Airbus A319-114 and Northrop T38 incident near Arlington, Virginia, March 28, 2025

The NTSB's narrative for the Airbus A319-114 preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record

On March 28, 2025, about 1516 eastern daylight time (EDT), DRAGO61, a flight of four US Air Force Northrop T38s, enroute to conduct an aerial flyby at Arlington National Cemetery, and Delta (DAL) Air Lines flight 2983 (DAL2983), an Airbus 319-114, N342NB, departing Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, were involved in a loss of separation approximately 0.6 miles south of DCA. DRAGO61 was operating as a title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 91 military flight, and DAL2983 was operating under title 14 CFR part 121 scheduled passenger flight. There were no injuries and no damage to any of the aircraft involved. The Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Traffic Control Tower (DCA ATCT) Air Traffic Manager (ATM) stated that at the time of the incident, the traffic volume was moderate with moderate complexity. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident. The weather at the time of the incident was visual flight rules (VFR) with the following conditions being reported: Wind from 180 at 6 knots, visibility 10 miles with an overcast ceiling at 11,000 feet. Showers were in the vicinity to the Northeast. At the time of the event there were 8 certified professional controllers (CPCs) and 1 CPC in-training (IT) on duty. There were 6 positions open. There were 6 CPCs and 1 controller in-charge (CIC) on position. 2 CPCs and 1 CPC-IT were available. Due to staffing constraints, the only Operations Supervisor (OS) that was scheduled to work that day had already completed their assigned shift and a CIC was providing general oversight at the time of the event. The Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control (PCT TRACON), DEALE radar sector was providing air traffic services to DRAGO61 when the loss of separation occurred. In the PCT TRACON Mount Vernon area at the time of the event, there were 15 CPCs and 1 OS on duty. There were 8 positions open with 7 CPCs and 1 OS on position. There were 4 CPCs available with 4 CPCs on other duties. A review of air traffic control (ATC) audio recordings provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) indicated that at about 1441:25 EDT, the PCT TRACON OS called the DCA ATCT CIC to verify that they knew about the DRAGO61 flyover. The CIC acknowledged and stated that they were waiting for a “stop the departures time.” The PCT TRACON OS stated that the Time on Target (TOT) would be at 1521 EDT and the stop time would be 17. The PCT OS stated that if it changed, they would call back. CIC acknowledged TOT 21 and stop around 17 but the OS would call back with official time. The OS acknowledged. 1502:11 The DEALE sector radar position was opened for the flyby. 1502:32 DRAGO61 checked in with the DEALE radar controller while a position relief briefing was in progress. 1502:40 The DEALE position relief briefing concluded. 1502:45 DRAGO61 requested an updated TOT, and the DEALE controller provided an updated TOT of 1515. DRAGO61 acknowledged. 1512:15 The LC controller cleared the first uninvolved aircraft for takeoff from runway 19. 1512:45 The PCT TRACON OS called the DCA ATCT CIC with “stop all departures hard time is now seventeen.” The CIC responded, “hard time seventeen we will stop all departures.” 1513:04 The LC controller cleared a second uninvolved aircraft for takeoff from runway 19. 1514:17 The DEALE controller issues DRAGO61 traffic information and control instructions regarding the first uninvolved departure. 1514:20 The LC controller cleared a third uninvolved aircraft for takeoff from runway 19. 1514:55 The DEALE controller issues DRAGO61 traffic information and control instructions regarding the first and second uninvolved departures. 1515:00 The LC controller cleared DAL2983 for takeoff on runway 19 with instructions to fly runway heading. 1515:22 The PCT TRACON OS called the DCA ATCT CIC and asked why they were departing aircraft. The CIC stated, “hard stop is seventeen, right?” OS responded that the instruction was to stop departures and that the hard time was seventeen. The CIC stated that there was one departure on departure roll. The OS said “stop”, and the CIC replied that the aircraft could not stop. The DEALE controller advised DRAGO61 of the third uninvolved departure and issued control instructions. 1515:34 DRAGO61 replied looking for traffic. 1515:37 The DEALE controller reissued traffic information to DRAGO61. 1515:47 DRAGO61 reported traffic in sight and advised that they were below the traffic. 1515:48 The DEALE controller instructed DRAGO61 to resume their own navigation and to proceed inbound. DRAGO61 acknowledged. 1516:00 The LC controller instructed DAL2983 to contact departure. 1516:04 The LC attempted to contact DAL2983 to advise them of the DRAGO61 flight but DAL2983 did not respond. 1516:15 The DEALE controller asked DRAGO61 if they had the additional traffic [DAL2983] departing DCA in sight. 1516:19 DRAGO61 reported the traffic in sight. 1516:23 The DEALE controller instructed DRAGO61 to maintain visual separation with the traffic, instructed them to climb to 5,000 feet and fly heading 270° when able. DRAGO61 acknowledged. After the event, the LC controller called the PCT TRACON KRANT sector radar controller to figure out where the confusion had occurred. They advised the KRANT controller that they were instructed to stop at seventeen, but the KRANT controller said seventeen was the hard time. Figure 1 is an overhead view of the incident flight tracks overlaid onto satellite imagery in Google Earth. The DAL2983 flight track is illustrated in yellow and DRAGO61 flight track in orange. The DCA airport is labeled, and arrows have been added to show the direction of travel. Figure 1. Overhead view of the flight tracks for DAL2983 and DRAGO61 – Closest proximity .64 nm / 100 ft. Upon notification, the NTSB formed an ATC investigative group and parties to the investigation include the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), and the United States Air Force. Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) data, audio recordings, and other pertinent data and documentation were obtained from the FAA. These data are currently being analyzed by the NTSB. During the week of March 30th, 2025, the ATC investigative group conducted an on-site investigation and interviewed personnel at both DCA ATCT and PCT TRACON, the ATC facilities that were providing services to DAL2983 and DRAGO61 at the time of the incident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Northrop T38 preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record

On March 28, 2025, about 1516 eastern daylight time (EDT), DRAGO61, a flight of four US Air Force Northrop T38s, enroute to conduct an aerial flyby at Arlington National Cemetery, and Delta (DAL) Air Lines flight 2983 (DAL2983), an Airbus 319-114, N342NB, departing Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, were involved in a loss of separation approximately 0.6 miles south of DCA. DRAGO61 was operating as a title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 91 military flight, and DAL2983 was operating under title 14 CFR part 121 scheduled passenger flight. There were no injuries and no damage to any of the aircraft involved. The Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Traffic Control Tower (DCA ATCT) Air Traffic Manager (ATM) stated that at the time of the incident, the traffic volume was moderate with moderate complexity. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident. The weather at the time of the incident was visual flight rules (VFR) with the following conditions being reported: Wind from 180 at 6 knots, visibility 10 miles with an overcast ceiling at 11,000 feet. Showers were in the vicinity to the Northeast. At the time of the event there were 8 certified professional controllers (CPCs) and 1 CPC in-training (IT) on duty. There were 6 positions open. There were 6 CPCs and 1 controller in-charge (CIC) on position. 2 CPCs and 1 CPC-IT were available. Due to staffing constraints, the only Operations Supervisor (OS) that was scheduled to work that day had already completed their assigned shift and a CIC was providing general oversight at the time of the event. The Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control (PCT TRACON), DEALE radar sector was providing air traffic services to DRAGO61 when the loss of separation occurred. In the PCT TRACON Mount Vernon area at the time of the event, there were 15 CPCs and 1 OS on duty. There were 8 positions open with 7 CPCs and 1 OS on position. There were 4 CPCs available with 4 CPCs on other duties. A review of air traffic control (ATC) audio recordings provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) indicated that at about 1441:25 EDT, the PCT TRACON OS called the DCA ATCT CIC to verify that they knew about the DRAGO61 flyover. The CIC acknowledged and stated that they were waiting for a “stop the departures time.” The PCT TRACON OS stated that the Time on Target (TOT) would be at 1521 EDT and the stop time would be 17. The PCT OS stated that if it changed, they would call back. CIC acknowledged TOT 21 and stop around 17 but the OS would call back with official time. The OS acknowledged. 1502:11 The DEALE sector radar position was opened for the flyby. 1502:32 DRAGO61 checked in with the DEALE radar controller while a position relief briefing was in progress. 1502:40 The DEALE position relief briefing concluded. 1502:45 DRAGO61 requested an updated TOT, and the DEALE controller provided an updated TOT of 1515. DRAGO61 acknowledged. 1512:15 The LC controller cleared the first uninvolved aircraft for takeoff from runway 19. 1512:45 The PCT TRACON OS called the DCA ATCT CIC with “stop all departures hard time is now seventeen.” The CIC responded, “hard time seventeen we will stop all departures.” 1513:04 The LC controller cleared a second uninvolved aircraft for takeoff from runway 19. 1514:17 The DEALE controller issues DRAGO61 traffic information and control instructions regarding the first uninvolved departure. 1514:20 The LC controller cleared a third uninvolved aircraft for takeoff from runway 19. 1514:55 The DEALE controller issues DRAGO61 traffic information and control instructions regarding the first and second uninvolved departures. 1515:00 The LC controller cleared DAL2983 for takeoff on runway 19 with instructions to fly runway heading. 1515:22 The PCT TRACON OS called the DCA ATCT CIC and asked why they were departing aircraft. The CIC stated, “hard stop is seventeen, right?” OS responded that the instruction was to stop departures and that the hard time was seventeen. The CIC stated that there was one departure on departure roll. The OS said “stop”, and the CIC replied that the aircraft could not stop. The DEALE controller advised DRAGO61 of the third uninvolved departure and issued control instructions. 1515:34 DRAGO61 replied looking for traffic. 1515:37 The DEALE controller reissued traffic information to DRAGO61. 1515:47 DRAGO61 reported traffic in sight and advised that they were below the traffic. 1515:48 The DEALE controller instructed DRAGO61 to resume their own navigation and to proceed inbound. DRAGO61 acknowledged. 1516:00 The LC controller instructed DAL2983 to contact departure. 1516:04 The LC attempted to contact DAL2983 to advise them of the DRAGO61 flight but DAL2983 did not respond. 1516:15 The DEALE controller asked DRAGO61 if they had the additional traffic [DAL2983] departing DCA in sight. 1516:19 DRAGO61 reported the traffic in sight. 1516:23 The DEALE controller instructed DRAGO61 to maintain visual separation with the traffic, instructed them to climb to 5,000 feet and fly heading 270° when able. DRAGO61 acknowledged. After the event, the LC controller called the PCT TRACON KRANT sector radar controller to figure out where the confusion had occurred. They advised the KRANT controller that they were instructed to stop at seventeen, but the KRANT controller said seventeen was the hard time. Figure 1 is an overhead view of the incident flight tracks overlaid onto satellite imagery in Google Earth. The DAL2983 flight track is illustrated in yellow and DRAGO61 flight track in orange. The DCA airport is labeled, and arrows have been added to show the direction of travel. Figure 1. Overhead view of the flight tracks for DAL2983 and DRAGO61 – Closest proximity .64 nm / 100 ft. Upon notification, the NTSB formed an ATC investigative group and parties to the investigation include the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), and the United States Air Force. Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) data, audio recordings, and other pertinent data and documentation were obtained from the FAA. These data are currently being analyzed by the NTSB. During the week of March 30th, 2025, the ATC investigative group conducted an on-site investigation and interviewed personnel at both DCA ATCT and PCT TRACON, the ATC facilities that were providing services to DAL2983 and DRAGO61 at the time of the incident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

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