Airbus AS350 accident near Juneau, Alaska, May 23, 2017
On May 23, 2017 at about 2:05 am local time, a 1987 Airbus AS350 (helicopter), registered N207CH, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Juneau, Alaska. It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 4 people had minor injuries; 3 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's decision to depart into an area of degraded visual meteorological and flat light conditions, which resulted in a loss of visual references and subsequent controlled flight into terrain.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 23, 2017 · about 2:05 am local time
- Place
- Juneau, Alaska · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 4 people had minor injuries; 3 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Airbus AS350 B2, built 1987
- Registration
- N207CH · registry record · serial 2027
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
After another company pilot returned to base due to deteriorating weather conditions en route, the instrument-rated commercial helicopter pilot flew to a remote glacier to pick up passengers. Upon departing from the glacier, the pilot encountered deteriorating visibility and flat light conditions. She decided to turn back to the departure point and land to wait for conditions to improve; however, during the turn, the helicopter impacted the featureless, snow-covered terrain and came to rest inverted. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation with the helicopter, and the accident is consistent with the pilot's failure to maintain clearance from terrain while operating in poor visibility and flat light conditions, which obscured features of the terrain and resulted in a loss of visual clues regarding the helicopter's distance from the ground. The operator assigned different weather minimums to each of its pilots depending on their experience level. The accident pilot was classified at the highest experience level and was permitted to fly in conditions as low as 1/2 mile visibility, cloud ceilings 300 ft above ground level (agl), and from remote sites with the potential for white out conditions. The estimated conditions reported from the landing site shortly before the accident included 1 1/2 miles visibility with fog and ceilings about 1,500 ft agl, though previous observations indicated that fog had begun developing about an hour before the accident occurred and that conditions had continued to deteriorate since that time. Though the reported weather conditions were above the minimums specified by the company's operations manual, it is possible that the pilot felt pressure to complete the flight given that she was classified as more experienced; it is also possible that the pilot and/or operator felt pressure to conduct the flight because there were no formal procedures in place in the event that passengers were required to remain on the glacier for an extended time due to a contingency such as weather conditions that prohibited flight.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- VFR encounter with IMC during enroute defining event
- Loss of visual reference during enroute
- Controlled flight into terrain or object (CFIT) during enroute
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Situational awareness › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring environment › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Altitude › Not attained/maintained
- cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Below VFR minima › Decision related to condition
- factor Personnel issues › Psychological › Personality/attitude › Motivation/respond to pressure › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 3,930 hours in all; 1,772 in this make and model; 128 in the last 90 days; 50 in the last 30 days; 3,870 as pilot in command; 1,452 on instruments
- Last flight review: November 3, 2016
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 13,838 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, December 8, 2016
- Maximum gross weight: 4,961 lb
- Seats: 7
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Turbomeca Arriel 1D1 (turboshaft); 2,170 hours total
- Operator: Coastal Helicopters, Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: JNU Juneau AK
- Destination: JNU Juneau AK
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 060° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 6,500 ft; a few clouds at 1,300 ft
- Temperature: 54°F (12°C), dew point 52°F (11°C)
- Altimeter: 29.95 inHg
- Observation at 2:53 am from PAJN, 14 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 3 | 3 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
16 documents, released by the NTSB on December 3, 2020. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.