MD Helicopters LLC 369FF accident near Superior, Arizona, January 2, 2026
On January 2, 2026 at about 6:00 pm local time, a 2023 MD Helicopters LLC 369FF, registered N3502P, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering (low-alt flying) near Superior, Arizona (Superior Municipal Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 4 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The NTSB has not yet published a probable cause for this accident. Investigations usually take one to two years; this page updates when the final report is released.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 12, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- January 2, 2026 · about 6:00 pm local time · cases in 2026
- Place
- Superior, Arizona · Superior Municipal Airport · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 4 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- MD Helicopters LLC 369FF, built 2023 · all 369FFs on the register
- Registration
- N3502P · registry record · serial 0346FF
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record
On January 2, 2026, at about 1100 mountain standard time, an MD Helicopters MD369FF helicopter, N3502P, was substantially damaged when it impacted a highline/slackline near Superior, Arizona. The pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Slacklining is a sport where a participant balances on a 1 to 3 inch wide piece of webbing made from synthetic fiber that is suspended between two fixed points. A subset of the sport, called highlining, entails rigging the slackline at higher altitudes above terrain, and often involves longer slacklines. Typically, a highline/slackline consists of a mainline that the participant balances on, and a backup line that the participant connects their safety harness to. The mainline is tensioned between two anchors, and the backup line is loosely attached to the mainline with intermittent connectors. According to a witness, on or around December 26, 2025, he and a group of friends traveled to the area near the accident site, which consisted of a valley with terrain elevations that ranged between 2,600-3,500 ft mean sea level (msl). Using two anchors spaced on bluffs about 0.74 mile apart, they raised a signalization line that carried five windsocks and about ten LED lights. After the signalization line was raised, they used additional nylon lines to draw the mainline and backup lines between the anchors. (See Figure 1.) The lines were oriented in a generally north/south direction and were estimated to be about 600 ft above the ground at their highest point. Figure 1: The series of lines between the anchors, as viewed from the northern bluff (photo courtesy of witnesses). On or about December 30, 2025, high winds and rain were predicted near the accident site, and the slackliners chose to lower the mainline and backup line. On the morning of the accident, the weather had improved, and the slackliners began to draw the mainline and backup line from the northern anchor toward the southern anchor. According to one of the slackliners, who was standing near the southern anchor point, the mainline and backup line had been drawn partway between the anchors when he heard the helicopter approach. The witness turned to the south and saw the helicopter flying at about eye level in an easterly direction. The helicopter briefly disappeared behind nearby terrain, and when it reappeared in the witness’s line of sight, it was flying toward the set of lines suspended between the anchors. The witness reported that the helicopter impacted the lines and appeared to slow or even reverse direction. The helicopter pitched nose up and yawed to the right, after which its tailboom separated. The fuselage became inverted, and the tailboom and fuselage subsequently impacted terrain about 150 and 350 ft from the lines. (See Figure 2.) Figure 2: The helicopter fuselage. The northern bluff, signalization line, and sections of the highline/slackline are visible in the background. According to first responders, about an hour after the accident, a second helicopter flying a similar flight path flew about 10 ft under the signalization line, which had remained suspended after the accident along with portions of the highline/slackline webbing. Examination of the helicopter revealed material consistent in appearance to highline/slackline webbing imbedded in the upper part of the vertical stabilizer. (See Figure 3.) The lower ends of the horizontal stabilizer end caps were sheared off, and striations similar to the webbing weave pattern were visible on the paint on the vertical and horizontal stabilizers. Additional striations were found on two of the main rotor blades. The helicopter was equipped with a wire strike protection system that consisted of cutters on the top and bottom of the forward fuselage. The cutting surfaces did not show any striations or disturbed paint. Figure 3: Highline/slackline webbing imbedded in the vertical stabilizer. On December 21, 2025, a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) was filed by a friend of the slackliners that showed the presence of a “tight rope” about 3 nautical miles south of Superior Municipal Airport (E81), Superior, Arizona. The NOTAM was active between December 26, 2025, and January 6, 2026. The wreckage and sections of the highline/slackline were retained for further examination.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during maneuvering (low-alt flying) defining event
The aircraft
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Operator: Fb Helicopter LLC
The flight
- Departed from: 5AZ3 Queen Creek AZ at 5:30 pm
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 160° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 4,500 ft
- Temperature: 63°F (17°C), dew point 57°F (14°C)
- Altimeter: 30.16 inHg
- Observation at 11:00 am from KIWA, 28 miles away
Weather report (METAR): METAR KIWA 021755Z 16003KT 10SM BKN045 17/14 A3016
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 3 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N3502P on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
- Md Helicopters Llc 369 34 registered today · the model family and its accident history
- Superior Municipal · nearest airport
- Pegasus Airpark · departed from
- Accidents and incidents in Arizona 2,983 since 1982 · 466 in the last ten years
- Arizona 8,422 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/WPR26FA074.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
