Embraer ERJ 190-100 IGW incident near Nassau, Bs, September 3, 2009
On September 3, 2009 at about 6:35 pm local time, a Embraer ERJ 190-100 IGW, registered N258JB, suffered minor damage in an incident during landing (landing roll) near Nassau (Lynden Pindling International airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). 6 people had minor injuries.
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
failure of the engine high pressure turbine active clearance control valve fuel rod supply tube coupling seal due to a cross-threaded B-nut as installed during original manufacture.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 3, 2009 · about 6:35 pm local time
- Place
- Nassau, Bs · Lynden Pindling International
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- 6 people had minor injuries.
- Weather
- not recorded
- Aircraft
- Embraer ERJ 190-100 IGW · all ERJ 190-100 IGWs on the register
- Registration
- N258JB · no longer on the register · serial 19000047
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
A No. 1 engine under cowl fire occurred following landing. An emergency evacuation was performed, but the fire was quickly extinguished. The airplane's fuel system was pressurized and fuel sprayed from under the No. 1 engine high pressure turbine active clearance control (HPTACC) valve rod tube valve fitting B-nut. The coupling was properly safetied, but the B-nut was cocked on the fitting, and 3-4 fitting threads were exposed below the B-nut, consistent with the B-nut being cross-threaded on the fitting during installation. The HPTACC valve fuel rod tube coupling has both primary (metal-to-metal) and secondary (O-ring) seals between the fitting and the tube ferrule. Pre-disassembly X-ray photographs of the coupling provided B-nut stack measurements and showed a gap between the fitting and the ferrule at the primary seal location, indicating that this seal had not been engaged when the B-nut was tightened on the fitting. Disassembly inspection of the coupling found that the O-ring (secondary) seal was radially separated and extruded from its gland, consistent with having failed in service. A high-torque B-nut connection and thread damage to the B-nut and fitting threads were further evidence of an improperly installed (cross-threaded) B-nut. Maintenance and manufacturing records indicated that the coupling had not been disassembled since the engine was assembled at manufacture. An extrusion calculation found that the damage to the O-ring seal was consistent with the engine total time since new. Based on this evidence, it is likely that the coupling was cross-threaded during manufacturing final assembly, and there was no engagement of the metal-to-metal seal. As a result, the O-ring acted as the primary seal, until it failed in service, resulting in the leak.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Fire/smoke (non-impact) during landing (landing roll) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Document revision tracking › Manufacturer
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control › Fuel distribution › Damaged/degraded
The aircraft
- Seats: 20
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: Ge CF34-10E6 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Ge CF34-10E6 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Destination: MYNN Nassau
- Flight plan: not recorded
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Passengers | 6 |
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ENG09IA017.