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Accidents · NTSB CEN21LA346 · Final report

Hph, Spol. S.R.O. Glasflügel 304S accident near Briggs, Texas, July 30, 2021

On July 30, 2021 at about 7:40 pm local time, a 2008 Hph, Spol. S.R.O. Glasflügel 304S (glider), registered N304AB, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near Briggs, Texas (Flf Gliderport airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The overstress fracture of the elevator control tube due to reduced wall thickness from water intrusion and subsequent corrosion. Contributing to the accident was the lack of a drain hole at the bottom of the elevator control tube, which allowed the tube to collect water, and the mechanic’s inadequate inspection of the elevator control system during the recent condition inspection.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 30, 2021 · about 7:40 pm local time
Place
Briggs, Texas · Flf Gliderport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Hph, Spol. S.R.O. Glasflügel 304S, built 2008
Registration
N304AB · registry record · serial 004-S
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot was departing on a local flight in the experimental glider when the glider unexpectedly separated from the towline shortly after liftoff. The glider then entered a left turn and landed in a wings-level attitude. The tailboom was substantially damaged during landing. The tow airplane and the towline were not damaged during the event. Postaccident examination determined that the elevator control tube installed in the vertical stabilizer was corroded along the entire length of its inner surface, reducing its wall thickness. Water likely entered the control rod, either through a witness hole near the upper end of the control tube or as moisture carried in by humid air. There was no drain hole at the bottom end of the control tube and, as a result, there was no way for liquid water to drain out of the control tube. The wall thickness eventually thinned sufficiently to cause the tube to burst in the longitudinal direction near its upper end. After the control tube burst, the resulting hole on the side of the tube allowed for the easy ingress of water that made its way past the boot seal. The corrosion product and standing water at the base of the tube eventually reduced the tube wall thickness to a point where it could no longer withstand the typical operational loads and subsequently fractured in overstress near the clevis fitting during the accident flight. The overstress failure of the control tube prevented the pilot’s control of the elevator during the accident flight. The last condition inspection of the glider was completed 24 days before the accident. The corresponding logbook entry noted that the flight controls were inspected, and that the glider was in an airworthy condition. The longitudinal fracture near the upper end of the elevator control tube would have been readily visible with the rubber boot removed and, as such, it is likely the mechanic did not remove the rubber boot to adequately inspect the elevator control tube during the last condition inspection.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Hard landing during landing
  2. Flight control sys malf/fail during takeoff defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Elevator control system › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Elevator control system › Design
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Elevator control system › Inadequate inspection
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; rotorcraft: glider
  • Flight time: 2,878 hours in all; 1,603 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: April 11, 2021
  • Medical certificate: None
  • Seat: sngl
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,062 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, July 6, 2021
  • Seats: 1
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Hph, Spol. S.R.O. Jet Propulsio (turbojet); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 16, 4,500 ft by 300 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: scat at 6,000 ft
  • Temperature: 91°F (33°C), dew point 68°F (20°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.06 inHg
  • Observation at 2:56 pm from KGRK, 14 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KGRK 301956Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM SCT060 33/20 A3006 RMK AO2 SLP167 T03330204=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

8 documents, released by the NTSB on September 14, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.