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Accidents · NTSB CEN10TA355 · Final report

Lockheed P2V-5 accident near Broomfield, Colorado, June 26, 2010

On June 26, 2010 at about 7:00 pm local time, a Lockheed P2V-5, registered N1386C, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Broomfield, Colorado (Rocky Mountain Metropolitan airport). It was an aerial application (crop spraying) flight under public-use (government) rules. No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s failure to follow published emergency procedures by taxiing to the parking ramp with a known hydraulic system failure. Contributing to the accident was the co-pilot’s improper selection of the bypass position on the emergency nose gear extension system, which shut off emergency hydraulic system pressure to the brakes, and a ruptured hydraulic line, which resulted in a total loss of the main hydraulic system pressure.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 26, 2010 · about 7:00 pm local time · cases in 2010
Place
Broomfield, Colorado · Rocky Mountain Metropolitan · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Lockheed P2V-5 · all P2V-5s on the register
Registration
N1386C · registry record · serial 128422
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Aerial application (crop spraying) flight · public-use (government) rules

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The airplane was returning from a retardant drop on a forest fire when the crew noted that the airplane’s main hydraulic system had failed. They configured the airplane using the emergency systems and declared an emergency. After landing on the runway, the pilot elected to exit the runway using the high-speed taxiway that went to the tanker base ramp. When he tried to stop the airplane using the emergency system brakes, there was no braking response. The airplane crossed the tanker ramp, exited the prepared surface, and went through the airport perimeter fence, down an embankment, and onto a road. According to the airplane flight manual, the procedure for a hydraulic system failure is to land and stop on the runway using the emergency brake and accumulator pressure. A postaccident examination of the airplane’s hydraulic system showed a rupture in the line that interconnects the main hydraulic system and retardant tank system. No other systems anomalies were found. The crew later reported that when the co-pilot lowered the nose gear using the emergency gear extension system, she did not return the emergency nose gear extension system selector to the “neutral” position, and it remained in the “bypass” position. This shut off the emergency system hydraulic system pressure to the elevator flight control and emergency brakes.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during enroute defining event

The NTSB's findings

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: glider; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 14,500 hours in all; 3,000 in this make and model; 80 in the last 90 days; 40 in the last 30 days; 1,400 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: March 10, 2010
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 5,950 hours in all; 127 in this make and model; 5,800 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: April 1, 2009
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 6,610 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, March 15, 2010
  • Maximum gross weight: 80,000 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Wright R3350 SERIES (piston); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Wright R3350 SERIES (piston); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: BJC Broomfield CO at 5:50 pm
  • Destination: BJC Broomfield CO
  • Runway 29R, 9,000 ft by 100 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

6 documents, released by the NTSB on May 15, 2012. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/CEN10TA355.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.