Airbus A320 incident near Newark, New Jersey, April 5, 2010
On April 5, 2010 at about 10:29 am local time, a Airbus A320, registered N535JB, suffered minor damage in an incident during takeoff near Newark, New Jersey (Newark International Airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 140 people were on board or involved.
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The separation of both halves of the left engine fan cowl assembly due to improper latching and locking of the all the fan cowl latches. The cause of the improper latching and locking of the fan cowls was due to the failure of the mechanic to unstow and properly latch and lock the fan cowl latches after the engine maintenance had been completed, and the failure of the maintenance inspector to detect and identify the unlatched condition. Contributing the incident is the design of the fan cowl latch assembly that can provide a false latch condition when the latch is neither latched or locked. Also contributing incident is the lack of adequate Airbus and Jet Blue fan cowl latch inspection guidance to detect and identify an unlatched condition.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- April 5, 2010 · about 10:29 am local time
- Place
- Newark, New Jersey · Newark International Airport · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 140 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- not recorded
- Aircraft
- Airbus A320 232 · all A320s on the register
- Registration
- N535JB · registry record · serial 1739
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
An Airbus A320 airplane experienced a left engine fan cowl separation during takeoff. The flight crew was unaware of the fan cowl separation until passengers pointed out the loss of both halves of the left engine fan cowl assembly. The flight crew returned for an uneventful landing. After parking and deplaning the passengers, the flight crew noted additional damage to the left engine pylon, leading edge flaps, left main landing gear, and horizontal stabilator. Examination of the engine fan cowls revealed that the cowl latch assembly and keeper housing assembly were intact, showed no evidence of malfunction, and exhibited no distortion or damage and that the cowling structure revealed no evidence of failure. Some delamination was found, but determined to not be contributory to the separation. Maintenance records revealed that a scheduled maintenance inspection of the left engine had been performed prior to the flight which required the opening and closing of the engine fan cowls. According to the operator’s maintenance records, the left engine maintenance sign-off sheet revealed that a mechanic had latched and locked the fan cowls and this task had been verify by another mechanic. Both the ‘action’ and ‘inspection’ signature blocks on the left engine maintenance sign-off sheet for the fan cowl latch procedure had been signed off as part of the Required Inspection Item (RII) procedure. The latch assembly is normally weighted and the inside and the sides of the latch handle are painted a different color (typically red or orange) than the cowling skin to visually highlight whether the latch is fully locked or not. If the latch is properly locked, the latch handle is flush with the cowling skin and painted portion of the latch handle is not visible. Examination of an exemplar Airbus A320 engine fan cowl revealed the possibility of a false latch condition that would mask an otherwise unlatched position. It was reported that mechanics working on the engine routinely push the latch assembly up against the latch keeper housing assembly in order to stow the latch to avoid inadvertent head injuries while working underneath engine. In this position, the latch is neither latched nor locked but the latch assembly may be flush with the cowling so that the paint on the latch handle is not visible, giving a false indication that the latch is properly locked Examination of the latch hardware revealed no mechanical damage such as would be expected if the latches were secured and locked at the time of the cowling separation.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Part(s) separation from AC during takeoff defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Nacelles/pylons structure › Main frame (on nacelles/pylon) › Malfunction
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Nacelles/pylons structure › (general) › Failure
The aircraft
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, March 20, 2009
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Iae V2527 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Iae V2527 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Jetblue Airways, Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: EWR Newark NJ
- Destination: FLL Ft. Lauderdale FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 22R
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 4 | |||
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 134 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.