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Accidents · NTSB DCA01MA005 · Final report

Douglas DC-9 accident near Atlanta, Georgia, November 29, 2000

On November 29, 2000 at about 6:50 pm local time, a Douglas DC-9, registered N826AT, was substantially damaged in an accident near Atlanta, Georgia (The William B Hartsfield Atlan). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). 13 people had minor injuries; 84 others were unhurt.

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

the leakage of lavatory fluid from the airplane's forward lavatory onto electrical connectors, which caused shorting that led to a fire. Contributing to the accident were the inadequate servicing of the lavatory and the failure of maintenance to ensure reinstallation of the shield over the fuselage station 237 disconnect panel.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
November 29, 2000 · about 6:50 pm local time
Place
Atlanta, Georgia · The William B Hartsfield Atlan
Type
Accident
Injuries
13 people had minor injuries; 84 others were unhurt.
Weather
not recorded
Aircraft
Douglas DC-9 · all DC-9s on the register
Registration
N826AT · registry record · serial 47359
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Shortly after takeoff, the airplane experienced electrical problems, including numerous tripped circuit breakers. The flight crew requested a return to airport. During the landing rollout, the lead flight attendant and air traffic control personnel reported to the flight crew that smoke was coming from the left side of the airplane; subsequently, the flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation on one of the taxiways. Examination of the airplane revealed fire damage to the left, forward areas of the fuselage, cabin, and forward cargo compartment. The greatest amount of fire damage was found just aft of the electrical disconnect panel located at fuselage station 237. There was no evidence that the drip shield normally installed over the disconnect panel was present at the time of the accident. Bluish stains caused by lavatory rinse fluid were observed on surfaces near the disconnect panel on the accident airplane and in the same areas on another of AirTran's DC-9 airplanes. Examination of one of the connectors from the disconnect panel on the accident airplane revealed light-blue and turquoise-green deposits on its internal surfaces and evidence of shorting between the connector pins. It could not be determined when the drip shield over the disconnect panel was removed; however, this likely contributed to the lavatory fluid contamination of the connectors. Following the accident, AirTran revised its lavatory servicing procedures to emphasize the importance of completely draining the waste tank to avoid overflows. Boeing issued an alert service bulletin recommending that operators of DC-9 airplanes visually inspect the connectors at the FS 237 disconnect panel for evidence of lavatory rinse fluid contamination and that they install a drip shield over the disconnect panel. Boeing also issued a service letter to operators to stress the importance of properly sealing floor panels and adhering to lavatory servicing procedures specified in its DC-9 Maintenance Manual. The Safety Board is aware of two incidents involving the military equivalent of the DC-9 that involved circumstances similar to the accident involving N826AT. Drip shields were installed above the FS 237 disconnect panels on both airplanes.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 12,000 hours in all; 6,000 in this make and model
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land
  • Flight time: 3,100 hours in all; 0 in this make and model
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 78,255 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, November 29, 2000
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Pratt & Whitney JT8D (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Fire in flight and on the ground
  • Operator: Airtran Airways INC

The flight

  • Destination: Akron/Canton OH
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 26R
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 270° at 7 knots
  • Visibility: 4 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 2,700 ft
  • Temperature: 52°F (11°C), dew point 50°F (10°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.13 inHg
  • Observation at 8:53 pm from KATL

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew5
Passengers1379

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number DCA01MA005.