Piper PA 38-112 accident near Jasper, Georgia, October 8, 2015
On October 8, 2015 at about 10:30 pm local time, a 1978 Piper PA 38-112, registered N4313E, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Jasper, Georgia (Pickens County Airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The student pilot's failure to accurately determine the airplane's fuel state, subsequent fuel exhaustion, and a total loss of engine power during initial climb. Contributing to the accident was the flight instructor's inadequate oversight of the student pilot's preflight inspection, the flight school's lack of fueling procedures, and the student pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle-of-attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 8, 2015 · about 10:30 pm local time
- Place
- Jasper, Georgia · Pickens County Airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA 38-112, built 1978 · all PA 38-112s on the register
- Registration
- N4313E · no longer on the register · serial 38-78A0546
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The student pilot was on his second supervised solo flight. According to the flight instructor, before the airplane departed, he observed the student pilot's preflight inspection of the airplane, and the student reported to him that the airplane had 14 gallons of fuel onboard. The flight instructor could not recall if he visually checked the fuel quantity himself or if the student used a fuel quantity measuring stick when checking the quantity. Further, the flight school's manager stated that he saw the instructor speaking on his phone while the student was performing the preflight. After takeoff, the student pilot flew to the practice area and came back to the airport about 1 hour later. The student pilot then performed a touch-and-go landing. During the climb after the touch-and-go, the flight instructor heard the engine suddenly stop running. The instructor saw the airplane turn to the left like the student pilot was going to return to the airport. The airplane entered an aerodynamic stall and then a spin to the left. It descended rapidly while in the spin until the instructor lost sight of the airplane behind trees; he then heard the impact. Examination of the accident site and wreckage revealed that the airplane impacted the ground about 1,700 ft from the departure end of the runway. Ground scarring and the lack of damage to the propeller indicated that the engine was not producing power during the impact sequence. The examination found no evidence of preimpact mechanical failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. However, the examination revealed that the fuel system was devoid of usable fuel. A broken fuel quantity measuring stick made from a wooden dowel was discovered in the wreckage. Review of the flight log recovered from the wreckage indicated that the airplane had been operated about 4.9 hours since the last refueling. According to the airplane manufacturer's pilot operating handbook, the airplane's endurance was about 4.5 hours when fueled to its maximum capacity of 32 total gallons, of which 30 gallons were usable. Although the student reported to the instructor that 14 gallons of fuel, or about half of its total capacity, were onboard, given the airplane's fuel consumption rate, it is unlikely that the airplane would have been devoid of fuel after 1 hour of flight had this assertion been accurate. Therefore, it is likely that the student erred in measuring the fuel onboard during his preflight inspection. Had the flight instructor personally observed the airplane's fuel state prior to the flight, he might have noticed the discrepancy and corrected the problem. Additionally, the flight school had no written policies or procedures regarding fueling. If a policy had been in place that prescribed a minimum fuel level prior to departure, or required the flight instructor to personally verify the fuel quantity on board before a student departed on a solo flight, the accident may have been prevented.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Preflight or dispatch event during prior to flight
- Fuel exhaustion during initial climb defining event
- Loss of engine power (total) during initial climb
- Abrupt maneuver during emergency descent
- Aerodynamic stall/spin during emergency descent
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › (general) › Instructor/check pilot
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Inadequate inspection
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid level
- factor Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of operation › Training organization
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Student/instructed pilot
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Not attained/maintained
Dual student
- Certificate: student
- Flight time: 13.5 hours in all; 12.5 in this make and model; 13.5 in the last 90 days; 5.3 in the last 30 days; 2.7 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,147.3 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, October 3, 2015; 7 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 1,670 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-235-L2C (piston); 3,154 hours total
- Operator: Asterix Aviation LLC
The flight
- Departed from: JZP Jasper GA at 9:06 pm
- Destination: JZP Jasper GA
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 16, 5,000 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 75°F (24°C), dew point 54°F (12°C)
- Altimeter: 30.14 inHg
- Observation at 10:35 pm from JZP, 1 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
