Raytheon Corporate Jets Beechjet 400 incident near Jacksonville, Florida, November 28, 2005
On November 28, 2005 at about 6:40 pm local time, a Raytheon Corporate Jets Beechjet 400, registered N691TA, suffered minor damage in an incident near Jacksonville, Florida (Jacksonville Intl airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The dual-engine flameout due to high-altitude ice crystals that had accreted onto the JT15D-5 engines' compressor vanes and were ingested into the engine when the pilots retarded the power levers, resulting in compressor surges and rapid reduction in fuel flow due to temporary ice blockage of the combustion pressure return line, and additionally preventing an in-flight restart. Contributing to the cause of the dual-engine flameout was the lack of training on the hazards of high-altitude ice crystals to gas turbine engines and guidance to the pilots to activate the engine anti-ice system in conditions where high-altitude ice crystals may exist.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 28, 2005 · about 6:40 pm local time · cases in 2005
- Place
- Jacksonville, Florida · Jacksonville Intl · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Raytheon Corporate Jets Beechjet 400
- Registration
- N691TA · registry record · serial RK317
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The flight was level at Flight Level (FL) 400 for approximately 30 minutes. Air traffic control (ATC) cleared the flight to FL380, where it remained for about 15 minutes. Further clearance was issued for pilot's discretionary descent to FL330. The flight was operating in visual meteorological conditions in the vicinity of cumulonimbus buildups. Upon reducing power to initiate descent the crew heard a "popping" noise and both engines rolled back. The crew declared an emergency, elected to divert to Jacksonville Airport, and initiated emergency procedures. All attempts to restart the engines were unsuccessful, and the crew elected to save battery power for navigation and landing. The crew executed a successful emergency landing. After landing, the Captain attempted to restart the engine, and did observe some rotation, however stopped when the temperature did not rise. Post incident examination of the aircraft, and review of crew actions indicated that the cause of the dual-engine flameout was not due to fuel exhaustion or fuel starvation. There were no open maintenance items, and post-incident evaluation and flight test of the aircraft revealed no mechanical malfunctions. The chemical composition of the fuel was correct, anti-ice additive was present, although it was marginally below the recommended ratio, and no contamination or excess water content was found. There was no evidence of core lock, a phenomenon in which differential cooling of engine components following a rapid in-flight rollback causes a mechanical binding of the rotating components of the engine. In-flight testing of the right engine of the incident airplane was unable to cause a core lock condition. This flight and other BE-400A engine flameout events before and subsequent to this incident occurred in similar environmental conditions. Pilot reports and meteorological records indicated the flights were in or near instrument meteorological conditions with convective weather cells in the area and the pilots had just retarded the power levers to initiate a descent. Research revealed that convective storms can lift significant amounts of water into the upper atmosphere and that the blowoff from the tops of these storms can contain significant amounts of ice crystals. A post-incident study showed that the ice crystals could partially melt passing through the low-pressure compressor of the JT15D-5 engine due to the increase in temperature of the air being compressed. Further, the study determined that with the engine anti-ice turned off, that it was possible for the ice crystals to accrete on the leading edges of the front inner compressor stator leading edges. The study also determined that if a significant build up of ice had occurred, any change in the airflow angle of incidence that would occur as power was reduced would cause any ice that had accreted on the leading edges of the stators to break away and would result in the engine surging or possibly flaming out. The study also revealed that after the engine had flamed out, the radiant heat from the oil tank, which is in the core of the engine between the low and high pressure compressors, could cause the ice on the front inner compressor stators to melt and the water could run back and refreeze in the high pressure compressor impeller, acting like a wedge to prevent engine rotation and restart. Research, flight tests, and bench testing revealed that a temporary ice blockage in an orifice in the combustion chamber pressure signal line could cause a sudden drop in fuel flow, much more rapidly than normal, and reduce flow to a level that would not support combustion. The orifice was added to eliminate trapped water from the line, however this orifice was small enough to be thermally overwhelmed in the incident conditions. Pilot interviews revealed that pilots do not perceive high altitude ice crystals to be a threat to the airplane or the engines. The Beechjet's airplane flight manual (AFM), and flight crew training, did not address high altitude ice crystals prior to the dual-engine flameout events. Post-incident, Raytheon developed guidance for Beechjet 400A flight crews on high altitude ice crystals that was distributed to the 400A community via a safety communiqué. The NTSB recommended that the guidance provided in the Raytheon safety communiqué be incorporated into the Beechjet 400A AFM as well as the AFMs of other JT15D-powered airplanes (A-06-57 and 58). The NTSB also recommended that the FAA require the operation of the engine anti-ice system whenever flights are near convective weather (A-06-56). Crew actions after the flameout were appropriate to attempt to restart the engines, notify and coordinate with ATC for an emergency diversion, and make a forced landing. In fact, investigators found the crew's coordination and actions to be exemplary. Investigators also found ATC's assistance to the crew was also exemplary and contributed to the successful outcome of the flight.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 8,200 hours in all; 1,800 in this make and model; 150 in the last 90 days; 50 in the last 30 days; 7,800 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: September 1, 2005
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,100 hours in all; 20 in this make and model; 60 in the last 90 days; 20 in the last 30 days; 1,800 as pilot in command; 1,600 on instruments
- Last flight review: October 1, 2005
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,010.3 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, November 1, 2005; 31.4 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 16,300 lb
- Seats: 8
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney Canada JT-15D (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney Canada JT-15D (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Flight Options LLC
The flight
- Departed from: IND Indianapolis IN at 4:44 pm
- Destination: MKY Marco Island FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 5 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 2,500 ft; ovct at 2,500 ft
- Temperature: -71°F (-57°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
- Observation at 6:56 pm from KJAX
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N691TA on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
- Engine: Pratt & Whitney Canada JT-15D 450 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Engine: Pratt & Whitney Canada JT-15D 450 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Jacksonville International · nearest airport
- Indianapolis International · departed from
- Marco Island Executive · bound for
- Accidents and incidents in Florida 6,111 since 1982 · 984 in the last ten years
- Florida 21,709 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/DCA06IA007.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
