Dassault-Breguet MYSTERE FALCON 900 incident near Orlando, Florida, April 16, 2015
On April 16, 2015 at about 11:10 pm local time, a 1988 Dassault-Breguet MYSTERE FALCON 900, registered N610RL, suffered minor damage in an incident during enroute (descent) near Orlando, Florida (Orlando International airport). It was an executive or corporate flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 15 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Unknown maintenance personnel’s inadequate securing of a wiring bundle during a maintenance, repair, or modification event, which led to chafing of the wiring bundle, an electrical short and arcing, and a subsequent in-flight fire.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- April 16, 2015 · about 11:10 pm local time
- Place
- Orlando, Florida · Orlando International · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 15 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Dassault-Breguet MYSTERE FALCON 900, built 1988 · all MYSTERE FALCON 900s on the register
- Registration
- N610RL · registry record · serial 68
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Executive or corporate flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
During the airplane’s descent to its destination airport, the cabin attendant noticed a “weird smell” in the galley area; she checked the appliances but could find nothing wrong with them. She then turned around and opened the area in the galley where they kept the crystal glasses and noticed a “glow behind it,” which was an electrical fire. The pilot extinguished the fire using two halon fire extinguishers, and the airplane incurred minor damage. Examination of the area behind the crystal storage area revealed sooting, a burnt wiring bundle containing the 28-volt direct current wiring and ground wires for the cabin lighting, and a tripped circuit breaker for the cabin lighting. Two of the insulation bags in the area of the burnt wiring bundle had been fire damaged, and the wires had been routed over the insulation bags instead of directly next to the airplane's structure. The wires were also in contact with or near a soft oxygen line, which had been completely burned through. Examination of the oxygen line revealed no evidence of copper on the exposed coil; thus, the wiring had chafed against itself and not against the soft oxygen line. During the 26 years between the completion of the airplane and the incident, numerous modifications to the lighting, interior, and galley had been made by several maintenance, repair, and overhaul organizations, which required rerouting and re-securing wiring, as well as removal and replacement of interior panels, partitions, and cabinetry near the fire. The oxygen line and wiring in the area of the fire damage had been changed from the originally specified configuration; it did not conform to the manufacturer's cabin oxygen system drawing or the manufacturer's installation standard. Further, a clamp on the oxygen line near the fire damaged area appeared to be the wrong part number clamp. A spacer and a support in this area were missing, which would have been used to achieve and maintain separation between the oxygen line and wiring. Postincident examinations of exemplar airplanes revealed that on three of the seven airplanes, the layout of the oxygen line and electrical wiring was in compliance with manufacturer installation standards. However, on the other four airplanes, incorrect routing, spacing, or support was found, which likely occurred during maintenance.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
- Electrical system malf/failure during enroute (descent) defining event
- Fire/smoke (non-impact) during enroute (descent)
- Emergency descent initiated during enroute (descent)
- Off-field or emergency landing during landing
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Post maintenance inspection › Maintenance personnel
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Modification/alteration › Maintenance personnel
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Scheduled/routine inspection › Maintenance personnel
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system › Electrical pwr sys wiring › Incorrect service/maintenance
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system › Electrical pwr sys wiring › Inadequate inspection
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system › Electrical pwr sys wiring › Damaged/degraded
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system › Electrical pwr sys wiring › Failure
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument airplane; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 6,200 hours in all; 500 in this make and model; 80 in the last 90 days; 40 in the last 30 days; 4,800 as pilot in command; 1,500 on instruments
- Last flight review: October 1, 2014
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 5,200 hours in all; 180 in this make and model; 90 in the last 90 days; 15 in the last 30 days; 4,832 as pilot in command; 2,366 on instruments
- Last flight review: October 1, 2014
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 9,949 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, April 13, 2015
- Maximum gross weight: 45,501 lb
- Seats: 17
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Garrett TFE 731-5BR-1 (turbofan); 9,895 hours total
- Engine 2: Garrett TFE 731-5BR-1 (turbofan); 9,791 hours total
- Engine 3: Garrett TFE 731-5BR-1 (turbofan); 9,753 hours total
- Operator: Rlb Holdings Transportation LLC
The flight
- Departed from: HPN White Plains NY at 9:15 pm
- Destination: MCO Orlando FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 18R, 12,004 ft by 200 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: dusk
- Wind: from 040° at 11 knots
- Visibility: 7 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 8,000 ft; scat at 6,000 ft
- Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
- Altimeter: 30.07 inHg
- Observation at 10:53 pm from MCO
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 1 | |||
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 12 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA15IA198.