Embraer-Empresa Brasileira De ERJ 170-200 LR accident near Boston, Massachusetts, July 14, 2025
On July 14, 2025 at about 10:30 pm local time, a 2008 Embraer-Empresa Brasileira De ERJ 170-200 LR, registered N224JQ, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (flare/touchdown) near Boston, Massachusetts (General Edward Lawrence Logan airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 80 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The captain’s decision to continue the landing after the bounce and the subsequent misapplication of pitch controls. Contributing to the accident was the ongoing “land and hold short” operations that may have created an urgency to land.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 14, 2025 · about 10:30 pm local time
- Place
- Boston, Massachusetts · General Edward Lawrence Logan · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 80 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Embraer-Empresa Brasileira De ERJ 170-200 LR, built 2008 · all ERJ 170-200 LRs on the register
- Registration
- N224JQ · registry record · serial 17000209
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
Republic Airways, dba Delta Connection, flight 5783 from Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG), Covington, Kentucky, to General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport (BOS), Boston, Massachusetts, was substantially damaged during a tail strike while landing at BOS. There were no injuries to the 4 crew members and 76 passengers on board. According to the flight crew, the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 22L was normal, until the initial touchdown. The first officer flew the airplane to the final approach fix and then transferred control to the captain, to comply with company procedures for land and hold short operations, which were in place for the runway at the time. The first officer reported that the approach met company standards for a stabilized approach at both 1,000 and 500 ft above ground level (agl). Slight deviations from the glideslope occurred on short final, for which the captain performed appropriate corrections. The first officer recalled that after an initial touchdown the airplane bounced slightly, and the captain added some more back pressure to the control column as the airplane quickly sank back to the ground. The airplane touched down hard, the captain maintained directional control and the remainder of the landing was uneventful. A review of the flight recorder data revealed that the computed airspeed at the time of the initial touchdown was about 129 knots, and the pitch attitude was about 8°. As the airplane touched down the second time, the pitch attitude was about 9° and increasing, it then rose to about 14° just after the air/ground parameter changed to ground. According to the manufacturer’s airplane operations manual, the tail cone of the airplane should contact the ground at a pitch attitude of 14.5° with the landing gear struts fully extended, and at 10.5° with the struts fully compressed. The tail likely stuck the ground as the landing gear struts compressed during the second touchdown. Figure 1. Damage to aft fuselage and tail cone. (Courtesy: Republic Airways) The weather reported at BOS near the time of the accident included wind from 200° at 12 knots, visibility 10 miles, and a scattered cloud layer at 2,400 ft agl.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Tailstrike during landing (flare/touchdown) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Flight crew
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,168 in this make and model
- Last flight review: July 18, 2025
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 90 in this make and model
- Last flight review: May 21, 2025
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Maximum gross weight: 85,517 lb
- Seats: 80
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Ge CF34-8E5 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Ge CF34-8E5 (turbofan); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: CVG Cincinnati OH
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 22L, 10,006 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 200° at 12 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 14,000 ft; scat at 2,400 ft
- Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
- Altimeter: 30.01 inHg
- Observation at 6:12 pm from KBOS
Weather report (METAR): SPECI KBOS 142212Z 20012KT 10SM SCT024 BKN140 BKN220 27/22 A3001 RMK AO2 T02670217=
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 2 | |||
| Flig | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 76 |
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number DCA25LA286.