Cessna 560XL incident near Debary, Florida, January 13, 2013
On January 13, 2013 at about 11:18 pm local time, a Cessna 560XL, registered N662QS, was involved in an incident during enroute (climb to cruise) near Debary, Florida. It was flown under fractional-ownership rules (Part 91 subpart K). No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
An accumulation of debris in the airplane’s bilge drain holes that prevented accumulated moisture from properly draining; the accumulated moisture subsequently froze around the elevator control components, which resulted in the flight control stiffness. Contributing to the accident was maintenance personnel’s improper installation of seals in the airplane’s tailcone, which allowed water to enter the tailcone.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- January 13, 2013 · about 11:18 pm local time
- Place
- Debary, Florida · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 560XL · all 560XLs on the register
- Registration
- N662QS · registry record · serial 560-5262
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · fractional-ownership rules (Part 91 subpart K)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The flight departed uneventfully and was climbing to their planned cruise altitude. As the airplane climbed through FL350 at a rate of 1,000 feet per minute (fpm) and with the autopilot engaged, the airplane pitched nose-down and entered a 400-fpm descent. The flight crew then disconnected the autopilot, assumed manual control of the airplane, and leveled at FL350. Both crewmembers noted that "excessive" force was required to change the pitch of the airplane, and subsequently notified air traffic control of the situation. The crew then requested a descent, and noted that both trim and manual elevator control inputs would result in an exaggerated pitch response from the airplane. Upon descending through FL180, the crew felt that something "broke loose" and the elevator controls began to respond normally. The crew subsequently re-engaged the autopilot and continued to the planned destination uneventfully. Post-incident examination of the airplane revealed that several of the fuselage bilge drain holes were partially or totally obstructed, allowing water to accumulate within the bilge and in areas adjacent to elevator control cables and pulleys. Several of the pulleys exhibited evidence of saturation with moisture, and two of the pulleys' bearings had seized completely and displayed evidence that the control cable had subsequently worn their grooves. Additionally, seals designed to limit the entry of moisture within the tail area were not trimmed according to the published installation procedure. As a result of the findings of the investigation, the airframe manufacturer and operator each implemented a revised inspection and cleaning program to ensure the proper drainage of moisture from the tailcone and fuselage bilge areas.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Flight control sys malf/fail during enroute (climb to cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Debris/dirt/foreign object › Effect on equipment
- cause Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Water/moisture › Effect on equipment
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Elevator control system › Malfunction
- Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Fuselage › Frames (main fuselage) › Related maintenance info
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 9,431 hours in all; 593 in this make and model; 66 in the last 90 days; 16 in the last 30 days; 3,138 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: November 19, 2012
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 7,107 hours in all; 3,017 in this make and model; 103 in the last 90 days; 50 in the last 30 days; 3,607 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: November 19, 2012
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 8,990 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, August 29, 2012
- Maximum gross weight: 20,200 lb
- Seats: 9
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: Pratt And Whitney Canada PW545A (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt And Whitney Canada PW545A (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Netjets Aviation, Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: FPR Fort Pierce FL at 10:52 pm
- Destination: PDK Atlanta GA
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night, dark
- Wind: from 130° at 10 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
- Altimeter: 30.12 inHg
- Observation at 10:53 pm from SFB, 7 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Other NTSB records under N662QS the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.