Piper PA-28R-200 and Robinson Helicopter R22 BETA mid-air collision near West Palm Beach, Florida, January 28, 2015

The NTSB's narrative for the Piper PA-28R-200 final · quoted from the NTSB record

The designated pilot examiner (DPE) and the commercial pilot on board the airplane were performing left traffic patterns during a checkride. A helicopter was simultaneously performing right traffic patterns to the same runway. Throughout the flight, the DPE and pilot had observed the accident helicopter and other helicopters in the right traffic pattern completing their approaches parallel to and to the right side of the runway. The airplane was on the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern, with the commercial pilot preparing for a simulated power-off landing. In light of the previously-observed helicopter operations to the right side of the runway, the DPE advised the pilot that the airplane would remain clear of the helicopters and to continue the approach and landing. The helicopter, however, was established on a shallow, final approach leg of the traffic pattern for a run-on landing. Upon entering the turn from the downwind leg and while on the final approach leg of the traffic pattern for landing, the DPE's view of the accident helicopter was blocked by the cabin and right wing. The airplane overtook the helicopter from above, and the aircraft collided. The helicopter entered a rapid, controlled descent to the runway. The airplane completed a go-around and subsequently landed safely. Review of recorded radio communications revealed that the pilots in the airplane transmitted position reports for the crosswind and downwind legs of the traffic pattern only, but did not announce their intentions to conduct, or the airplane's entry into, the simulated power-off landing maneuver. The helicopter pilots transmitted position reports on the downwind, base, and final legs of the traffic pattern, but before the accident landing approach, announced only that the helicopter was "turning final." The helicopter pilots provided no specificity about the shallow approach or performing a run-on landing to the runway surface. Other helicopters operating in the traffic pattern on the day of the accident had conducted their operations to the grass on the right side of the runway. On the previous approach, the accident helicopter pilots had announced their intention to land the helicopter in the grass abeam the runway. The lack of explicit communication from the helicopter pilots regarding their intentions resulted in the helicopter being in a position that was unexpected to the airplane pilots. In the absence of any information to the contrary, the airplane pilots likely assumed that the accident helicopter would continue to remain clear of the runway and the extended runway centerline, as it and other helicopters had done during previous approaches. This likely lowered the airplane pilots' vigilance in maintaining visual contact with the helicopter throughout the approach for landing.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Robinson Helicopter R22 BETA final · quoted from the NTSB record

The designated pilot examiner (DPE) and the commercial pilot on board the airplane were performing left traffic patterns during a checkride. A helicopter was simultaneously performing right traffic patterns to the same runway. Throughout the flight, the DPE and pilot had observed the accident helicopter and other helicopters in the right traffic pattern completing their approaches parallel to and to the right side of the runway. The airplane was on the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern, with the commercial pilot preparing for a simulated power-off landing. In light of the previously-observed helicopter operations to the right side of the runway, the DPE advised the pilot that the airplane would remain clear of the helicopters and to continue the approach and landing. The helicopter, however, was established on a shallow, final approach leg of the traffic pattern for a run-on landing. Upon entering the turn from the downwind leg and while on the final approach leg of the traffic pattern for landing, the DPE's view of the accident helicopter was blocked by the cabin and right wing. The airplane overtook the helicopter from above, and the aircraft collided. The helicopter entered a rapid, controlled descent to the runway. The airplane completed a go-around and subsequently landed safely. Review of recorded radio communications revealed that the pilots in the airplane transmitted position reports for the crosswind and downwind legs of the traffic pattern only, but did not announce their intentions to conduct, or the airplane's entry into, the simulated power-off landing maneuver. The helicopter pilots transmitted position reports on the downwind, base, and final legs of the traffic pattern, but before the accident landing approach, announced only that the helicopter was "turning final." The helicopter pilots provided no specificity about the shallow approach or performing a run-on landing to the runway surface. Other helicopters operating in the traffic pattern on the day of the accident had conducted their operations to the grass on the right side of the runway. On the previous approach, the accident helicopter pilots had announced their intention to land the helicopter in the grass abeam the runway. The lack of explicit communication from the helicopter pilots regarding their intentions resulted in the helicopter being in a position that was unexpected to the airplane pilots. In the absence of any information to the contrary, the airplane pilots likely assumed that the accident helicopter would continue to remain clear of the runway and the extended runway centerline, as it and other helicopters had done during previous approaches. This likely lowered the airplane pilots' vigilance in maintaining visual contact with the helicopter throughout the approach for landing.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

Other NTSB records under N54380 the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time