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Accidents · NTSB CEN22LA427 · Final report

Cessna A188A accident near Canby, Minnesota, September 12, 2022

On September 12, 2022, a 1970 Cessna A188A, registered N2122U, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near Canby, Minnesota (Myers Field Airport). It was an aerial application (crop spraying) flight under agricultural flying rules (Part 137). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control during the landing, which resulted in an overload failure of the tailwheel cross tube and subsequent impact with the runway.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
September 12, 2022
Place
Canby, Minnesota · Myers Field Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna A188A, built 1970 · all A188As on the register
Registration
N2122U · registry record · serial 18800672
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Aerial application (crop spraying) flight · agricultural flying rules (Part 137)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot stated that the tailwheel spring cross tube broke when the tailwheel landing gear touched down. After landing, the airplane made an immediate turn and spun around. The left main landing gear collapsed, and the left wing struck the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wing. Postaccident examination of the tailwheel spring cross tube revealed that the outside diameter of the tube was about 0.002 inch smaller than the specified nominal outside diameter of 0.875 inch, and the wall thickness was 0.0009 inch thinner than the specified nominal wall thickness of 0.049 inch for the original tube design. Examination of the tube showed signatures consistent with overstress deformation. The part dimensions indicated the part could have been from original manufacture and likely had not been replaced since at least 1985, when the drawing for replacement parts was changed to have a thicker wall, 0.120 inch. An uncoated steel part of that age used in an airplane used in aerial application service would be expected to have a more corroded surface than what was observed on the accident part. The surface condition suggests it may have been recently sanded, possibly removing about 0.001 inch of material around the outside diameter. The recent change in outside diameter likely did not significantly affect the strength of the tube. The bending strength of the tube was reduced by about 2 percent relative to the nominal tube based on a comparison of the bending moments required to reach given stress at the exterior surface. Similarly, the cross-sectional area was also reduced by just 2 percent. While some increase in impact loading on the tube could be expected due to the additional clearance between the tube and the fitting, the failure is more likely attributed to loads that exceeded the maximum design load for the tailwheel. An additional margin of safety could have been achieved if the tube had been replaced with the thicker-walled replacement part rather than apparently having been cleaned up and reused. The metallurgical examination of the tailwheel spring cross tube revealed that it failed in overload, which indicates that it was not the initiating event for the loss of control. It is likely that the pilot failed to maintain airplane control during the landing sequence, which resulted in a ground loop and the substantial damage to the left wing and the fractured tailwheel spring cross tube.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during landing (landing roll) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Nose/tail landing gear › Capability exceeded

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot, flight engineer
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 14,299 hours in all; 5,266 in this make and model; 60 in the last 90 days; 20 in the last 30 days; 13,700 as pilot in command; 500 on instruments
  • Last flight review: July 2, 2022
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: sngl
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,548 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, July 1, 2022
  • Maximum gross weight: 4,000 lb
  • Seats: 1
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental IO-520-D (piston); 2,707 hours total

The flight

  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 12, 4,648 ft by 75 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 68°F (20°C), dew point 43°F (6°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.12 inHg
  • Observation at 7:15 pm from CNB

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

3 documents, released by the NTSB on December 20, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.