Piper PA32RT accident near Pflugerville, Texas, January 27, 2019
On January 27, 2019 at about 9:14 pm local time, a 1978 Piper PA32RT, registered N39650, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Pflugerville, Texas (Austin Executive airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's fuel mismanagement and his improper use and placement of the fuel selector, contrary to operating procedures, which resulted in a partial loss of engine power due to fuel starvation.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- January 27, 2019 · about 9:14 pm local time
- Place
- Pflugerville, Texas · Austin Executive · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person had minor injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA32RT 300T, built 1978 · all PA32RTs on the register
- Registration
- N39650 · registry record · serial 32R-7887132
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot departed with about 40 gallons of fuel on board and completed several flights to local area airports. After about 90 minutes of total flight time, the pilot departed the last airport and had flown a few miles when the engine began running roughly. He stated he switched the fuel selector back and forth between both fuel tank positions, turned the fuel pump on, and advanced the mixture to full rich, but the engine roughness continued. He performed an emergency landing to a road, during which the airplane hit a parked car. The right wing separated from the fuselage, and the airplane flipped upside down. Nine gallons of fuel were recovered from the left wing tanks, and the inboard right wing tank was found empty, with the right fuel cap secure on the wing. The outboard right wing tank was ruptured and the right wing fuel lines were compromised during impact, but no evidence of fuel from the right wing tanks was found at the scene. The on-scene examination noted that the fuel selector lever was found in an intermediate position between the left and right tank detents, about 1 to 2 inches past center, more toward the right tank position. Recovered engine data monitor (EDM) data associated with the accident flight showed a consistent decrease in cylinder head temperatures (CHTs) during the final 3 minutes of the recording, and exhaust gas temperature (EGT) data showed a series of temperature fluctuations during the same time period. The decreasing CHTs and varying EGTs were consistent with a rough-running engine with fluctuating engine speeds. Postaccident functional engine test runs were performed, and no anomalies were noted with the engine or fuel system. When the fuel system was configured to mimic fuel available in the left tank and no fuel in the right tank, engine roughness and a partial loss of engine power was duplicated through placement of the fuel selector lever to the approximate position as found at the accident scene. The engine roughness can likely be attributed to a mixture of fuel and air in the fuel system. It was not possible to compute exact fuel usage associated with all the engine operations on the day of the accident due to a lack of information regarding power settings and altitudes flown. However, computations using best economy and best power fuel flow rates for the 94 minutes recorded by the EDM resulted in fuel used of 21.62 gallons for best economy and 37.6 gallons for best power. Although the EDM did not record fuel usage, it is likely the airplane consumed sufficient fuel to empty the right tanks during operations on the day of the accident. The pilot's operating handbook states the electric fuel pump should be turned on before switching tanks, and, to provide continuity of fuel flow, the selector should be changed to another tank before fuel is exhausted from the tank in use. If signs of fuel starvation occur at any time during flight, fuel exhaustion should be suspected, and the fuel selector should be immediately positioned to a full tank and the electric fuel pump switched to the on position. It is likely that the pilot exhausted the fuel in the right tanks before switching tanks, contrary to the recommended operating procedures, which introduced air into the fuel system and resulted in a partial loss of engine power due to fuel starvation. Additionally, the pilot likely continued to switch between the left and right tanks, and ultimately placed the fuel selector handle between the left and right tank positions, instead of selecting and leaving the fuel selector on the left tank with available fuel. This allowed more air into the system and further reduced the fuel available to the engine.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Fuel related during enroute
- Fuel starvation during enroute defining event
- Loss of engine power (partial) during enroute
- Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing
- Nose over/nose down during landing
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Incorrect use/operation
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management
- Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Ground vehicle › Contributed to outcome
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 1,741 hours in all; 120 in this make and model; 70 in the last 90 days; 35 in the last 30 days
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 6,000 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, December 20, 2018
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming TIO-540 (piston); 350 hours total
- Operator: Stew Industries LLC
The flight
- Departed from: EDC Austin TX
- Destination: T74 Taylor TX
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: not recorded; not recorded
- Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 30°F (-1°C)
- Altimeter: 29.94 inHg
- Observation at 9:15 pm from edc
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
12 documents, released by the NTSB on October 9, 2019. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Jpi EDM Factual | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Attach 1 - Jpi Engine Data | data file | Download |
| 4 | Attach 2 - Jpi Engine Graphs | PDF, 7 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Record of Communications - Pilot | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 6 | Record of Conversation - Recovery Company | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 7 | Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 8 | Photos | PDF, 7 pages | View Download |
| 9 | Flight Aware Data | data file | Download |
| 10 | Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 11 | POH and Service Manual Excerpts | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 12 | Revised Factual | PDF, 6 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
