Cessna 208B accident near Acampo, California, May 12, 2016
On May 12, 2016 at about 9:13 pm local time, a 1992 Cessna 208B, registered N1114A, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (climb to cruise) near Acampo, California (Lodi airport). It was a skydiving flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person had minor injuries; 17 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A total loss of engine power due to a fatigue fracture of the fuel pressure line that connected the fuel control unit and the fuel flow transducer due to vibration as the result of a fatigue fracture of an associated support clamp. Contributing to the accident was the mechanic’s inadequate inspection of the fuel line support clamp during the previous replacement of the fuel line.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 12, 2016 · about 9:13 pm local time
- Place
- Acampo, California · Lodi · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person had minor injuries; 17 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 208B B, built 1992 · all 208Bs on the register
- Registration
- N1114A · registry record · serial 208B0309
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Skydiving flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The commercial pilot reported that, after takeoff on the local skydiving flight, the engine experienced a total loss of power. He initiated a turn toward the airport, but realized the airplane would not reach the runway and chose to perform a forced landing to an open field. During the landing roll, the airplane exited the field, crossed a road, impacted a truck, and continued into a vineyard, where it nosed over. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the fuel pressure line that connects the fuel control unit to the airframe fuel pressure transducer was fractured below the fuel control unit fitting's swaged seat. In addition, a supporting clamp for the fuel pressure fuel line was fractured and separated. The operator reported that the fractured fuel line had been replaced the night before the accident and had accumulated about 4 hours of operational time. The previously-installed line had also fractured. Metallurgical examination of the two fractured fuel lines revealed that both fuel lines fractured due to reverse bending fatigue through the tube wall where a ferrule was brazed to the outside of the tube. There were no apparent anomalies or defects at the crack initiation sites. Examination of the supporting clamp determined that it fractured due to unidirectional bending fatigue where one of the clamp's tabs met the clamp loop, with the crack initiating along the inward-facing side of the clamp. The orientation of the reverse bending fatigue cracks and the spacing of the fatigue striations on the tube fracture surfaces were consistent with high-cycle bending fatigue due to a vibration of the tube. The cushioned support clamp is designed to prevent such vibrations from occurring. However, if the clamp tab is fractured, it cannot properly clamp the tube and will be unable to prevent the vibration. The presence of the fractured clamp combined with the fact that the two pressure tubes failed in similar modes in short succession indicated that the clamp most likely failed first, resulting in the subsequent failure of the tubes. Since the clamp was likely fractured when the first fractured fuel pressure line was replaced, the clamp was either not inspected or inadequately inspected at the time of the maintenance.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (climb to cruise) defining event
- Off-field or emergency landing during landing
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing
- Nose over/nose down during landing
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control › Fuel distribution › Failure
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › (general) › Maintenance personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider
- Flight time: 7,050 hours in all; 253 in this make and model; 80 in the last 90 days; 25 in the last 30 days; 6,680 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: March 2, 2015
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 12,848.9 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, February 10, 2016; 69 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 7,449 lb
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: P&W PT6A SER (turboprop); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: 1O3 Acampo CA
- Destination: 1O3 Acampo CA
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 88°F (31°C), dew point 54°F (12°C)
- Altimeter: 29.95 inHg
- Observation at 8:53 pm from KSAC, 21 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 17 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
