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Accidents · NTSB WPR13FA070 · Final report

Piper PA-31T1 accident near Ely, Nevada, December 15, 2012

On December 15, 2012 at about 6:00 pm local time, a 1980 Piper PA-31T1, registered N93CN, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Ely, Nevada. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s failure to regain airplane control following a sudden rapid descent during cruise flight, which resulted in an exceedance of the design stress limits of the aircraft and led to an in-flight structural failure.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 15, 2012 · about 6:00 pm local time
Place
Ely, Nevada · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA-31T1, built 1980 · all PA-31T1s on the register
Registration
N93CN · no longer on the register · serial 31T-8004029
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The private pilot and passenger departed on the 875-nautical-mile cross-country flight and leveled off at a cruise altitude of 24,000 feet mean seal level, which, based on the radar data, was accomplished with the use of the autopilot. About 1 hour 40 minutes after departure, the pilot contacted air traffic control personnel to request that he would "like to leave frequency for a couple of minutes." No further radio transmissions were made. About 20 seconds after the last transmission, the airplane banked to the right, continued in a spiral while rapidly descending, and subsequently broke apart. At no time during the flight did the pilot indicate that he was experiencing difficulty or request assistance. Just prior to departing from the flight path, the pilot made an entry of the engine parameters in a flight log, which appeared to be consistent with his other entries indicating the airplane was not experiencing any difficulties. Portions of the wings, along with the horizontal stabilizers and elevators, separated during the breakup sequence. Analysis of the fracture surfaces, along with the debris field distribution and radar data, revealed that the rapid descent resulted in an exceedance of the design stress limits of the airplane and led to an in-flight structural failure. The airplane sustained extensive damage after ground impact, and examination of the engine components and surviving primary airframe components did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane was flying on a flight path that the pilot was familiar with over largely unpopulated hilly terrain at the time of the upset. The clouds were well below his cruising altitude, giving the pilot reliable external visual cues should the airplane have experienced a failure of either the flight instruments or autopilot. Further, no turbulence was reported in the area. The airplane was equipped with a supplemental oxygen system, which the pilot likely had his mask plugged into and available in the unstowed position behind his seat; the passenger's mask was stowed under her seat. The airplane's autopilot could be disengaged by the pilot by depressing the appropriate mode switch, pushing the autopilot disengage switch on the control wheel, or turning off the autopilot switch on the control head. All autopilot servos were also equipped with a clutch mechanism that allowed the servo to be manually overridden by the pilot at any time. It is likely that the reason the pilot requested to "leave the frequency" was to leave his seat and attend to something in the airplane. While leaving his seat, it is plausible he inadvertently disconnected the autopilot and was unable to recover by the time he realized the deviation had occurred.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Inflight upset during enroute (cruise) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › (general) › (general) › Capability exceeded
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 6,336 hours in all; 51 in the last 90 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,725 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, March 23, 2012
  • Seats: 7
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Pratt And Whitney PT6-A (turboprop); 5,800 hours total
  • Engine 2: Pratt And Whitney PT6A (turboprop); 4,600 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: FFZ Mesa AZ at 4:18 pm
  • Destination: TTD Portland OR
  • Flight plan: IFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 160° at 5 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 23°F (-5°C), dew point 19°F (-7°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.85 inHg
  • Observation at 5:53 pm from KELY, 17 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.