Raytheon Aircraft Company 400A incident near Sugar Land, Texas, May 13, 2014
On May 13, 2014 at about 6:11 pm local time, a Raytheon Aircraft Company 400A, registered N412GJ, suffered minor damage in an incident during takeoff (rejected takeoff) near Sugar Land, Texas (Sugar Land Regional Airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was conditions the NTSB did not record.
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The probable cause of the uncontained No. 2 engine failure on the Raytheon Beechjet 400A was a yellow-crowned night-heron birdstrike that resulted in fan blade contact with the inlet case and rub induced excitation of a previously unidentified natural frequency (resonance) within the engine operating range.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 13, 2014 · about 6:11 pm local time
- Place
- Sugar Land, Texas · Sugar Land Regional Airport · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- conditions the NTSB did not record
- Aircraft
- Raytheon Aircraft Company 400A A
- Registration
- N412GJ · registry record · serial RK-412
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The No. 2 engine sustained a yellow-crowned night-heron birdstrike during takeoff roll from Sugar Land Regional Airport (SGR)- Sugar Land, Texas. The impact from the birdstrike resulted in contact between the fan and inlet case that separated all nineteen (19) fan blades. The released blade fragments penetrated the engine case and cowl and caused an engine fire. A blade fragment impacted the right wing and punctured the fuel tank resulting in fuel spillage onto the wing surface and runway. Materials analysis on recovered fan blade fragments determined that all separated blades failed due to overload and no evidence of fatigue was identified. A series of modal tests including: tap hammer, high energy shaker, and computer model simulation were conducted at the system and component level. The tests identified a four nodal diameter coincidence at about 72% N1 speed. When sufficient energy is imparted to the engine fan during a foreign object ingestion event like a birdstrike, it may result in a rub induced excitation and subsequent fan blade separation and catastrophic engine failure.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Birdstrike during takeoff (rejected takeoff)
- Uncontained engine failure during takeoff (rejected takeoff)
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during takeoff (rejected takeoff) defining event
- Fire/smoke (non-impact) during takeoff (rejected takeoff)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Power plant › (general) › Failure
The aircraft
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney Canada JT5D-5 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-5 (turbofan); 5,845 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Runway 17, 8,000 ft by 100 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.