The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB ERA18FA221 · Final report

Quicksilver MXL II Sport accident near Westminster, Maryland, August 18, 2018

On August 18, 2018 at about 2:40 pm local time, a 2006 Quicksilver MXL II Sport, registered N105SE, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern final) near Westminster, Maryland (Baugher'S Orchard Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The in-flight fracture of a stainless steel bolt that was used to secure the upper and lower wing cables to the outer attach point at the leading edge spar of the right wing due to stress corrosion cracking, which caused the right wing to fail and precluded controlled flight. Contributing to the bolt failure was the installation of a bolt that did not conform with the company's specification.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 12, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 18, 2018 · about 2:40 pm local time · cases in 2018
Place
Westminster, Maryland · Baugher'S Orchard Airport · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Quicksilver MXL II Sport, built 2006 · all MXL II Sports on the register
Registration
N105SE · registry record · serial 000891
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The private pilot and a passenger departed on a local flight and returned for landing about 15 minutes later. While the airplane was on final approach at an altitude between 100 and 200 ft, several witnesses heard a loud sound, and one of the witnesses saw the right wing fold and the airplane enter a steep descent. The airplane subsequently impacted terrain in a field near the airport. A witnesses reported observing the airframe parachute system deploy. The inspection of the components of the airframe ballistic parachute system indicated that the system had likely deployed just before or at the time of impact. Deployment of the parachute system at that low altitude would have been insufficient to adequately arrest the airplane's descent prior to impact. A stainless steel bolt secured the upper and lower wing cables to the outer leading edge spar of the right wing. Examination of the bolt showed that it fractured during flight due to stress corrosion cracking that extended across about 95% of the cross-section area of the bolt shank. The bolt failure allowed the leading edge spar to rotate upward relative to the trailing edge spar and fracture at the inboard cable attach point, precluding controlled flight. The stainless-steel material used for the wing cable attachment bolt was susceptible to stress corrosion cracking when exposed to a chloride-containing environment (such as the ocean). The airplane was previously equipped with floats, and was likely operated as an amphibious airplane at some point before the pilot purchased it. In addition, the installed bolt was a different material than the AN5-30A bolt specified in the Quicksilver Assembly, Maintenance, and Parts Manual for securing the outer upper and lower wing cables to the leading edge spar of the right wing. The material of the bolt recommended in the manual would be generally resistant to stress corrosion cracking as a result of a chloride-containing environment. The maintenance records did not indicate when the stainless steel bolt was installed. Evidence of stress corrosion cracking might not be apparent during visual inspections of the bolted joint. Also, the location of the stress corrosion cracking on the bolt would likely not have been detected during a condition inspection with the bolted joint in place. Further, the assembly, maintenance, and parts manual did not provide for a specific inspection of the bolt that secured the upper and lower wing cables to the outboard leading edge spar. However, the manual indicated that the security of all bolts should be checked every 50 hours. Although the pilot was taking a medication that could impair his ability to perform tasks requiring judgment or motor and cognitive skills, his use of the medication did not contribute to the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aircraft structural failure during approach (VFR pattern final) defining event
  2. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Wing structure › (general) › Fatigue/wear/corrosion other cases naming the airframe structure
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Attain/maintain not possible
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Wing structure › (general) › Incorrect service/maintenance other cases naming the airframe structure

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 1,200 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 75 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, January 6, 2010
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,000 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rotax 582 UL DCDI (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: 07MD Westminster MD at 2:20 pm
  • Destination: 07MD Westminster MD
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 19, 1,035 ft by 60 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 240° at 7 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.93 inHg
  • Observation at 2:50 pm from DMW, 2 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Photographs from the investigation 12 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

14 documents, released by the NTSB on April 23, 2020. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA18FA221.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.