Amateur-built BE20 incident near Camp Springs, Maryland, May 13, 2009
On May 13, 2009 at about 3:47 pm local time, a amateur-built BE20, registered VM206, was involved in an incident during taxi (into takeoff position) near Camp Springs, Maryland (Andrews Air Force Base airport). It was flown under military rules. No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of the ground controller to coordinate the runway crossings with the local controller and her failure to scan the runway prior to issuing the crossing instructions. Contributing to the incident was the combination of the front line manager/tower supervisor and the local control position, which prevented diligent oversight of the tower cab operations.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 13, 2009 · about 3:47 pm local time
- Place
- Camp Springs, Maryland · Andrews Air Force Base · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Amateur-built BE20
- Registration
- VM206 · no longer on the register
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · military rules
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The Andrews Air Force Base (ADW), Camp Springs, Maryland, ground controller, who was working the ground control (GC), clearance delivery (CD), and flight data (FD) positions combined, authorized four vehicles to cross runway 19R without the local controller’s (LC's) approval while VM206, a BE-20, was departing runway 19R. At the time of the incursion, the LC was also the front line manager (FLM). VM206 was holding short of runway 19R at the midfield taxiway C waiting to back-taxi toward the approach end of the runway for departure. One of four vehicles was holding behind VM206 on taxiway C waiting to cross the runway from west to east, and three other vehicles were on taxiway S waiting to cross the departure end from east to west. After landing traffic cleared runway 19R, the LC/FLM cleared VM206 for takeoff from runway 19R at taxiway C, permitting the use of the full runway for takeoff. VM206 entered runway 19R at taxiway C, turned left and taxied approximately 500 feet toward the approach end of the runway, turned, and commenced the takeoff roll. As VM206 was turning and beginning its takeoff roll, the GC asked the LC, “am I crossing?”. The request was not made on a recorded landline as required by local air traffic control directives. The LC responded to the GC on the recorded land line, “You’re not crossing.” The GC then instructed the vehicles to cross the departure end of the runway. The vehicle operator who was holding behind VM206 again requested clearance to cross. The GC, performing tasks associated with CD, stated in her interview that she cleared the vehicle to cross runway 19R without visually scanning the runway. According to the controllers interviewed, the Airport Movement Area Safety System did not alarm. The LC noticed the vehicle cross the departure end and directed the GC to stop the vehicle. However, the vehicle was nearly across the runway by the time the GC instructed them to stop. The vehicle operator continued across the runway until clear of runway 19R. FAA Order 7110.65, “Air Traffic Control” states that the LC has primary responsibility for operations conducted on the active runway and must control the use of those runways. The GC is required to obtain approval from the local controller before authorizing an aircraft or a vehicle to cross or use any portion of an active runway and advise the local controller when the coordinated runway operation is complete.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Runway incursion veh/AC/person during taxi (into takeoff position) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Issuing instructions › ATC personnel
- factor Organizational issues › Management › Scheduling › Scheduling of personnel › ATC
The aircraft
- Landing gear: fixed
The flight
- Departed from: ADW Camp Springs MD
- Flight plan: not recorded
- Runway 19R, 9,300 ft by 200 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 170° at 8 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 68°F (20°C), dew point 43°F (6°C)
- Observation at 3:55 pm from KADW
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.