Airbus Industrie A320 incident near Los Angeles, California, September 22, 2005
On September 22, 2005 at about 1:18 am local time, a Airbus Industrie A320, registered N536JB, suffered minor damage in an incident near Los Angeles, California (Los Angeles International airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 146 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The fatigue failure of two anti-rotation lugs due to repeated cyclic pre-landing tests, which allowed the nosewheels to deviate from the 0-degree position on landing gear retraction. A contributing factor was the design of the Brake Steering Control Unit (BSCU) system logic, which prevented the nosewheels from centering. Also contributing was the lack of a procedure to attempt to reset the BSCU system under these conditions.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 22, 2005 · about 1:18 am local time
- Place
- Los Angeles, California · Los Angeles International · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 146 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Airbus Industrie A320 · all A320s on the register
- Registration
- N536JB · registry record · serial 1784
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
Shortly after the landing gear handle was positioned to the up position in the initial climb, the flight crew noted an error message on the Electric Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system listing a fault (L/G SHOCK ABSORBER FAULT) message for the nose landing gear (NLG) shock absorber. The gear handle was then moved to the down position and the crew received an error message of a fault for the nose wheel steering (WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT). After determining that the nose landing gear was cocked 90 degrees, the crew landed at an alternate airport, and the NLG tires and both wheels were worn down into the axle. Post incident examination of the nose gear assembly found that two of the four anti-rotation lugs on the NLG upper support assembly fractured and separated due to induced fatigue from the stearing system's programed pre-landing dynamic steering tests that repeatedly cycles pressure to the stearing cylinders. The failed lugs allowed the NLG to deviate from its 0-degree position in the landing gear bay upon gear retraction on takeoff. This resulted in the L/G SHOCK ABSORBER FAULT error message on the ECAM system. When the pilots extended the incident airplane's landing gear, the nose gear achieved the down and locked position 1.5 seconds before the main gear and/or all of the landing gear doors closed. The nose wheel assembly was not centered at this time. The Brake Steering Control Unit (BSCU) detected this off center condition of the NLG and attempted to re-center the nose wheel; however, due to the sequencing of the nose and main landing gear and their respective doors, hydraulic pressure was shut off to the NLG steering valve. This lack of hydraulic power to the servo valve resulted in a lack of position feedback to the BSCU. After a 0.5-second monitoring time period, the BSCU detected this as a fault and deactivated the steering system so that the BSCU could not return the nose wheels to center. Failure of the nosewheels to center initiated a WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT caution message on the ECAM. There were no approved procedures that allowed the flight crew to attempt to reset the BSCU system, which would have re-enabled the hydraulic system and could have resulted in the system recentering the nose wheels.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 10,830 hours in all; 2,552 in this make and model; 160 in the last 90 days; 40 in the last 30 days; 4,683 as pilot in command; 973 on instruments
- Last flight review: March 1, 2005
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 5,732 hours in all; 1,284 in this make and model; 254 in the last 90 days; 94 in the last 30 days; 1,337 as pilot in command; 0 on instruments
- Last flight review: April 1, 2005
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 14,227 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme
- Maximum gross weight: 169,754 lb
- Seats: 166
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: International Aero Engines V2500-A5 (turbojet); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: International Aero Engines V2500-A5 (turbojet); 0 hours total
- Operator: Jet Blue Airways, Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: BUR Burbank CA at 10:31 pm
- Destination: JFK New York NY
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 25L, 11,096 ft by 200 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 250° at 8 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 7,000 ft
- Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
- Altimeter: 29.90 inHg
- Observation at 1:19 am from LAX
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 6 | |||
| Passengers | 140 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.