCl based retardants caused significant residue buildup in the level sensors used in the retardant tanks. Despite the evidence of incompatibilities between the retardants and without performing additional corrosion testing, the USFS decided to initiate an integration operational field evaluation (I-OFE) during the 2023 fire season with two large air tankers using Fortress FR-200 (MgCl-based) and Perimeter Solutions MVP-Fx (MAP and DAP-based) retardants. During the first part of the season both airtankers carried only FR-200 retardant then both airtankers alternated between FR-200 and MVP-Fx retardants for the second part of the season. At the conclusion of the 2023 fire season, post-season maintenance on the two airplanes involved found significant evidence of corrosion on the internal tank structure and components as well as the external airplane structure. Several items from each airplane were examined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) lab under the direction of the investigation. For some of the items, NIST concluded that there was galvanic corrosion occurring where the steel and aluminum alloy components were coupled electrically in the presence of liquid retardants. For other items, NIST concluded that the corrosion was the result of a breakdown in material surface protection treatments in the presence of the liquid or dried retardants. NIST also examined the chemical interaction of the retardants and concluded that there is a likely interaction related to the nitrogen-based proprietary corrosion inhibitors present in the different retardants. Preliminary studies by NTDP based on the investigation findings validated the galvanic corrosion action between certain steel and aluminum alloys in the presence of a single liquid retardant, either FR-200 or MVP-Fx. NTDP also performed additional studies at the request of the investigation examining the galvanic corrosion action in comingled retardants that showed the comingled products resulted in more severe corrosion on certain alloys. The more severe galvanic corrosion in comingled retardants is likely due to the more acidic mixture that results from comingling. NTDP has initiated several corrosion studies to further examine corrosive mechanisms on additional alloys and built-up structures in the presence of LTFRs.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Mcdonnell Douglas DC-9-87 final · quoted from the NTSB record

The United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service (USFS) had been using long term fire retardants (LTFRs) for many decades with no significant corrosion issues noted on their contract aircraft. Since at least 2006, the USFS had a single source supplier for LTFRs that provided retardants with monoammonium phosphate (MAP), diammonium phosphate (DAP), and/or ammonium polyphosphate (APP) used as the retardant salt. Beginning in 2020, the USFS allowed LTFRs to be submitted for qualification that contained retardant salts different from the historic phosphate-based retardants. The USFS granted conditional qualification to Fortress FR-100, a magnesium chloride-based (MgCl) dry powder concentrate, and Fortress FR-200, a MgCl-based liquid powder concentrate in May 2021 and August 2021, respectively, after they successfully completed uniform corrosion testing in accordance with USFS Specification 5100-304d, Long-Term Retardant, Wildland Firefighting at the USFS National Technology and Development Program (NTDP). The specified corrosion testing, which only examined the corrosive effects of a single retardant on one aluminum alloy, one steel alloy, one brass alloy, and one magnesium alloy, had been unchanged for many years. Beginning in June 2021, the first operational field evaluation (OFE) of FR-100 (MgCl-based) retardant began to show there was an incompatibility between MgCl-based and phosphate-based retardants when they were comingled in service. Increased corrosion was present on some aircraft components, and subsequent laboratory testing by NTDP confirmed the incompatibility between certain retardants. Test reports, USFS documents, and information received from operators and vendors suggested that the use of any new retardant should be delayed until further corrosion testing, more appropriate comingling studies, and updated operational procedures were completed. Additional testing by NTDP completed in July 2023 showed that alternating between phosphate-based and MgCl based retardants caused significant residue buildup in the level sensors used in the retardant tanks. Despite the evidence of incompatibilities between the retardants and without performing additional corrosion testing, the USFS decided to initiate an integration operational field evaluation (I-OFE) during the 2023 fire season with two large air tankers using Fortress FR-200 (MgCl-based) and Perimeter Solutions MVP-Fx (MAP and DAP-based) retardants. During the first part of the season both airtankers carried only FR-200 retardant then both airtankers alternated between FR-200 and MVP-Fx retardants for the second part of the season. At the conclusion of the 2023 fire season, post-season maintenance on the two airplanes involved found significant evidence of corrosion on the internal tank structure and components as well as the external airplane structure. Several items from each airplane were examined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) lab under the direction of the investigation. For some of the items, NIST concluded that there was galvanic corrosion occurring where the steel and aluminum alloy components were coupled electrically in the presence of liquid retardants. For other items, NIST concluded that the corrosion was the result of a breakdown in material surface protection treatments in the presence of the liquid or dried retardants. NIST also examined the chemical interaction of the retardants and concluded that there is a likely interaction related to the nitrogen-based proprietary corrosion inhibitors present in the different retardants. Preliminary studies by NTDP based on the investigation findings validated the galvanic corrosion action between certain steel and aluminum alloys in the presence of a single liquid retardant, either FR-200 or MVP-Fx. NTDP also performed additional studies at the request of the investigation examining the galvanic corrosion action in comingled retardants that showed the comingled products resulted in more severe corrosion on certain alloys. The more severe galvanic corrosion in comingled retardants is likely due to the more acidic mixture that results from comingling. NTDP has initiated several corrosion studies to further examine corrosive mechanisms on additional alloys and built-up structures in the presence of LTFRs.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the British Aerospace BAE 146 SERIES 200A from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Miscellaneous/other during standing defining event
  2. Aircraft inspection event during standing

The NTSB's findings

  • Organizational issues › Development › Selection/certification/testing › (general) › Other government
  • Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Fuselage › Bulkheads (main fuselage) › Fatigue/wear/corrosion

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 34,458.1 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, February 22, 2024
  • Maximum gross weight: 91,200 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Honeywell ALF-502R-5 (turbojet); 10,469 hours total
  • Engine 2: Honeywell ALF-502R-5 (turbojet); 31,860 hours total
  • Engine 3: Honeywell ALF-502R-5 (turbojet); 40,734 hours total
  • Engine 4: Honeywell ALF-502R-5 (turbojet); 27,622 hours total
  • Operator: Neptune Aviation Services INC

The flight

  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: not reported
  • Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)

The factual record for the Mcdonnell Douglas DC-9-87 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aircraft inspection event during standing
  2. Miscellaneous/other during standing

The NTSB's findings

  • Organizational issues › Development › Selection/certification/testing › (general) › Other government
  • Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Fuselage › Plates/skins (aux fuselage) › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Wing structure › Spar (on wing) › Fatigue/wear/corrosion

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 35,874.3 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, December 16, 2022
  • Maximum gross weight: 132,000 lb
  • Seats: 3
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: P & W JT8D-219 (turbofan); 63,564 hours total
  • Engine 2: P & W JT8D-219 (turbofan); 34,386 hours total
  • Operator: Aero Air LLC

The flight

  • A second pilot was aboard

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ENG24LA012.