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April 28, 2025

John Lovell
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RE: Southwest Airlines Flight 3006 Crew Statements

John,

Per your request, please find below the statements from the Flight Crew, Cabin Crew involved in the evacuation and serious injury event on April 17, 2025.

Flight Crew

Captain

On April 16th I started a 3-day trip out of Phoenix. I was flying with a re-qual FO that required Line Experience training with me as I am a Check Pilot for Southwest Airlines. She had been out of flying for approximately a year and had just finished her sim training recently. Day one was uneventful with an overnight in New Orleans (MSY). We departed MSY on April 17th and landed in Houston Hobby (HOU). Once we pulled into the gate we gathered our belongings due to an aircraft swap. We walked to the new gate and began our preflight activities, which included me briefing the flight attendants. The briefing was the standard introductions, time en-route and what the weather and turbulence would be like for serving our passengers. It was a gusty day in HOU and I advised them to stay seated until I called them at a safe altitude to get up and serve.

My FO would be PF this leg. We both did our flows and proper briefings about the aircraft, taxi routing, SID briefing. We used the briefing card to make sure we discussed all items needed. We had discussed on day one what I had expected of her if we were to have an engine failure prior to V1 and what I expected after V1. We did discuss the engine failure procedure off runway 22 which was a straight-out departure. We had noticed in the ATIS that LLWS advisories were in effect so I informed her that we would be using the precautionary takeoff profile. In this profile we use max thrust and have an extended rotation speed. We discussed this profile and how it was different than our normal takeoff departure. Other than the gusty conditions the weather was partly cloudy and no adverse weather in the area.

The pushback was normal as was the engine start. We started both engines because it was a short taxi to runway 22. The taxi out to runway 22 was normal and I chimed the flight attendants for departure and ran the Before Takeoff checklist. We were cleared for takeoff. The takeoff roll and rotation was normal for the precautionary takeoff profile. The pilot flying had a normal rotation and climb out. Shortly thereafter I saw the engine number 2 EGT go into the red, exceeding engine temperature limits. I watched the engine over temp and then the temperature decreased and the red over temp light extinguished. Soon after that, around 700 feet, I heard what sounded like a loud squeal and popping noise. Then the engines gauges had a white flashing box around them and the engine number 2 N1 decreased to approximately 50%. I stated to the pilot flying that we just lost the number 2 engine and to remain flying. I then informed HOU tower that Southwest 3006 was declaring an emergency and that we had lost engine number 2. I requested a straight-out departure and a climb to 3000 feet. We were queried by ATC as to our intentions. I informed them that I wanted to stay near HOU but I had several checklists to accomplish. ATC provided radar vectors while I ran the checklists. I first looked at the number 2 engine and saw we had N1 rotation, so my first thought was the Engine Failure checklist. As I was looking in the QRH for the Engine Failure checklist, ATC was still giving vectors to us and I asked the PF if she would handle the radios. I looked up again at the instruments and reexamined the engine readouts. I then noticed that the engine vibration meter was at 5.0. I re-assessed our problem as a severe damage and went to the QRC Engine Fire, Severe Damage or Separation Checklist. I told the PF what I was seeing and the PF agreed with my assessment. Somewhere during this time the A Flight Attendant chimed and wanted to talk to us. I answered her call and she said something to the effect that she knew we were busy doing checklists but wanted to tell us that there was a burning smell in the back. At the

moment that she called it was very busy and I was just re-assessing the engine instruments and ATC was providing instructions.

We continued with the QRC and then the QRH checklist items. We shut down the number 2 engine. There was no indication of fire so the fire bottle was not used. The QRH directed us to start the APU, during that time waiting for the APU to come on-line, I called the flight attendants and told them that we we had an engine malfunction. I informed them that we would be landing in about 20 minutes. They didn't have any questions as I recall and I don't recall them saying anything more about the burning smell in the back. I also made a PA to the passengers informing them of the situation and that we would be landing back in HOU in about 20 minutes. We continued with the QRH and ran the PWB for the single engine performance landing calculations. PWB came up with a solution saying that auto brakes 3 and max were available. I selected auto brakes max to ensure stopping. We briefed the approach and weather for landing runway 22 into HOU. We had just landed on that runway a few hours earlier so we both were very familiar with the approach and runway. We also ran PWB brake cooling and it said that we could park at the gate with about a 42 minute cooling time. I contacted Southwest operations to inform them of our return and to let dispatch know of our situation. Operations said it was all taken care of and everyone was aware of our situation. We looked at each other and agreed we were ready for the approach. Once all checklist were completed we transferred aircraft controls and I now became the PF and the FO now PM.

We informed ATC that we were ready for the approach. I called for flaps 5 and soon thereafter landing gear down and flaps 15. All indications were good and we ran the Before Landing checklist. The landing was uneventful and braking was easily assured that we would stop well before the end of the runway. I was going to turn off on H2 but tower told us to taxi to the end of the runway and contact ARFF. We taxied to the end of the runway. I took a right turn and exited the runway clearing it. I told the FO that I wanted to talk to the flight attendants before going to the gate. I chimed the flight attendants and asked something along the lines of how are you doing? Is everybody ok? I got a response back that there was a strong burning smell in the back of the aircraft. Her voice sounding with conviction and urgency. I said we will be doing an evacuation, standby. I informed my FO that we would be doing an evacuation. As she was getting the QRH out I informed ARFF that we would be evacuating. He must not of heard me because he asked me what we needed. I again repeated that we would be evacuating and again he was asking me what we needed. I chose to continue with the evacuation checklist. As we started the checklist I brought the flaps to 40 knowing that it takes some time for the flaps to extend. We completed the checklist and shut down the remaining engine. I made the PA to evacuate captain's side of the aircraft.

We opened the flight deck door and watched as the passengers exited down the escape slide. My FO also went down the slide to assist the passengers at the bottom of the slide. As most of the passengers were off the aircraft I noticed the passengers on the wing were coming back into the aircraft. The flight attendants were informing the passengers to exit off of the wing but they all filed back into the aircraft and went down the escape slides. After the last passenger deplaned I told the flight attendants to exit. I did a final walk through to check if any remaining passengers were on board. With none remaining I also exited the aircraft via the escape slide.

Once on the tarmac I was talking to one of the firemen. I asked about the passengers on the wing and them going back inside the aircraft. He said that he told the passengers to go back inside the aircraft and go down the escape slide. He said too many passengers would have been injured sliding down the back of the wing and flap. After that the crew gathered together and I was informed that all passengers were safe and no injuries except of one of my flight attendants had sustained an ankle injury. She received medical attention and we got in a van and were driven back to the terminal to debrief the event.

First Officer

This was day two with my Check Pilot for I was just returning from maternity leave and had just completed re-qualification training in Dallas. Our first leg of the day was MSY-HOU and it was an uneventful flight other than some gusty winds arriving in HOU on runway 22. We had a scheduled plane swap in HOU and proceeded to our next aircraft. During our preflight flows I selected "windshear" in our PWB for a precautionary takeoff profile since the ATIS was advertising LLWS. We briefed the taxi out, single engine procedure and reviewed the precautionary profile at the gate for a shared mental model.

The pushback, engine start and taxi out to runway 22 was uneventful as we accomplished our Before Takeoff

flows and checklist. We were cleared for takeoff on runway 22 and departures using the precautionary takeoff with MAX thrust and extended rotation speed. On takeoff right after I called for the landing gear up, I noticed our EGT on the number 2 engine overheated and stayed in the red band momentarily. We heard a popping noise and the white box appeared around the engine instruments. The CA (PM) declared an emergency and let Hobby tower know we lost our #2 engine. I continued to fly the aircraft on runway heading and we requested 3000 FT as we accelerated and flew the single engine takeoff profile. We accessed the engine parameters which ultimately led us to the QRC/QRH for Engine Fire, Severe Damage or Separation checklist due to the high vibration we were experiencing.

The CA requested that I take the radios as he accomplished the checklists, spoke with FA's and made a PA to the passengers explaining we would return to HOU in approximately 20 minutes. Once time permitted he also notified SWA HOU OPS of our situation and planned return. Once we accomplished all the pertinent checklists, ran our brake cooling and briefed the approach to runway 22, we transferred controls to the CA who was now PF and I was now the PM. We landed uneventfully on runway 22 and the tower instructed us to taxi to the end of the runway onto taxiway H where ARFF would be waiting. I checked on with ARFF, "we are stopped on H". The CA requested to wait for any further instructions until he spoke with the flight attendants to check on status in the cabin. I did not hear what was said as I was monitoring ARFF, but he returned from talking to the FA's and said we are evacuating and requested the Evacuation checklist. I grabbed the QRH and began the evacuation checklist as the CA placed the flap handle to 40 and notified ARFF of our intentions.

I left the flight deck after the checklist was complete to assist with the evacuation. I exited the aircraft from the forward entry door slide and helped corral the passengers onto the grass, safely away from the aircraft. Once most of the passengers were in a group I went back to help assist passengers coming down the slides. Eventually we were driven back to the terminal where we accomplished our required notifications and debriefed with the flight attendants. It was at this time we learned that our B flight attendant had sustained an injury to her ankle and would be receiving medical attention.

Cabin Crew

Flight Attendant 'A'

Flight 3006 boarded as usual in HOU. We secured the cabin, armed and cross checked doors and pushed the gate on time. We completed the emergency demo, took our jump seats and were cleared for departure. Immediately after take off we heard and felt a loud boom. I thought we might have blown a tire on take off. We also noticed the aircraft was no longer climbing in altitude; we are just circling and hovering unusually low. Then, I get a call from the B flight attendant in back, she says there is a strong burnt smell in the back of the cabin. So I called the Captain to make him aware of the strong burnt smell in the back. The Captain confirms the loss of power to one engine and says he will call us back. Shortly after, the Captain calls to let us know we are circling back to HOU and we will be on the ground within 20 minutes. Right away, he makes an announcement on the PA informing the passengers that we lost power to one engine and are returning to HOU and will be on the ground in 20 mins. He assures them we are able to land with one engine and says not to worry; he reminds them that flight crews are trained for this kind of stuff.

Hovering at such a low altitude while circling we remained in our jump-seats. I called the B in the back, she said the burnt smell had somewhat subsided. She also noticed our low altitude and was secure in her jump seat. Several minutes later we land in HOU and the passengers applaud! I make an announcement on the PA to please stay seated and keep carry-ons stowed. We taxi away from the terminal and come to a stop. Once we stop, the Captain calls us to check the environment in the cabin. He asks if we see or smell smoke or fire. I answer no, but the B in the back answers YES. She said she does not see anything, but the strong burnt smell from before had returned upon landing. Then the Captain says, then we have to evacuate. He immediately announces on the PA, EVACUATE, EVACUATE, EVACUATE! So I start with RELEASE SEATBELTS, RELEASE SEATBELTS as I confirm conditions out the window are clear and begin to open the forward entry door. I watch to ensure the slide deploys while rotating hands from the door to assist handle. While holding on, I face the aisle with my back against the wall/jump seat and start with COME THIS WAY, THIS WAY OUT, LEAVE EVERYTHING, CROSS YOUR ARMS JUMP! Those commands were quickly changed to get passengers attention and move them forward, COME THIS WAY, COME THIS WAY! Suddenly, passengers were bringing all their carry-ons to the front exit to carry down the slide. My commands LEAVE EVERYTHING were modified in the moment to LEAVE YOUR BAGS, NO SUITCASES, LEAVE YOUR BELONGINGS! One passenger carried a large backpack and argued, THIS IS NOT MY BIG SUITCASE

BAG ITS ONLY A BACKPACK. Another lady insisted she take her huge tote/duffle bag because it had too much cash and valuables to leave. So I continued with LEAVE YOUR BELONGINGS!

The egress traffic up front also slowed when kids gathered at the threshold and were unsure of going down the slide. There were several bunches of young kids that were being corralled forward to exit by their parents/adults. Once they reached the door and slide to exit, they were unsure about jumping out to slide. I had to say STEP OUT, SIT TO SLIDE! I also had to physically help several kids STEP OUT onto the slide and SIT them down on the slide to exit. So that command wavered between STEP OUT, SIT TO SLIDE and CROSS YOUR ARMS, JUMP; almost like case by case instruction. After the first waves of customers exit, the First Officer exits down the slide to assist on the ground. The Captain stays upfront between the flight deck and front galley. Once the egress traffic at the front exit slows, we are able to see towards the OWE. It seemed like more customers were headed towards the front exit from the OWE area. When the front exit dries up, the Captain and I head towards the OWE to ensure all passengers exit. We see one guy towards the back of the cabin laying, bending or squatting in a row, possibly retrieving carry-ons. As he heads towards the back exit, he's somewhat arguing while yelling to the B Flight Attendant, YOU CAN STOP YELLING, IM THE LAST ONE!

The Captain and I head towards the front exit as he confirms all customers have exited; the C flight attendant does the same and heads to the front also. The Captain tells us to exit down the slide and he follows. Once outside, we continue to move the customers away from the plane, keep them grouped together and ask everyone if they are ok. We continue to remind them, MOVE AWAY FROM THE AIRCRAFT, STAY TOGETHER IN A GROUP, NO SMOKING! We are quickly met plane side by local Southwest Leaders, Emergency Responders and Airport Operations. We circle back to meet the Captain and First Officer and stay together as a crew while Airport Operations, Ground Operations and HPD take control of the situation. The Chief Pilot arranges for Airport Operations to transport us to the terminal and escort us to the conference room. There we meet local base leaders and ground operations leaders. The pilots were then moved to the Flight OPS conference room. We waited as our bags were retrieved and we debriefed with HOU base leaders. Nikki and her team made sure we were comfortable and safe. They also brought us food and drinks to keep us well. They let us take our time to catch our breath, gather our thoughts and sort through all that transpired. While we were there, both the NOC and CISM reached out to us to show their support. We were given ample time to decompress and reset before they released us to go home.

Flight Attendant 'B'

During takeoff I heard a loud noise. I didn't know where it came from. It sounded more on aircraft right. Looked in the cabin passengers were looking to both sides. Then the burnt smell and smell of smoke. Start looking around in galley from my jump seat electrical, smoke, touched the floor...

Noticed passengers were looking back for approval. I would motion my hand to remain calm. We continued climbing in altitude. The smell was not strong but present still. I got out of my jump seat to check for anything in the cabin or outside. Nothing.

Called the 'A' to let her know what I smelled and heard. She was waiting for the pilots to call, allowing them time to do checks. Received call from pilots confirmed we had lost an engine. Checks were good and would be making announcement to passengers. We had 20 minutes before landing.

Flight attendants stayed in jump seats. The smell was not intense, but you could still smell something burnt. We landed, stopped on runway. Request passengers remain seated and stay calm. Captain called and inquired about smell. We told him that it smelled like something was burning and smoke somewhere. Captain stated he was commanding evacuation, captain's side.

Captain made evacuation command, flight attendants started evacuating aircraft.

Flight Attendant 'C'

The boarding of flight 3006 went as usual, nothing abnormal. I did my OWE briefing and made sure to get the verbal confirmation from each of the passengers seated there. We secured the cabin, armed and cross-checked our doors, and did the emergency demo. We took our seats and were ready to go. Again, nothing abnormal had

happened at this point. Once we were cleared, we start taking off down the runway and within 5-10 seconds of us fully leaving the ground, we both heard and felt a pop boom. Up in the front, me and the A thought it could've possibly been a tire that had blown. We very quickly realize that we are no longer climbing and we proceed to wait for a call. We get a call from the B in the back saying that there was a strong burnt smell and smell of smoke in the back of the cabin. There was no visible smoke though. The smell did not carry to the front half of the cabin. After getting that information from the B, the A called the pilots to inform them of the smell so that they would be aware. They confirmed the loss of an engine but would call us back when their checklists were completed. The Captain called back soon thereafter to give us the official update and how we would be returning to HOU in the next 20 minutes. Once he informed us, he then proceeded to jump on the PA to notify the passengers. I do not believe that any of us thought that we would have to evacuate. We did not prepare the cabin for evacuation. That being said, all crew members, myself included, were going over our commands and going over procedures in the event of an evacuation. Upon landing, and turning off the runway, the A jumps on the PA to tell everyone to remain seated and to make sure all of their carry-on items remain stowed. Seconds after that, we come to a complete stop and the Captain calls us to check on the status of the cabin.

Upon hearing of the continued smell of smoke in the back half of the cabin, he confirms evacuation over the PA system, making sure to tell us only to evacuate on the captain side of the aircraft. We all jump into immediate action and because my forward service door would not be used I immediately head to the OWWE to head the evacuation there as we are telling everyone our commands of RELEASE SEATBELTS and LEAVE EVERYTHING. Unfortunately upon arrival to the middle of the cabin, not a single person in the OW had even removed their seatbelts. I tell everyone to get up and a passenger in the 2-seater nearest the OWWE asks if she should open the exit and I quickly confirm. The window opened without issue and I make my way to standing on the aisle seat of the row directly in front of the exit row. I start saying my commands, telling people to STEP OUT and to FOLLOW THE ARROWS while also instructing them on the safety strap. I very quickly realize that NO ONE has gone down the wing. Everyone is collecting onto the wing but not following the step necessary steps to get down. People are calling out that there are no slides or rafts for them to get down. I acknowledge them while telling them they have to slide down. Again, NO ONE listens to those commands. At this point the rest of the cabin has started to significantly thin out. Then, passengers start to come back in through the window and when I again say my commands, they tell me that a firefighter told them to go back in and come down through the slides. While frustrated that our procedures were being contradicted, I did not even attempt to argue because my concern was that we were definitely going to be going over the 90 seconds to get everyone safely evacuated and I just wanted get everyone safely out and off of the aircraft. I quickly relayed the information of the passengers coming back in through the wing as told by a firefighter to the A and Captain who were standing up in the front of the cabin and made sure to go back to the wing to watch and wait for every single passenger to come back in and ensure they were all off and safe before heading back up to the front of the cabin to exit, ensuring there was no one else in the cabin as I went. Once I get up to the front, the Captain proceeds to tell me to evacuate and I listen and jump onto the slide as trained without hesitation.

Once off, I look around for where the passengers are collecting and immediately go into my commands of GET AWAY FROM THE AIRCRAFT, STAY TOGETHER IN A GROUP, and NO SMOKING. I hear both the A and B doing the same thing. After we have pushed everyone out further from the aircraft, we go around and check on everyone, making sure that they are all okay and that no one is injured. After we confirm everyone is okay, we go to the pilots to stay together as a crew and allow the police and airport operations to step in and take control of the next steps. We did have people start showing up to check on us and the passengers, such as the HOU Chief Pilot of others. From there, we gave our information to HPD and were then taken to a conference room together as a crew to go over everything that had happened with management before being allowed to go home.

Thank you,

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