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Accidents · NTSB WPR14LA374 · Final report

Bell 206 accident near Tombstone, Arizona, September 12, 2014

On September 12, 2014 at about 6:15 pm local time, a 2004 Bell 206 (helicopter), registered N64AW, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Tombstone, Arizona. It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A partial loss of engine power during cruise flight due to loose “B” nut fittings and a bent tube as a result of maintenance personnel’s inadequate inspection of the nuts during the most recent inspection.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
September 12, 2014 · about 6:15 pm local time
Place
Tombstone, Arizona · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Bell 206 L4, built 2004 · all 206s on the register
Registration
N64AW · registry record · serial 52298
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The commercial pilot reported that, after initiating a climb for the local flight, he observed that the helicopter was not producing adequate power. He found a suitable landing site and descended toward it. When the helicopter was about 60 to 70 ft above the ground, the helicopter started descending rapidly and impacted the ground hard. During a pressure leak check of the engine, air leaks at three separate "B" nut fittings were found; two of the leaks were at the power turbine governor, and one leak was at the gas producer fuel control. The engine was test run, and it operated; however, it then lost power consistent with the pilot's report. Further examination of the "B" nut fittings revealed that one of the "B" nuts was less than finger tight, the second one was just above finger tight, and the third exhibited breakaway torque within the specified range. The "B" nut fittings were tightened to specifications and rechecked. One of the leaks was still present; the tube was removed, and it was bent near where the leak was found. A new tube was installed, and the engine was run again with no anomalies noted. The engine manufacturer had previously issued several commercial service letters regarding the importance of properly torqueing and aligning the fuel, lubrication, and pneumatic systems tubes and fittings; the service letters contained proper directions, placards, and 100-hour-inspection requirements. The helicopter's most recent 100-hour inspection occurred about 66 hours before the accident. It is likely that the "B" nuts became loose during the approximate 66 hours of operation since the most recent inspection and that maintenance personnel did not adequately inspect the "B" nuts at that inspection and, thus, failed to detect that they were not properly torqued. It could not be determined when the tube became bent.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (partial) during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Off-field or emergency landing during enroute (cruise)
  3. Hard landing during landing (flare/touchdown)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Misc hardware › Fasteners › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Misc hardware › Hoses and tubes › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Other/unknown
  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Misc hardware › Fasteners › Related operating info
  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Misc hardware › Fasteners › Related maintenance info

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 10,800 hours in all; 1,650 in this make and model; 55 in the last 90 days; 15 in the last 30 days; 9,800 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: February 4, 2014
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 4,297 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, July 11, 2014; 67 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 4,450 lb
  • Seats: 7
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rolls-Royce 250 C30P (turboshaft); 4,297 hours total
  • Operator: Airwest Helicopters LLC

The flight

  • Departed from: FHU Sierra Vista AZ at 5:50 pm
  • Destination: FHU Sierra Vista AZ

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: at 5 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 7,000 ft
  • Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 57°F (14°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.10 inHg
  • Observation at 5:55 pm from FHU, 16 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.