Atr ATR72 incident near St. Croix, January 12, 2010
On January 12, 2010, a Atr ATR72, registered N434AT, suffered minor damage in an incident during takeoff near St. Croix (Henry e Rohlsen Airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 48 people were on board or involved.
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The sealing failure between the fuel nozzle adapter assembly and fuel transfer tubes that allowed fuel to leak into the nacelle fire zone where it was subsequently ignited by the hot combustor case. Contributing to the failure was a combination of manufacturing defects of the fuel nozzle adapter assembly by the manufacturer and incorrectly overhauled fuel transfer tubes by the engine manufacturer. Contributing to the incident was a second defect of the fuel nozzle adapter assembly by the manufacturer which prevented maintenance personnel from detecting the internal fuel leak.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 12, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- January 12, 2010 · cases in 2010
- Place
- St. Croix · Henry e Rohlsen Airport · cases near this airport
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 48 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- not recorded
- Aircraft
- Atr ATR72 212A
- Registration
- N434AT · no longer on the register · serial 434
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
During takeoff the No. 1 (left) engine fire warning illuminated in the cockpit. The pilot declared an emergency, shut down the No. 1 engine and discharged one fire bottle. The fire warning continued and the pilot discharged the second bottle; but the fire warning did not extinguish. The pilot performed an air turnback and landed the airplane uneventfully approximately 11 minutes later. Engine testing at the manufacturer’s facility revealed a large fuel leak emanating from the No. 2 fuel nozzle manifold adapter-to-transfer tube O-ring connection. Examination revealed two manufacturing defects in the No. 2 fuel nozzle manifold adapter. The first defect, poor surface finish, caused damage to the transfer tube O-ring during the installation process, initiating an internal fuel leak. The second defect, blockage of the internal safety tell-tale drain due to an improper machining and subsequent cleaning procedure, prevented the leaking fuel from flowing into the tell-tale drain and being detected by maintenance personnel. Examination of the transfer tubes revealed an undersized O-ring retention zone, which allowed the O-ring to fit loosely such that it was not capable of withstanding continuous maximum fuel pressure load. Eventually the O-ring failed to seal properly, fuel leaked and was ignited by the hot combustor case. The undersized O-ring retention zone was created during the cleaning and overhaul process of the transfer tube.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Fire/smoke (non-impact) during takeoff defining event
The NTSB's findings
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › (general) › Incorrect service/maintenance other cases naming the engine
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control › Fuel distribution › Failure other cases naming the engine
The aircraft
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Pratt and Whitney PW127 (turboprop); 0 hours total
- Operator: American Airlines
The flight
- Departed from: STX St. Croix
- Destination: STX St. Croix
- Flight plan: not recorded
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 4 | |||
| Passengers | 44 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
10 documents, released by the NTSB on August 8, 2013. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Powerplants 8 - Factual Report of Group Chairman | PDF, 18 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Powerplants 8 - Attachment 1 | PDF, 14 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Powerplants 8 - Attachment 2 | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 4 | Powerplants 8 - On-site Airplane Fire Documentation | PDF, 19 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Powerplants 8 - Corrective Action - Pwc Quality Flash #14 | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 6 | Powerplants 8 - Corrective Action - Pwc Special Instruction 33-2010 | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Powerplants 8 - Corrective Action - Pwc Service Information Letter | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 8 | Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report | PDF, 6 pages | View Download |
| 9 | Flight Data Recorder 10 - Attachment 1 FDR Tabular | data file | Download |
| 10 | Cockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Specialist's Factual Report | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N434AT: not on the register today · the record of its deregistration
- Engine: Pratt and Whitney PW127 · as the NTSB recorded it
- Henry E Rohlsen Airport · nearest airport
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ENG10IA010.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
