The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB ERA18LA215 · Final report

Cessna R182 accident near Florence, South Carolina, August 9, 2018

On August 9, 2018 at about 5:12 pm local time, a 1978 Cessna R182, registered N1693R, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Florence, South Carolina (Florence Regional airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's failure to comply with emergency procedures in the pilot's operating handbook, resulting in the collapse of the main landing gear during landing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to address the low battery voltage before departure.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 9, 2018 · about 5:12 pm local time
Place
Florence, South Carolina · Florence Regional · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna R182, built 1978 · all R182s on the register
Registration
N1693R · registry record · serial R18200518
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Before departure on the personal flight, the private pilot reported that the engine had to be started using an auxiliary power supply because the battery was dead; however, he did not determine the reason for the dead battery. After the engine was started, he reported normal electrical system indications. About 10 minutes into the 20-minute flight, the pilot noticed that the electric fuel gauges were reading zero and the ammeter was showing a discharge. He did not consult or comply with emergency procedures from the pilot's operating handbook (POH) for a discharging ammeter and continued to his destination, where he attempted to extend the landing gear using the normal system; however, there was no down-and-locked indication. He confirmed visually that the nose landing gear was down and locked; he performed a fly-by of the air traffic control tower, was informed that the landing gear appeared to be down, and returned for landing. After touchdown, both main landing gear collapsed, the airplane began to veer to the left, and the left wing and horizontal stabilizer contacted the runway. The airplane came to rest in the grass off the left side of the runway. Postaccident examination and operational testing of the normal and emergency landing gear extension and indicating systems revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. Had the pilot shed unnecessary electrical load per the POH when he first noticed the discharging state or pumped the landing gear down using the emergency gear extension mechanism, it is likely that the landing gear would have extended and locked into position. The reason for the electrical system failure was not investigated.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Electrical system malf/failure during standing (engine(s) start-up)
  2. Electrical system malf/failure during enroute (cruise) defining event
  3. Miscellaneous/other during approach (VFR pattern downwind)
  4. Landing gear collapse during landing (flare/touchdown)
  5. Dragged wing/rotor/float/other during landing (landing roll)
  6. Runway excursion during landing (landing roll)

The NTSB's findings

  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system › (general) › Malfunction
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • Not determined › Not determined › (general) › (general) › Unknown/Not determined
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system › (general) › Malfunction
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › (general) › Incorrect use/operation

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 376 hours in all; 90 in this make and model; 12 in the last 90 days; 3 in the last 30 days; 256 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: June 21, 2018
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,997.6 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, February 10, 2018
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,100 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Lycoming O-540-J3C5D (piston); 2,752 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: PHH Andrews SC at 4:52 pm
  • Destination: FLO Florence SC
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 27, 6,502 ft by 150 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 290° at 8 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 88°F (31°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.01 inHg
  • Observation at 4:53 pm from KFLO

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

6 documents, released by the NTSB on February 28, 2019. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.