Lockheed P2V-5 accident near Broomfield, Colorado, June 26, 2010
On June 26, 2010 at about 7:00 pm local time, a Lockheed P2V-5, registered N1386C, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Broomfield, Colorado (Rocky Mountain Metropolitan airport). It was an aerial application (crop spraying) flight under public-use (government) rules. No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s failure to follow published emergency procedures by taxiing to the parking ramp with a known hydraulic system failure. Contributing to the accident was the co-pilot’s improper selection of the bypass position on the emergency nose gear extension system, which shut off emergency hydraulic system pressure to the brakes, and a ruptured hydraulic line, which resulted in a total loss of the main hydraulic system pressure.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 26, 2010 · about 7:00 pm local time
- Place
- Broomfield, Colorado · Rocky Mountain Metropolitan · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Lockheed P2V-5 · all P2V-5s on the register
- Registration
- N1386C · registry record · serial 128422
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Aerial application (crop spraying) flight · public-use (government) rules
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airplane was returning from a retardant drop on a forest fire when the crew noted that the airplane’s main hydraulic system had failed. They configured the airplane using the emergency systems and declared an emergency. After landing on the runway, the pilot elected to exit the runway using the high-speed taxiway that went to the tanker base ramp. When he tried to stop the airplane using the emergency system brakes, there was no braking response. The airplane crossed the tanker ramp, exited the prepared surface, and went through the airport perimeter fence, down an embankment, and onto a road. According to the airplane flight manual, the procedure for a hydraulic system failure is to land and stop on the runway using the emergency brake and accumulator pressure. A postaccident examination of the airplane’s hydraulic system showed a rupture in the line that interconnects the main hydraulic system and retardant tank system. No other systems anomalies were found. The crew later reported that when the co-pilot lowered the nose gear using the emergency gear extension system, she did not return the emergency nose gear extension system selector to the “neutral” position, and it remained in the “bypass” position. This shut off the emergency system hydraulic system pressure to the elevator flight control and emergency brakes.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during enroute defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system › Hydraulic, main system › Failure
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Copilot
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system › Hydraulic, main system › Not specified
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Nose/tail landing gear › Incorrect use/operation
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Brake › Not specified
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: glider; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 14,500 hours in all; 3,000 in this make and model; 80 in the last 90 days; 40 in the last 30 days; 1,400 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: March 10, 2010
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 5,950 hours in all; 127 in this make and model; 5,800 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: April 1, 2009
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 6,610 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, March 15, 2010
- Maximum gross weight: 80,000 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Wright R3350 SERIES (piston); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Wright R3350 SERIES (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: BJC Broomfield CO at 5:50 pm
- Destination: BJC Broomfield CO
- Runway 29R, 9,000 ft by 100 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flig | 2 |
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number CEN10TA355.