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Accidents · NTSB WPR24LA071 · Final report

Learjet INC 55 accident near Livingston, Montana, January 11, 2024

On January 11, 2024 at about 3:37 pm local time, a 1983 Learjet INC 55, registered N558RA, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near Livingston, Montana (Mission Fld airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The flight crew’s decision to land on a snow-covered runway with a tailwind, resulting in a runway excursion and subsequent impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident, was the failure of the airport authority to plow the runway.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
January 11, 2024 · about 3:37 pm local time
Place
Livingston, Montana · Mission Fld · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people had minor injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Learjet INC 55, built 1983
Registration
N558RA · registry record · serial 086
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot in command of the airplane reported that, while on an instrument GPS approach, they listened to the automated surface observing system several times and determined that they would be landing with a “light quartering tailwind” on an upsloping runway. Once clear of clouds and with the runway in sight, the pilot canceled the instrument flight rules clearance, announced their position over the airport’s common traffic advisory frequency and received a reply with a report of 1/4 inch of dry snow covering the runway, unplowed. During the landing roll, they applied brakes, extended spoilers, and thrust reversers. Initially the airplane slowed; however, about halfway down the runway, the airplane’s antiskid system was functioning continuously, and the airplane’s rate of deceleration decreased. The pilot was unsure if the thrust reversers deployed, and he cycled the thrust reversers and did not feel any effects. The pilot stated that, in his experience, the airplane’s thrust reversers do not feel very effective. The pilot considered aborting the landing, started to clean up the airplane but thought it was too late. The airplane overran the departure end of the runway, onto a grass covered area and into a deep ravine, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The automated weather observation station located on the airport reported that, about 44 minutes before the accident, the wind was from 090° at 12 knots. The same automated station reported that, about 16 minutes after the accident, the wind was from 090° at 12 knots. The airplane landed on runway 22. The fixed based operator owner reported that, on the day of the accident, his review of the runway conditions at the airport appeared to be around an inch of snow on the runway surface. Additionally, plowing at the airport so far this year had been “abysmal.” Big windrows and ice chunks have been left; taxiway corners had been built up to the point there could be an occurrence should an airplane be taxiing by. Earlier this year, several departures were delayed due to the runway not being plowed. According to the chairman of the airport board, there is no formal process to conduct runway assessments. However, an airport board member lives in the area and routinely visits the airport to conduct runway assessments. The runway assessments and frequency of the observations are not documented but are conveyed verbally to the airport board via cell phone. To the best of his knowledge, there is no formal snow or ice removal plan. When the runway is required to be cleared, a board member will use county provided equipment to clear the runway. The frequency of the snow removal is not documented. The airport snow removal equipment is limited to clear substance to ½ inch of the runway surface. On the day of the accident, he was not aware of a Notice to Air Misson (NOTAM) issued for the conditions of the runway environment. According to the airplane manufacturer, the estimated landing distance on a dry runway was about 3,350 ft, with loose snow and no tailwind the estimated landing distance was about 6,700 ft, and on loose snow with tailwind, the estimated landing distance was 7,531 ft. According to the Federal Aviation Administration, the airport is not required to have a snow and ice control plan. However, the airport was provided federal funds (grant) to purchase/acquire a snowplow to maintain the airport surfaces during inclement weather conditions. There may be times where issues arise, and action is delayed. In that case it is expected that a NOTAM be issued as outlined in the grant agreement.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Runway excursion during landing (landing roll) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Copilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Surface speed/braking › Attain/maintain not possible
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment › Runway/land/takeoff/taxi surface › Snow/slush/ice covered surface › Effect on equipment
  • Environmental issues › Operating environment › Airport facilities/design › Snow removal service/equipment › Response/compensation

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 31,800 hours in all; 800 in this make and model; 150 in the last 90 days; 6 in the last 30 days; 29,800 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: August 30, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: minor injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,726 hours in all; 9 in this make and model; 53 in the last 90 days; 17 in the last 30 days; 1,432 as pilot in command; 900 on instruments
  • Last flight review: December 12, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 14,135 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, May 25, 2023
  • Maximum gross weight: 21,500 lb
  • Seats: 9
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Honeywell TFE731-3AR-2B (turbofan); 8,148 hours total
  • Engine 2: Honeywell TFE731-3AR-2B (turbofan); 9,330 hours total
  • Operator: Royal Air Freight INC

The flight

  • Departed from: PTK Waterford MI at 12:26 pm
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 22, 5,701 ft by 75 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 090° at 12 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 1,900 ft
  • Temperature: 1°F (-17°C), dew point -2°F (-19°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.68 inHg
  • Observation at 8:53 am from KLVM

Weather report (METAR): KLVM 111553Z AUTO 09012KT 10SM OVC019 M17/M19 A2968 RMK AO2 SLP131 T11671194

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Photographs from the investigation 3 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

9 documents, released by the NTSB on August 1, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.