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Accidents · NTSB WPR22LA344 · Final report

Gates Lear Jet CORP. 36 accident near San Diego, California, September 9, 2022

On September 9, 2022 at about 8:14 pm local time, a 1975 Gates Lear Jet CORP. 36, registered N26FN, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near San Diego, California (North Island Nas /Halsey Fld/ airport). It was an other work-use flight under public-use (government) rules. 2 people had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The flight crew’s fast landing on a wet runway, which resulted in the airplane hydroplaning during the landing roll and subsequently overrunning the runway.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
September 9, 2022 · about 8:14 pm local time
Place
San Diego, California · North Island Nas /Halsey Fld/ · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people had minor injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Gates Lear Jet CORP. 36, built 1975 · all 36s on the register
Registration
N26FN · registry record · serial 011
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Other work-use flight · public-use (government) rules

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The flight crew was supporting a United States Navy (USN) training mission and ended the flight early due to icing conditions. The flight crew calculated a landing reference speed (Vref) of 140 knots (kts) indicated airspeed (KIAS) and landing distance required of 4,200 ft for a wet runway and a flap setting of 20°. Due to underwing-mounted external storage, the landing flaps were limited to a maximum extension of 20°. The flight crew configured the airplane with 20° flaps and reported that the airplane touched down at 140 kts. Although the runway was 8,001 ft long, an arresting cable was located 1,701 ft from the runway threshold, resulting in a runway distance available of about 6,300 ft. After landing, the second in command (SIC) reported that the pilot-in-command (PIC) deployed the spoilers and brakes, then announced that the airplane was not slowing down. The PIC stated that the airplane did not decelerate normally, that the brake anti-skid system was active, and that the airplane seemed to be hydroplaning. He cycled the brakes, which had no effect. The airplane subsequently overran the departure end of the runway, breached an ocean sea wall and came to rest in a nose-down attitude on a sandbar. The airport weather observation system recorded that 0.06 inches of liquid equivalent precipitation fell between 18 and 9 minutes before the accident. In the 4 hours before the accident, the airport received 0.31 inches of liquid equivalent precipitation. A landing performance study conducted by the airplane manufacturer modeled a variety of landing scenarios considered during the investigation. The modeling used factual information provided by the investigation, including ADS-B data, as well as manufacturer-provided airplane performance data specific to the airplane. The study considered the effect on landing distance of both a wet and dry runway, a contaminated runway, both full and intermittent hydroplaning, a localized tailwind (which was not present in the weather data), and an inboard brake failure. The study showed that the most likely scenario, based on the available data, was that the airplane touched down with a ground speed well in excess of the 140 kts Vref speed reported by the crew, and that subsequent to the touchdown encountered full hydroplaning at speeds above 104 kts. The airplane sat overnight on the sandbar and was submerged in saltwater before the airplane was recovered. As a result, the airplane’s braking system could not be functionally tested. However, the physical evidence from the brakes as found postaccident, combined with the results of the landing distance modeling, did not indicate that a brake failure occurred. Similarly, ADS-B data did not support the presence of a localized tailwind when such a landing was modeled in the study. Thus, it’s likely that the flight crew landed too fast and then encountered hydroplaning during the landing roll as a result of a recent heavy rain shower, which diminished the calculated stopping distance.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Runway excursion during landing (landing roll) defining event
  2. Abnormal runway contact during landing (landing roll)

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Surface speed/braking › Attain/maintain not possible
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment › Runway/land/takeoff/taxi surface › Wet surface › Effect on equipment
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Rain › Effect on equipment

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 7,200 hours in all; 5,250 in this make and model; 133 in the last 90 days; 46 in the last 30 days; 5,665 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: July 27, 2022
  • Medical certificate: Class 1
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: minor injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 18,288 hours in all; 165 in this make and model; 116 in the last 90 days; 21 in the last 30 days; 12,147 as pilot in command; 1,347 on instruments
  • Last flight review: February 22, 2022
  • Medical certificate: Class 2
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 17,024.1 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, May 3, 2022
  • Maximum gross weight: 15,300 lb
  • Seats: 3
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Garrett TFE-731-2-2B (turbofan); 19,753 hours total
  • Engine 2: Garrett TFE-731-2-2B (turbofan); 18,286 hours total

The flight

  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 36, 8,000 ft by 200 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 200° at 6 knots
  • Visibility: 2.5 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 3,300 ft; clear
  • Temperature: 77°F (25°C), dew point 73°F (23°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.51 inHg
  • Observation at 1:05 pm from KNZY

Weather report (METAR): SPECI KNZY 092005Z 20006KT 2 1/2SM +RA BR BKN033 BKN045 OVC055 25/23 A2951 RMK AO2 P0006 T02500228=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Other NTSB records under N26FN the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

2006-12-01LAX07TA051 · accident near San Diego, CA · substantial damage · no injuries

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR22LA344.