Amateur-built 4P accident near Lake Havasu City, Arizona, May 9, 2024
On May 9, 2024 at about 5:52 pm local time, a 1997 amateur-built 4P, registered N78GP, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Lake Havasu City, Arizona (Lake Havasu City airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A loss of engine power during initial climb due to fuel vapor lock. Contributing to the accident was the incorrect installation of the ancillary fuel supply system components.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 9, 2024 · about 5:52 pm local time
- Place
- Lake Havasu City, Arizona · Lake Havasu City · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person had minor injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Amateur-built 4P, built 1997
- Registration
- N78GP · registry record · serial 001
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The float-equipped, experimental amateur-built airplane had just come out of its condition inspection and the accident flight was the first time it had flown in about 6 years. The pilot stated that the engine performed normally during multiple post maintenance run-ups, and with no anomalies observed he departed with the intention of remaining within the traffic pattern. However, shortly after takeoff the engine lost power and the pilot performed a forced landing into a flat open area, where the airplane landed hard on its floats and tumbled over. The airplane was originally an FAA type-certificated Piper PA-22 Tri-Pacer but had been reclassified to the experimental amateur-built category after undergoing extensive modifications, including a larger fuel-injected engine and an extension of the fuselage and wings. Postaccident examination did not reveal any failures in the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation, and fuel was present in the fuel tanks and lines leading into the fuel injection system. Review of data recorded by the airplane’s engine monitor revealed that shortly after takeoff, a reduction in fuel flow was followed immediately by an increase in engine exhaust gas temperatures. Such an increase is consistent with a lean fuel-to-air mixture, often experienced during the initial phases of a fuel exhaustion event. The manifold pressure remained unchanged, indicating the pilot kept the throttle fully open. A short time later, with no change in manifold pressure, the engine began to lose power. The loss of power was partially interrupted as fuel flow resumed, but then all power was again lost as fuel flow dropped. The manufacturer of the engine’s fuel injection servo gave specific instructions for the design of fuel supply system that were intended to prevent vapor lock. The instructions recommended that if a fuel strainer must be used, it should not be installed on the engine side of the firewall, and if it must be installed there, it should be configured to receive blast air. Additionally, a purge valve should be installed as close to the fuel flow divider as possible, preferably directly next to it. However, the examination of the airframe revealed that the fuel strainer was mounted on the firewall right next to a hot exhaust pipe, and although a purge valve was installed, it was installed within the cabin, where its lines were routed through the engine compartment. Due to the multiple engine starts performed before takeoff, the engine would have been hot and retaining residual heat, and as such the fuel system likely exhibited vapor lock. The installation of a purge valve indicated the airplane likely had a history of vapor lock. Such a vapor lock would have presented itself as a fuel starvation event as observed in the engine monitor data.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Hard landing during landing (flare/touchdown)
- Dragged wing/rotor/float/other during landing (landing roll)
- Collision during takeoff/land during landing (landing roll)
- Fuel starvation during initial climb defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control › Fuel distribution › Design
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel temperature › Capability exceeded
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Owner/builder
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea
- Flight time: 1,051 hours in all; 0 in this make and model; 12 in the last 90 days; 2 in the last 30 days; 985 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: March 17, 2024
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 568.4 hours
- Last inspection: condition inspection, May 9, 2024; 0.5 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,000 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Lycoming O-540 B2B5 (piston); 568 hours total
The flight
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 14/3, 8,000 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 320° at 20 knots, gusting 24
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 75°F (24°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
- Altimeter: 29.87 inHg
- Observation at 9:55 am from KHII
Weather report (METAR): METAR KHII 091655Z AUTO 32020G24KT 10SM 24/M03 A2987 RMK AO1=
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
8 documents, released by the NTSB on July 16, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 9 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Factual Examination Report | PDF, 6 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Appendix 1 - Accident Flight Engine Monitor Data | data file | Download |
| 4 | Factual Fuel Injection System Examination Report | PDF, 6 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Maintenance Logbook Excerpts | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 6 | Engine Monitor Data from Last Flight | data file | Download |
| 7 | Airflow Maintenace and Installation Manual | PDF, 188 pages | View Download |
| 8 | Evidence Control Form | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
