Sikorsky S 61A accident near Ironside, Oregon, August 20, 2015
On August 20, 2015 at about 2:15 am local time, a 1982 Sikorsky S 61A (helicopter), registered N1043T, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering (low-alt flying) near Ironside, Oregon. It was a firefighting flight under external-load helicopter rules (Part 133). 1 person had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A loss of power to the No. 2 engine due to the failure of the accessory gearbox drivetrain. Also causal was the pilot’s inability to release the external longline due to the use of a safety wire across the coupling of the quick-disconnect mechanism, which interfered with his efforts to land. Contributing to the accident was the repair facility’s failure to maintain a clean environment, which resulted in the inadvertent introduction of a contaminant during the engine overhaul/repair process.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 20, 2015 · about 2:15 am local time
- Place
- Ironside, Oregon · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Sikorsky S 61A, built 1982 · all S 61As on the register
- Registration
- N1043T · registry record · serial 61083
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Firefighting flight · external-load helicopter rules (Part 133)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The commercial pilot reported that they had picked up 4,000 lbs of water from a pond for a helicopter firefighting operation and were starting a climbing left turn. About 20 ft above the ground, the No. 2 (right) engine lost power, and the rpm dropped. The pilot dumped the water from the bucket and attempted to gain airspeed and altitude as the helicopter entered a small valley. The pilot also attempted to release the longline and bucket to no avail. The second pilot used the emergency throttle, but the helicopter continued to lose engine and rotor rpm. Unable to gain altitude and with the terrain rising, the pilot landed the helicopter, which subsequently rolled over and came to rest on its right side. Before touchdown, the longline and bucket had impacted brush and trees and the bucket became entangled in a fence, which likely hindered the pilot's ability to successfully land the helicopter. On-scene examination revealed that the fuselage belly hook released the longline as intended; however, one of the two hydraulic quick-disconnect couplings failed to release the longline. A safety wire was used to connect the fitting on the quick-disconnect mechanism to the coupling. The use of the safety wire did not allow the quick-disconnect mechanism to function as intended and release the longline. The examination of the No. 2 (right) engine revealed metallic debris on all four magnetic plugs. The front frame accessory drive was manually rotated, and no concurrent rotation of the centrifugal fuel purifier drive splines was observed. Removal of the radial driveshaft revealed scallop-shaped wear marks around the shaft, which matched the mating female splines of the pinion assembly. In addition, about 0.10 inch of material wear was observed on the front frame housing consistent with pinion gear assembly contact. Removal of the pinion gear assembly from the accessory gearbox revealed that the pinion gear, which mates with the bevel gear, exhibited wear on the gear teeth and some metal smearing along the tips, which is consistent with gear disengagement. When the bevel and pinion splines disengaged, the fuel and oil pumps were no longer being driven, so fuel and lubrication to the engine were cut and the engine lost power. Disassembly of the pinion support assembly revealed roller ball, bearing cage, and race damage to the upper support bearing and wear to the bevel gear teeth consistent with that observed on the mating pinion. Aluminum oxide particles were embedded in the cage pocket and inner races of both bearings and likely contributed to the bearing wear that eventually caused bevel and pinion gear disengagement. According to the manufacturer, aluminum oxide is not present in this engine's bearing or any component within the oil lubrication system pathway. However, aluminum oxide can be introduced into the engine during the overhaul/repair process if measures are not taken to maintain a clean environment, including management of air flow when bearings are exposed. Aluminum oxide is abrasive and, once embedded into the bearing, will typically result in uneven wear and accelerated failure. The last engine light overhaul was completed about 1 year before the accident, and it is likely that the aluminum oxide was introduced at that time.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (partial) during maneuvering (low-alt flying)
- Off-field or emergency landing during maneuvering (low-alt flying)
- External load event (Rotorcraft) during maneuvering (low-alt flying) defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during maneuvering (low-alt flying)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Equipment/furnishings › Agricultural/external load sys › Malfunction
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Accessory gear › boxes › (general) › Failure
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Accessory gear › boxes › (general) › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Accessory gear › boxes › (general) › Incorrect service/maintenance
- Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Fence/fence post › Contributed to outcome
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 26,062 hours in all; 14,863 in this make and model; 145 in the last 90 days; 52 in the last 30 days; 24,500 as pilot in command; 600 on instruments
- Last flight review: April 3, 2015
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 17,016 hours in all; 17 in the last 90 days; 17 in the last 30 days; 14,177 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: August 15, 2015
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 40,309 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, August 9, 2015; 56 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 21,000 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: Ge T58-GE-402 (turboshaft); 10,098 hours total
- Engine 2: Ge T58-GE-402 (turboshaft); 7,492 hours total
- Operator: Croman CORP
The flight
- Departed from: BKE Baker City OR
- Destination: BKE Baker City OR
- Flight plan: none
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 250° at 6 knots
- Visibility: 6 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 52°F (11°C)
- Altimeter: 29.88 inHg
- Observation at 1:53 am from BKE, 32 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
