Costruzioni Aeronautiche Tecna P92 Eaglet accident near Stevensville, Maryland, July 15, 2017
On July 15, 2017 at about 8:15 pm local time, a 2017 Costruzioni Aeronautiche Tecna P92 Eaglet, registered N561TU, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern final) near Stevensville, Maryland (Bay Bridge Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The fatigue failure of an exhaust valve spring retainer due to air trapped in the lubrication system, which resulted in a total loss of engine power.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 15, 2017 · about 8:15 pm local time · cases in 2017
- Place
- Stevensville, Maryland · Bay Bridge Airport · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Costruzioni Aeronautiche Tecna P92 Eaglet, built 2017 · all P92 Eaglets on the register
- Registration
- N561TU · no longer on the register · serial 1561
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
**This report was modified on December 4, 2022. Please see the public docket for this accident to view the original report.** While in the airport traffic pattern for landing at the conclusion of a cross-country flight, the airplane experienced a total loss of engine power, and the pilot performed a forced landing during which the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane had recently been purchased and the Rotax 912 ULS engine had 13.2 hours total operating time. Review of onboard data indicated that the fuel pressure, cylinder head temperature, and oil temperature remained relatively steady until the loss of power occurred, which indicated that the engine failure likely did not involve the fuel system, cooling system, or lubrication system. Examination of the engine revealed that there was no oil in the oil line between the oil thermostat and oil pump. The oil pump drive pin also displayed excessive wear in relation to the operating hours of the engine, and the magnetic plug was covered in metallic particles, although the oil filter was clean. Further examination of the engine revealed that the No. 1 cylinder was substantially damaged, and evidence of bluing was present. The cylinder’s exhaust valve spring retainer was fractured in half, and one half of the cotter was fractured. A small ridge could be felt on the exhaust valve spring retainer and galling (a rough surface) was visible on the exhaust valve bore in the cylinder head. The hydraulic lifter for the exhaust valve displayed a small indentation on the edge of the lifter, and when the hydraulic lifters were manually depressed, the lifter for the exhaust valve was easier to depress than the lifter for the intake valve. The pushrod for the exhaust valve was straight, but displayed a ridge on the rocker arm side of the pushrod, and the rocker arm displayed impact damage on the valve connection face. The exhaust valve was found in the combustion chamber. It was chipped, and bent, and deformed into an “S” shape. A hole was visible in the piston as the result of the piston face striking the exhaust valve after it dropped into the cylinder. A small amount of oil captured from the hydraulic tappets indicated that the oil contained significantly elevated levels of nickel, which could have come from manganese-containing alloys, as they occur in high-alloy hardened steels, e.g. for camshafts, valves or valve shafts. Examination of the fractured surface on the exhaust valve spring retainer revealed the presence of fatigue with pronounced vibration stripes when viewed with an electron microscope; however, the heat treatment corresponded to the target specifications, as did the statistical process control value. Between 2 and 3 years after this accident, four more cases of broken valve spring retainers on Rotax 900 engine series occurred in the United States. All the engines had differing hours of operation. Extensive metallurgical examination of the engine components from these four engines revealed that they met their specifications, and the fractured surfaces on the valve spring retainers revealed the presence of fatigue with pronounced vibration stripes, which was the same pattern that was observed on the valve spring retainer from this accident. Review of the engine manufacturer’s published guidance revealed that air could be introduced into the oil lubrication system through several means, including exceedance of the maximum bank angle of 40°, poorly or insufficiently vented hydraulic valve tappets, lack of proper oil system purging, spinning the propeller in the reverse direction from normal rotation, or opening portions of the oil system during maintenance or servicing. Testing of an exemplar engine with air introduced into the lubrication system revealed that with air trapped in the hydraulic tappets, it took about 6.5 minutes of engine operation at 2,538 rpm for air to be purged from the tappets, allowing them to work as designed. This indicated that with air trapped in the hydraulic tappets, the valve train could be overloaded, which could lead to a fatigue crack and breakage of a valve spring retainer; this was likely the reason for the fatigue cracking of the valve spring retainers in this accident and in the other four failures identified.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (partial) during approach (VFR pattern downwind)
- Loss of engine power (total) during approach (VFR pattern final) defining event
- Loss of engine power (total) during emergency descent
- Off-field or emergency landing during landing
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing (landing roll)
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip eng cyl section › Failure other cases naming the engine
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip eng cyl section › Fatigue/wear/corrosion other cases naming the engine
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, private
- Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: sport pilot
- Flight time: 4,625 hours in all; 594 in this make and model; 142 in the last 90 days; 38 in the last 30 days; 4,570 as pilot in command; 2,100 on instruments
- Last flight review: May 1, 2017
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 330 hours in all; 5 in this make and model; 18 in the last 90 days; 8 in the last 30 days; 45 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: March 30, 2017
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 13.2 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, January 1, 2017; 13 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 1,320 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Rotax 912 ULS2-01 (piston); 13 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: 0P2 Stewartstown PA at 7:20 pm
- Destination: W29 Stevensville MD
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 29, 2,713 ft by 60 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 350° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 7,000 ft
- Temperature: 84°F (29°C), dew point 68°F (20°C)
- Altimeter: 29.92 inHg
- Observation at 8:25 pm from KW29, 1 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Photographs from the investigation 19 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them
Photo 1 – Main Wreckage –
Photo 3 – Left Wing Tip –


Photo 8 – Right Side View of Aft Fuselage –
Photo 9 – View of Inboard Right Wing –
Photo 10 – Magnetic Plug –
Photo 11 – Oil Line –
Photo 12 – Oil Pump Drive Pin –
Photo 13 – Oil Pump
Photo 14 – Oil Tank
Photo 15 – Broken Valve Spring Retainer
Photo 16 – Cylinder Head
Photo 17 – Exhaust Valve
Photo 18 - Piston
Photo 19 – Close Up of Piston
Photo 20 – Combustion ChamberThe NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
15 documents, released by the NTSB on January 21, 2021. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N561TU: not on the register today · the record of its deregistration
- Costruzioni Aeronautiche Tecna P92 73 registered today · the model family and its accident history
- Costruzioni Aeronautiche Tecna 631 aircraft on the register
- Engine: Rotax 912 ULS2-01 3,381 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Bay Bridge Airport · nearest airport
- Shoestring Aviation Airfield · departed from
- Accidents and incidents in Maryland 837 since 1982 · 111 in the last ten years
- Maryland 2,352 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA17LA246.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.