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Accidents · NTSB DCA25LA185 · Final report

Boeing 737 accident near Houston, Texas, April 17, 2025

On April 17, 2025 at about 4:42 pm local time, a 2009 Boeing 737, registered N7724A, was involved in an accident during standing near Houston, Texas (William P. Hobby Airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). 1 person was seriously injured; 138 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

Serious Injury to a flight attendant sustained during an evacuation.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 17, 2025 · about 4:42 pm local time
Place
Houston, Texas · William P. Hobby Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was seriously injured; 138 others were unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Boeing 737 7BD, built 2009 · all 737s on the register
Registration
N7724A · registry record · serial 36725
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Southwest Airlines flight 3006, a scheduled international passenger flight from William P. Hobby Airport (HOU), Houston, Texas, to Los Cabos International Airport (SJD), San Jose del Cabo, Mexico, experienced a right engine failure resulting in an air turnback. During the turnback, a burning odor was reported in the cabin and an evacuation was commanded after landing. During the evacuation, one flight attendant (FA) sustained a serious injury. According to the flight crew, they were on day two, leg two, of a three-day line experience rotation. The first officer (FO), pilot flying, was returning from leave and the captain (CA) was a line check airman for the company. During the preflight, the flight crew discussed the automatic terminal information service (ATIS) reporting windshear and planned for a precautionary takeoff profile. The flight crew briefed the engine out procedures and the takeoff profile for runway 22. The taxi and takeoff were normal. During climb out, the flight crew observed the right engine exhaust gas temperature (EGT) indication momentarily increase into the red overtemp range, then decrease. The flight crew then heard a “popping” noise and observed the right engine N1 indication decrease to approximately 50%. The CA declared an emergency with air traffic control (ATC) and initiated the Engine Fire, Severe Damage or Separation quick reference checklist (QRC) and the quick reference handbook (QRH) procedures. The FO continued as the pilot flying and coordinated vectors for a return to HOU. The “A” FA contacted the cockpit to inform them of a burning odor in the cabin. The CA informed the FAs that they had an engine malfunction and were returning to HOU. The CA then made a public announcement informing the passengers that they would be landing in 20 minutes. After completing all appropriate checklists, the CA assumed control of the aircraft, and the FO transitioned to the pilot monitoring. The approach and landing were uneventful. ATC requested that the flight crew exit the runway at the end and coordinate with airport rescue firefighting (ARFF). After clearing the runway and stopping, the CA contacted the FA’s and was informed that there was still a strong burning odor in the cabin. At that time, the CA elected to initiate an evacuation of the airplane. The CA informed ARFF of the decision and the FO began the QRH for an evacuation. The flight crew completed the QRH procedure, including left engine shutdown and FLAP 40 extension, and the CA commanded an evacuation via the left side of the aircraft. The FO evacuated the aircraft to assist with the evacuation while the CA remained onboard until all passengers had evacuated. The CA observed passengers re-entering the aircraft from the overwing exits and then utilizing the door slides. After all passengers and flight attendants had evacuated the aircraft, the CA conducted a final walkthrough and evacuated the aircraft. On the ground, the CA learned that ARFF personnel had directed passengers back into the aircraft due to concerns of injuries sliding off the wing. According to the “B” FA, seated in the aft galley, during takeoff there was a loud noise and followed by a burning odor. As the aircraft continued to climb the odor intensity decreased and they inspected the area and were unable to identify a source. The B FA contacted the A FA and informed them of the odor. The CA made an announcement that they had experienced an engine failure, and they would be landing in approximately 20 minutes. After landing and stopping, the CA called the FAs and asked if the odor still existed, to which the B FA replied that they still smelled a burning odor. After the evacuation, the B FA reported an injury to their ankle. They were diagnosed with a hairline fracture.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Evacuation during standing defining event
  2. Loss of engine power (partial) during initial climb

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › (general) › Failure
  • Environmental issues › Task environment › Physical workspace › Air quality/dust/smoke › Contributed to outcome
  • Personnel issues › Physical › Impairment/incapacitation › Illness/injury › Cabin crew

Pilot (unmanned)

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 18,000 hours in all; 12,000 in this make and model; 54 in the last 90 days; 34 in the last 30 days; 8,000 as pilot in command; 1,000 on instruments
  • Last flight review: November 21, 2024
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 3,794 hours in all; 527 in this make and model; 7 in the last 90 days; 7 in the last 30 days; 1,726 as pilot in command; 1,364 on instruments
  • Last flight review: April 8, 2025
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rear
  • Injury: no injuries

Cabin Crew

  • Seat: rear
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 49,134 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, April 13, 2025
  • Maximum gross weight: 155,000 lb
  • Seats: 148
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Cfm Intl CFM56-7B24 (turbofan); 60,640 hours total
  • Engine 2: Cfm Intl CFM56-7B24 (turbofan); 61,281 hours total
  • Operator: Southwest Airlines CO

The flight

  • Destination: MMSD San Jose Del Cabo OF
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 22, 7,602 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 170° at 15 knots, gusting 21
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 3,000 ft
  • Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.99 inHg
  • Observation at 9:53 am from KHOU

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Cabi12
Flight crew2
Passengers134

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

2 documents, released by the NTSB on October 23, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.