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Accidents · NTSB MIA06FA090 · Final report

Beech B-60 accident near Gainesville, Florida, April 16, 2006

On April 16, 2006 at about 3:53 pm local time, a Beech B-60, registered N999DE, was destroyed in an accident near Gainesville, Florida (Gainesville Regional airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 3 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The loss of control for an undetermined reason.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 16, 2006 · about 3:53 pm local time
Place
Gainesville, Florida · Gainesville Regional · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
3 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Beech B-60 · all B-60s on the register
Registration
N999DE · registry record · serial P-447
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The airplane crashed into the terminal building following a loss of control on takeoff initial climb from runway 25. Witnesses reported that shortly after takeoff, the airplane banked sharply to the left, then it seemed to momentarily stabilize and commence a climb before beginning to roll to the left again. The airplane rolled to an inverted position, entered a dive, collided with the airport terminal building and exploded on impact. The entire airplane sustained severe fire and impact damage. Examination of the engines and propellers revealed no evidence of any discrepancies that would preclude normal operation. All the propeller blades displayed signatures indicative of high rotational energy at the time of impact, indicating that both propellers were rotating, not feathered, and the engines were operating at high power at the time of impact. Components of the autopilot system, specifically the pitch servo assembly and a portion of the roll servo assembly, were identified in the wreckage. The portion of the roll servo assembly found remained attached to a piece of skin torn from the airframe and consisted of the mounting bracket for the roll servo with the capstan bolted to the bracket, clearly indicating that this component had been reinstalled and strongly suggesting that the pilot reinstalled/reactivated all of the removed autopilot components the day before the accident. Maintenance personnel started an annual inspection on the airplane the month prior to the accident and found an autopilot installed in the airplane without the proper paperwork. The pilot explained to them that he designed and built the autopilot and was in the process of getting the proper paperwork for the installation of the system in his airplane. During the inspection, a mechanic found the aileron cable rubbing on the autopilot's roll servo capstan so the mechanic removed the roll servo along with the capstan. Additionally, mechanics disabled the autopilot's pitch servo and removed the autopilot control head. They were in the process of completing the inspection when the pilot asked for the airplane stating that he needed it for a trip. The pilot also asked that the airplane be returned to him without the interior installed. Two days before the accident, the airplane was returned to the pilot with the annual inspection incomplete. The autopilot control head, roll servo and capstan were returned to the pilot in a cardboard box on this date. A friend of the pilot reported that the day before the accident, the pilot completed reinstalling the seats and "other things" in order to fly the airplane the next day. It is possible that improper installation or malfunction of the autopilot resulted in the loss of control; however, the extent of damage and fragmentation of the entire airplane wreckage precluded detailed examination of the flight control and autopilot systems and hence a conclusive determination of the reason for the loss of control.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,500 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,901 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, February 1, 2006
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Lycoming TIO-541-E1C4 (piston); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Lycoming TIO-541-E1C4 (piston); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: GNV Gainesville FL at 3:53 pm
  • Destination: GNV
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 25, 4,158 ft by 100 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 240° at 11 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 77°F (25°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.00 inHg
  • Observation at 3:53 pm from GNV

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew1
Passengers2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number MIA06FA090.