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Accidents · NTSB DCA95MA020 · Final report

Douglas DC-8-63 accident near Kansas City, Missouri, February 17, 1995

On February 17, 1995 at about 2:27 am local time, a Douglas DC-8-63, registered N782AL, was destroyed in an accident near Kansas City, Missouri (Kansas City International airport). It was a ferry flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 3 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

(1) THE LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL BY THE PILOT IN COMMAND DURING THE TAKEOFF ROLL, AND HIS DECISION TO CONTINUE THE TAKEOFF AND INITIATE A ROTATION BELOW THE COMPUTED ROTATION AIRSPEED, RESULTING IN A PREMATURE LIFTOFF, FURTHER LOSS OF CONTROL AND COLLISION WITH THE TERRAIN. (2) THE FLIGHTCREW'S LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE THREE-ENGINE TAKEOFF PROCEDURES, AND THEIR DECISION TO MODIFY THOSE PROCEDURES. (3) THE FAILURE OF THE COMPANY TO ENSURE THAT THE FLIGHTCREW HAD ADEQUATE EXPERIENCE, TRAINING, AND REST TO CONDUCT THE NONROUTINE FLIGHT. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE INADEQUACY OF FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OVERSIGHT OF AIR TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL AND FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION FLIGHT AND DUTY TIME REGULATIONS THAT PERMITTED A SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED FLIGHTCREW REST PERIOD WHEN CONDUCTING A NONREVENUE FERRY FLIGHT UNDER 14 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS PART 91. (NTSB REPORT AAR-95/06)

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 17, 1995 · about 2:27 am local time
Place
Kansas City, Missouri · Kansas City International
Type
Accident
Injuries
3 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Douglas DC-8-63 · all DC-8-63s on the register
Registration
N782AL · registry record · serial 45929
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Ferry flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

THE AIRPLANE CRASHED IMMEDIATELY AFTER LIFTOFF DURING A THREE-ENGINE TAKEOFF. FLIGHTCREW HAD SHORTENED REST BREAK; REST PERIODS NOT REQUIRED FOR FERRY FLIGHTS. FLIGHTCREW FATIGUED FROM LACK OF REST, SLEEP, AND DISRUPTION OF CIRCADIAN RHYTHMS. FLIGHTCREW DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE, REALISTIC TRAINING IN THREE-ENGINE TAKEOFF TECHNIQUES OR PROCEDURES. FLIGHTCREW DID NOT ADEQUATELY UNDERSTAND THREE-ENGINE TAKEOFF PROCEDURES, INCLUDING SIGNIFICANCE OF VMCG. FLIGHT ENGINEER IMPROPERLY DETERMINED VMCG SPEED, RESULTING IN VALUE 9 KNOTS TOO LOW. DURING FIRST TAKEOFF ATTEMPT, CAPTAIN APPLIED POWER TO ASYMMETRICAL ENGINE TOO SOON, WAS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CONTROL, AND REJECTED THE TAKEOFF. CAPTAIN AGREED TO MODIFY PROCEDURE BY ALLOWING FLIGHT ENGINEER TO ADVANCE THROTTLE, A DEVIATION OF PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE. FAA OVERSIGHT OF OPERATOR WAS INADEQUATE BECAUSE THE POI AND GEOGRAPHIC INSPECTORS WERE UNABLE TO EFFECTIVELY MONITOR DOMESTIC CREW TRAINING AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS. EXISTING FAR PART 121 FLIGHT TIME LIMITS & REST REQUIREMENTS THAT PERTAINED TO THE FLIGHTS THAT THE FLIGHTCREW FLEW PRIOR TO THE FERRY FLIGHTS DID NOT APPLY TO THE FERRY FLIGHTS FLOWN UNDER FAR PART 91. CURRENT ONE-ENGINE INOPERATIVE TAKEOFF PROCEDURES DO NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE RUDDER AVAILABILITY FOR CORRECTING DIRECTIONAL DEVIATIONS DURING THE TAKEOFF ROLL COMPATIBLE WITH THE ACHIEVEMENT OF MAXIMUM ASYMMETRIC THRUST AT AN APPROPRIATE SPEED GREATER THAN GROUND MINIMUM CONTROL SPEED.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, flight engineer, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 9,711 hours in all; 4,483 in this make and model; 201 in the last 90 days; 60 in the last 30 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 4,261 hours in all; 171 in this make and model; 142 in the last 90 days; 39 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: October 7, 1994
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

Flight Engineer

  • Certificate: flight instructor
  • Flight time: 4,460 hours in all; 248 in this make and model; 135 in the last 90 days; 57 in the last 30 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rear
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 77,096 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, February 11, 1995; 12 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 220,226 lb
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: P&W JT3D-7 (turbojet); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground
  • Operator: Air Transport International Limited Liability CO

The flight

  • Departed from: MCI at 8:27 am
  • Destination: CEF Westover Afb MA
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 1L, 10,801 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: night, dark
  • Wind: from 210° at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 20 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 30°F (-1°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
  • Observation at 1:50 am from KCI, 1 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew3

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.