The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB DCA24LA210 · Final report

Boeing 767-316 ER accident near Milan, Indiana, June 17, 2024

On June 17, 2024 at about 4:57 am local time, a 1996 Boeing 767-316 ER, registered CFCJU, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Milan, Indiana. It was a flight of an unrecorded kind under foreign airline rules (Part 129). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

One or more latches were not fully re-engaged after a service check which resulted in the auxiliary power unit (APU) doors separating from the aircraft during climb out.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 17, 2024 · about 4:57 am local time
Place
Milan, Indiana · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Boeing 767-316 ER, built 1996 · all 767-316 ERs on the register
Registration
CFCJU · no longer on the register · serial 26327
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight of an unrecorded kind · foreign airline rules (Part 129)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

On June 17, 2024, Cargojet Airways flight 1926 experienced an in-flight separation of the auxiliary power unit (APU) doors while climbing through 13,000 feet near Milan, Indiana. The flight crew did an air turnback to Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG), Hebron, Kentucky, and landed without further incident. Post flight inspection of the airplane revealed that the APU access doors had separated from the airplane and substantially damaged the lower surface of the left and right elevators (see figure 1). The flight was operated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 129 as a non-scheduled international cargo flight from CVG to Vancouver International Airport (YVR), Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. Figure 1. View of the structural damage to the APU doors and elevators. (Source: Cargojet) The flight was operated by two flight crewmembers that consisted of a captain and a first officer (FO). According to the flight crewmembers, the pre-fight inspection, start-up, taxi, and takeoff were uneventful. There were no unusual noises, vibrations, or Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) messages observed during the takeoff. After takeoff, the flight was cleared to FL360 by air traffic control (ATC). While the aircraft was passing through 13,000 feet, the flight crew noted an audible “loud bang” followed by airframe vibrations and a FIRE/OVERHEAT SYS EICAS message. Additionally, the lower EICAS displayed an APU FIRE LOOP 1 and 2 status notification. The flight crewmembers requested and were instructed by ATC to level off at 17,000 feet and reduce their airspeed to 280 kts. Because the vibrations had stabilized in intensity, they requested a climb to FL240, and they informed dispatch of their situation through the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS). As the flight climbed through FL210, the intensity of the vibrations began to increase, so they levelled off at FL240 and requested to return to CVG. The autopilot remained engaged throughout the flight and the aircraft handled normally. The landing and subsequent taxi to parking was uneventful, with no abnormal noises or vibrations noted. During a postflight inspection of the airplane, the flight crewmembers observed that the APU access doors were missing and the lower surface of the left and right elevators were damaged. There are two (a left and a right) APU access doors that have four latch assemblies (see Figure 2). The right door contains the latch hooks, and the left door contains the U-bolt and engagement pins. Safety features include a trigger action actuator safety and an overcenter toggle action of the latch handle. The latches are designed so that failure of the spring will not cause the latch to open. The APU access door is opened by pushing the trigger in each latch handle, using moderate thumb pressure, to release the latch safety catch and allow the latch handle and hook to begin the movement required to unlatch the door. Figure 2. APU doors and latch. (Source: Boeing AMM 52-48-13. Copyright © Boeing. Reproduced with permission.) Departed sections of the left hand (LH) APU access door were located and recovered. However, the right hand (RH) APU access door, including all four latch hooks, were not recovered. The damaged sections of the LH and RH elevators were removed from the aircraft along with the remaining portions of the LH and RH APU access doors. The sections of the LH APU access door, a section of the RH APU door, an elevator control rod assembly, an APU door hold open strut, a horizontal stabilizer panel seal, a flexible drive shaft, the LH elevator assembly, and the RH elevator assembly were sent to the Boeing Equipment Quality Analysis (EQA) facility in Seattle, Washington for examination and analysis. According to Cargojet Airways, their review of the flight data recorder (FDR) data showed that the APU access doors likely began to separate at the onset of the APU fire loop fault indication about 04:56:38Z, at an indicated altitude of 12,011 feet MSL, and an indicated airspeed of about 315 kts. A review of the data also revealed no further anomalies that were related to the occurrence. Two sections (an aft section and a forward section) of the recovered LH APU door were visually examined at the Boeing EQA. The aft section measured approximately 21 inches along the latch edge and 27 inches along the torn forward edge (see figure 3). The U-bolt, part of the latching mechanism, was visually examined and was unremarkable and typical of an in-service aircraft. Figure 3. Left photo is of the recovered left hand door aft section and the right photo is a close up of the u-bolt. (Source: Boeing. Photo Copyright © Boeing. Reproduced with permission.) The forward door section measured approximately 38 inches along the forward edge, and 70 inches along the latch edge. The door was distorted and bent, and the skin was wrinkled in multiple areas (see figure 4). The skin was fractured and bent in the outboard direction at the second support rib from the forward edge of the door. Additionally, the skin was separated from the second support rib with portions of the rivet remaining in the second support rib. The three U-bolts on the forward access door section were visually examined with nothing remarkable. Figure 4. Recovered left hand door forward section. (Source: Boeing. Photo Copyright © Boeing. Reproduced with permission.) Cargojet Airways maintenance records showed that during the period of June 15 -17, 2024, the APU oil level was checked as part of a weekly and daily service check. This inspection required the opening and closing of the APU doors. The maintenance technician who conducted the pre-departure check for the accident flight stated that he visually observed the APU doors and that they appeared to be latched and secured. After the event, Cargojet Airways maintenance conducted a fleet campaign to inspect APU latch assemblies on seventeen (17) B757, three (3) B767-200 and twenty-one (21) B767-300’s. The results of the inspection showed that (3) 757 aircraft and (3) B767-300 aircraft needed adjustments to their latch assemblies to bring them within minimum and maximum closure force limits. For the latch assemblies needing adjustment, maintenance attempted, on the ground in a hangar environment, to simulate vibration and external forces to pull open the door.  They were unable to duplicate a failure and open the doors when an out of limit latch was correctly closed. Because the RH APU access door and latches were not recovered and examined, the exact reason why the APU doors opened in-flight cannot be determined. However, based on the examination of the LH access door, it is likely that one or more latches were not fully engaged and closed before departure.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Part(s) separation from AC during enroute (cruise) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 13,989 hours in all; 1,203 in this make and model; 89 in the last 90 days; 55 in the last 30 days; 9,313 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: April 23, 2024
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 2,200 hours in all; 633 in this make and model; 90 in the last 90 days; 34 in the last 30 days; 700 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: April 8, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 96,261.3 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, May 19, 2024
  • Maximum gross weight: 412,000 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Pratt And Whitney PW4060-3 (turbofan); 71,349 hours total
  • Engine 2: Pratt And Whitney PW4060-3 (turbofan); 64,588 hours total
  • Operator: Cargojet Airways Ltd.

The flight

  • Departed from: KCVG Cincinnati KY
  • Destination: CYVR Vancouver OF
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Wind: from 180° at 6 knots
  • Sky: scat at 25,000 ft
  • Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.30 inHg

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

3 documents, released by the NTSB on August 20, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.