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Accidents · NTSB CEN19FA170 · Final report

Piper PA28 accident near Huntsville, Texas, June 14, 2019

On June 14, 2019 at about 11:28 pm local time, a 1967 Piper PA28, registered N9754J, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Huntsville, Texas (Huntsville Muni airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A total loss of engine power as a result of the pilot's inadvertent placement of the fuel selector to the "off" position.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 14, 2019 · about 11:28 pm local time
Place
Huntsville, Texas · Huntsville Muni · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA28 180, built 1967 · all PA28s on the register
Registration
N9754J · no longer on the register · serial 28-3854
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot was in cruise flight nearing the destination airport when the engine lost total power. The pilot reported that his low altitude precluded him from completing emergency procedures for a loss of engine power and he attempted to glide the airplane to an open field, but impacted trees short of the field. The fuel selector was found in the "off" position at the accident site. Examination of the airplane and a subsequent engine run did not reveal any anomalies with the airplane, engine, or systems. The fuel selector installed on the accident airplane was located on the airplane's sidewall by the pilot's knee and allowed the pilot to freely rotate the selector handle through its four available positions; right tank, left tank, and two "off" positions. Two upgraded designs were subsequently provided by the manufacturer; the most recent design required the pilot to depress a spring-loaded stop while positioning the fuel selector to "off" in order to prevent the inadvertent selection of that position. Most of the pilot's experience was in airplanes equipped with the most recent fuel selector design. The manufacturer issued a mandatory service bulletin to upgrade to the most recent design, but the Federal Aviation Administration did not issue an airworthiness directive, which would have required operators to comply with that service bulletin. It is likely that the pilot inadvertently selected the off position of the fuel selector due to his unfamiliarity with the design/operation of the installed selector, which resulted in fuel starvation and a total loss of engine power. Although the pilot was familiar with the accident airplane/make model, he had very limited experience in airplanes equipped with a fuel selector of the design on the accident airplane. Further, the loss of engine power may have been prevented if the accident airplane had been required to be equipped with the most recent fuel selector design.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Fuel starvation during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management
  • cause Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of equipment › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Incorrect use/operation
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 89.3 hours in all; 76.5 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: May 27, 2019
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 4,405 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, June 13, 2019; 4 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,400 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-360-A4A (piston); 4,405 hours total
  • Operator: Awmr Llc

The flight

  • Departed from: CXO Conroe TX at 10:54 pm
  • Destination: CXO Conroe TX
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 160° at 7 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 90°F (32°C), dew point 66°F (19°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.93 inHg
  • Observation at 11:53 pm from KUTS, 6 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

11 documents, released by the NTSB on October 16, 2020. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.