The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB ENG18IA003 · Final report

Airbus A330-243 incident near Seattle, Washington, November 7, 2017

On November 7, 2017 at about 10:45 pm local time, a 2015 Airbus A330-243, registered N375HA, suffered minor damage in an incident during approach near Seattle, Washington (Seattle-Tacoma International A airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The loss of control of the left-hand engine and the subsequent thermal damage to the left wing on landing during engine reverse operation was due to a blockage of the variable stator vane torque motor filter that resulted in the engine’s electronic engine control to improper schedule maximum fuel flow resulting in flames out the engine’s exhaust tailpipe that impinged the wing. Contributing to the event were: - The presence of water containing dissolved aluminum sulfate (alum) in the airplane fuel system that initiated a sudden blockage of the engine VSV TM SP filter. - The maintenance provider omitted to sump the fuel tanks during the 10-day period of inactivity of the airplane. - While the engine was in an internally stalled condition during the reverse and post-reverse thrust operation, the electronic engine control logic allowed the fuel metering unit to supply maximum fuel flow despite the throttle at idle speed.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
November 7, 2017 · about 10:45 pm local time
Place
Seattle, Washington · Seattle-Tacoma International A · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Airbus A330-243 243, built 2015 · all A330-243s on the register
Registration
N375HA · registry record · serial 1606
Damage
Minor damage
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

A confluence of four fuel system anomalies caused a blockage of a fuel filter in the engine control system of the Rolls Royce Trent 700 that led to the loss of control of the left-hand (No. 1) engine thrust during approach and landing. The Rolls-Royce Trent 700 features several protective fuel filters throughout the many fuel components that constitute the engine’s fuel system. An extensive teardown of the fuel system components of the No. 1 engine revealed a significant blockage of the Variable Stator Vane (VSV) Torque Motor (TM) supply port (SP) filter. The VSV TM constantly modulates the VSV actuators to match the rotational speed, altitude, temperature, and power requirements of the engine. Without this matching, the internal airflow of the engine will be disrupted resulting in multiple surges, overspeed, over temperature and incorrect fuel scheduling. The reason for the blockage of the VSV TM was not readily apparent; however, it was concluded that long-term use of fuel containing higher concentrations of sulphur compounds caused debris to adhere and accumulate to the upstream side of the VSV Control Unit Main Inlet Filter (MIF) element, with sulfate acting as the binding agent. Laboratory testing and analytical assessment of the fuel system determined the most likely sequence was that a larger-than-normal quantity of water was introduced into the fuel lines dissolving the water-soluble sulphate and releasing the MIF deposits/debris. The MIF debris particles flowed downstream to the partially blocked VSV TM SP filter, completely blocking it. The EEC increased the fuel flow to maximum fuel flow based on an erroneous VSV position, causing fireballs and fire streaks from the exhaust pipe and subsequent thermal damage to the wing. Only the forced closing of the wing spar valve stopped the exhaust fire. The reason for the larger-than-normal quantity of water to be introduced into the fuel was the omission by the maintenance provider to ‘sump’ the wing tanks after ten days of the airplane being stationary for unrelated scheduled service. Examination of other components of the fuel system revealed the presence of aluminum sulfate (alum) nodules. Since aluminum sulfate can only be dissolved in water and not fuel this implies the presence of water in the fuel. The four conditions that precipitated this event were. Water in the fuel: The most likely scenario was that the airplane wing tanks contained water that had accumulated and settled during the 10 days while it was undergoing maintenance and the maintenance provider failed to manage routine fuel tank sumping on the airplane as recommended by the manufacturer. One hour, prior to start 4,300 pounds of fuel was uploaded to the airplane. This was considered to be sufficient time for any water to settle back to the bottom. The engines are started with 120 liters of the original fuel in the engine fuel system components and lines. The fuel consumed during engine start, idle and taxi was estimated to be about 87 liters. The selection of takeoff power requires high VSV servo flow for 500 milliseconds to position the VSVs quickly in response to the power demand, thus drawing the high-water-content fuel from the tanks through the VSVC MIF, thereby liberating previously deposited material from the filter into the servo passages. As the takeoff power was achieved, low fuel flow to the servo allowed the liberated debris near the VSV TM supply port filter. During the flight, there is low servo fuel flow in the VSVC since there is not a large change in power; however, during landing approach, high servo flow was again commanded, and a ‘cloud’ of liberated debris almost completely blocked the VSV TM SP filter, creating a slow VSV response, leading to increased N2 and subsequent N1 speed increase upon reverse thrust selection. Aluminum Sulfate (alum) was found throughout the left engine fuel system and is unique to this event. Alum is not used in the aviation industry, and it is not likely that the alum was introduced into the fuel system by simple fueling contamination. Recent industry research on the quality of fuel distributed in the United States indicated that fuel distributed on the west coast can, in the long-term cause more sulfate precipitate in the fuel system and be dissolved by water than fuel distributed on the east coast. These studies also suggest that sulfates increase a chemical binding phenomenon that was observed in the VSV torque motor filter. The long-term use of west coast fuel may increase the precipitation of sulfate salts in fuel lines. Examination of the left engine main high-pressure fuel pump revealed cavitation erosion. The elemental makeup of metallic debris found in the VSV TM SP filter was very similar in composition to that of the main high pressure fuel pump parts. Ordinarily this fine material should pass easily through the filters (MIF mesh size is 45 microns (µ) and the VSV TM SP filters mesh size is 80 µ; however, there appears to be an unexplained process in which the fine fuel pump particles clump together, using the fuel breakdown products (sulfate) as a binder. Because the normally smooth engine internal airflow was disrupted due to the VSV slow response, the engine became internally stalled and unstable during approach. Due to the inhibited cockpit warnings during final approach, the pilots were not aware of the increasing internal engine airflow instability. During landing the EEC logic changes modes so that it controls the N1 spool; however, because of the airflow disruption from the mis-scheduled VSVs, the N1 spool did not respond in accordance with the reverse power demand. The EEC kept increasing fuel flow until it reached the maximum flow rate, causing excess fuel in the combustor and unburnt fuel to exit the tailpipe where it mixed with fresh air and became ignited, causing thermal damage to the airplane skin.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during landing (flare/touchdown)
  2. Loss of engine power (partial) during landing (landing roll)
  3. Fire/smoke (non-impact) during landing (landing roll)
  4. Flight control sys malf/fail during approach defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service › Maintenance/inspections › Scheduled maint checks › Not serviced/maintained
  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control › Fuel controlling system › Not specified
  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Unknown/Not determined

The aircraft

  • Maximum gross weight: 507,063 lb
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine 1: Rolls-Royc RR772B-60; 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Rolls-Royc RR772B-60; 0 hours total
  • Operator: Hawaiian Airlines

The flight

  • Departed from: PAE Everitt WA
  • Destination: Seattle WA
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

5 documents, released by the NTSB on June 28, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Flight Data Recorder - Specialista��s Factual Report PDF, 16 pages View Download
2 Flight Data Recorder - Attachment 1 data file Download
3 Flight Data Recorder - Attachment 2 data file Download
4 Flight Data Recorder - Attachment 3 data file Download
5 Powerplants Factual Report PDF, 54 pages View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.