Airbus A321-231 and Airbus A321 accident near Boston, Massachusetts, February 8, 2024
On February 8, 2024 at about 11:37 am local time, 2 aircraft, Airbus A321-231 (N956JT) and Airbus A321 (N2157J), were involved in the same accident near Boston, Massachusetts (General Edward Lawrence Logan airport). No one was hurt; 364 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The “follow me” driver stopping the airplane (flight 551) about 35 feet from the normal stopping point due to a difficulty in seeing the yellow “T”-bar because of the dark night conditions and the presence of de-icing fluid on the ground.
The “follow me” driver stopping the airplane (flight 551) about 35 feet from the normal stopping point due to a difficulty in seeing the yellow “T”-bar because of the dark night conditions and the presence of de-icing fluid on the ground.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 8, 2024 · about 11:37 am local time
- Place
- Boston, Massachusetts · General Edward Lawrence Logan · map
- Type
- Accident · collision on the ground
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 364 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Airbus A321-231, built 2015 · all A321-231s on the register
- Registration
- N956JT · registry record · serial 6791
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
- Aircraft 2
- Airbus A321, built 2023 · all A321s on the register
- Registration
- N2157J · registry record · serial 11397
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative for the Airbus A321-231 final · quoted from the NTSB record
While taxiing within the Amelia Earhart de-icing pad area, the left sharklet of JetBlue Airways flight 777 collided with the right horizontal stabilizer and elevator of JetBlue Airways flight 551 at the General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport (BOS), Boston, Massachusetts. There were no injuries to the 210 passengers and crew on flight 551 or the 154 passengers and crew on flight 777. The flight crew of flight 551 stated that, following a normal preflight and uneventful taxi from the gate to the de-icing pad, they were guided by a “follow me” vehicle operated by JetBlue contractor, Aeromag (see figure 1). The flight crew proceeded to follow the vehicle to the D2 parking spot. A yellow painted “T” inside a black square marked the proper stopping point location for the airplane’s nose tires when parked. Nearing the stopping point, the “follow me” vehicle turned to the right and stopped with its headlights facing toward the back of the airplane. The driver of the “follow me” vehicle communicated with the flight crew via radio and began a “countdown” for when the captain should stop the airplane. Upon the verbal stop command, the captain stopped the airplane and set the parking brake. After the de-ice procedure was complete, the flight crew received instructions to taxi the airplane to runway 9 for departure. Immediately after releasing the airplane’s parking brake, the flight crew felt jolts and vibrations and the airplane swayed back and forth. The captain set the parking brake and the first officer (FO) contacted air traffic control (ATC) and was informed they had been struck by another aircraft. Figure 1. Google Earth image showing the ground position tracks of both airplanes. In a post-accident statement, the driver of the “follow me” vehicle indicated that he stopped the airplane (flight 551) at what he thought was the normal stopping point. He had difficulty seeing the yellow “T” -bar due to the dark night conditions and the de-icing fluid that was present on the ground (figure 2). A post-accident inspection found that the airplane was about 35 ft short of the normal stopping point. Figure 2. Photograph showing N956JT (JetBlue flight 551) about 35 feet from the yellow “T” bar. (Source: JetBlue) The flight crew of flight 777 indicated that after a normal preflight and uneventful taxi from the gate to the de-icing pad they were guided to the D1 spot by a “follow me” vehicle. The captain stated spacing appeared to be tight and he focused on the yellow taxi line to ensure proper clearance from other airplanes in the area. Shortly thereafter, while taxiing, the flight crew heard a grinding noise and felt a vibration. While still moving forward, they heard another aircraft on the Aeromag radio frequency ask if something had struck their airplane. The flight crew of flight 777 stopped their airplane and set the parking brake. The captain had difficulty seeing the left sharklet due to the dark night conditions but noted that it was intact. In addition, he was unable to see the empennage of flight 551 parked at the D2 location as it was behind them. Flight 551 (N956JT) sustained substantial damage to the left horizontal stabilizer and the left elevator. As a result of this event, Aeromag investigated and produced a February 12, 2024, memo to their BOS-JBU [JetBlue] operations staff discussing an amendment to the Coordinator of Traffic and Movement (CTM) phraseology and aircraft stopping procedures. The memo outlined the updated procedures and phraseology as: “Follow me” truck is now required to verbally confirm with the flight crew that the aircraft is correctly stopped on the deicing “T”-Bar. JetBlue will add to the Airport Briefing Guide (ABG) that the pilot will not configure the aircraft until confirmation that the aircraft is correctly stopped on the deicing “T”-Bar. The “follow me” truck is required to check the rear of the aircraft to ensure that it is within the bay and clear of the zipper line before confirming brake set. Safety Lead will perform a secondary check, reconfirming with the CTM that the aircraft has stopped on the deicing “T”-Bar. Safety Lead will also verify that the rear of the aircraft is clear of the zipper line and within the bay. Truck positioning and aircraft deicing will commence after these checks have been completed. Additionally, once CTM has confirmed with the flight crew that they have a visual on the “follow me” truck, the “follow me” truck operator will follow these steps: 1. Guide the aircraft into the assigned bay. 2. Ensure the aircraft is properly stopped on the deicing “T”-Bar. 3. Confirm that the rear of the aircraft is within the bay, clear of the zipper line, before bringing any other aircraft in. Finally, the Safety Lead will: 1. Inspect and confirm with CTM that the aircraft is properly stopped on the deicing “T”-Bar. 2. Inspect that the rear of the aircraft is well within the bay and clear of the zipper line. Aeromag also increased its daily roster to include sufficient qualified staff to allocate a Safety Lead dedicated to each operational bay regardless of operating conditions. Long term prevention strategies identified were: Repainting and reviewing the color format of the delineated markings using high-visibility paint and/or reflective inset markers. Investigating the feasibility of adding high mast lighting for the Earhart facility. Operational audits to focus on the correct positioning of aircraft while maintaining the safety buffer zones. Explore opportunities to locate Aeromag tower personnel in elevated positions.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Airbus A321 final · quoted from the NTSB record
While taxiing within the Amelia Earhart de-icing pad area, the left sharklet of JetBlue Airways flight 777 collided with the right horizontal stabilizer and elevator of JetBlue Airways flight 551 at the General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport (BOS), Boston, Massachusetts. There were no injuries to the 210 passengers and crew on flight 551 or the 154 passengers and crew on flight 777. The flight crew of flight 551 stated that, following a normal preflight and uneventful taxi from the gate to the de-icing pad, they were guided by a “follow me” vehicle operated by JetBlue contractor, Aeromag (see figure 1). The flight crew proceeded to follow the vehicle to the D2 parking spot. A yellow painted “T” inside a black square marked the proper stopping point location for the airplane’s nose tires when parked. Nearing the stopping point, the “follow me” vehicle turned to the right and stopped with its headlights facing toward the back of the airplane. The driver of the “follow me” vehicle communicated with the flight crew via radio and began a “countdown” for when the captain should stop the airplane. Upon the verbal stop command, the captain stopped the airplane and set the parking brake. After the de-ice procedure was complete, the flight crew received instructions to taxi the airplane to runway 9 for departure. Immediately after releasing the airplane’s parking brake, the flight crew felt jolts and vibrations and the airplane swayed back and forth. The captain set the parking brake and the first officer (FO) contacted air traffic control (ATC) and was informed they had been struck by another aircraft. Figure 1. Google Earth image showing the ground position tracks of both airplanes. In a post-accident statement, the driver of the “follow me” vehicle indicated that he stopped the airplane (flight 551) at what he thought was the normal stopping point. He had difficulty seeing the yellow “T” -bar due to the dark night conditions and the de-icing fluid that was present on the ground (figure 2). A post-accident inspection found that the airplane was about 35 ft short of the normal stopping point. Figure 2. Photograph showing N956JT (JetBlue flight 551) about 35 feet from the yellow “T” bar. (Source: JetBlue) The flight crew of flight 777 indicated that after a normal preflight and uneventful taxi from the gate to the de-icing pad they were guided to the D1 spot by a “follow me” vehicle. The captain stated spacing appeared to be tight and he focused on the yellow taxi line to ensure proper clearance from other airplanes in the area. Shortly thereafter, while taxiing, the flight crew heard a grinding noise and felt a vibration. While still moving forward, they heard another aircraft on the Aeromag radio frequency ask if something had struck their airplane. The flight crew of flight 777 stopped their airplane and set the parking brake. The captain had difficulty seeing the left sharklet due to the dark night conditions but noted that it was intact. In addition, he was unable to see the empennage of flight 551 parked at the D2 location as it was behind them. Flight 551 (N956JT) sustained substantial damage to the left horizontal stabilizer and the left elevator. As a result of this event, Aeromag investigated and produced a February 12, 2024, memo to their BOS-JBU [JetBlue] operations staff discussing an amendment to the Coordinator of Traffic and Movement (CTM) phraseology and aircraft stopping procedures. The memo outlined the updated procedures and phraseology as: “Follow me” truck is now required to verbally confirm with the flight crew that the aircraft is correctly stopped on the deicing “T”-Bar. JetBlue will add to the Airport Briefing Guide (ABG) that the pilot will not configure the aircraft until confirmation that the aircraft is correctly stopped on the deicing “T”-Bar. The “follow me” truck is required to check the rear of the aircraft to ensure that it is within the bay and clear of the zipper line before confirming brake set. Safety Lead will perform a secondary check, reconfirming with the CTM that the aircraft has stopped on the deicing “T”-Bar. Safety Lead will also verify that the rear of the aircraft is clear of the zipper line and within the bay. Truck positioning and aircraft deicing will commence after these checks have been completed. Additionally, once CTM has confirmed with the flight crew that they have a visual on the “follow me” truck, the “follow me” truck operator will follow these steps: 1. Guide the aircraft into the assigned bay. 2. Ensure the aircraft is properly stopped on the deicing “T”-Bar. 3. Confirm that the rear of the aircraft is within the bay, clear of the zipper line, before bringing any other aircraft in. Finally, the Safety Lead will: 1. Inspect and confirm with CTM that the aircraft is properly stopped on the deicing “T”-Bar. 2. Inspect that the rear of the aircraft is well within the bay and clear of the zipper line. Aeromag also increased its daily roster to include sufficient qualified staff to allocate a Safety Lead dedicated to each operational bay regardless of operating conditions. Long term prevention strategies identified were: Repainting and reviewing the color format of the delineated markings using high-visibility paint and/or reflective inset markers. Investigating the feasibility of adding high mast lighting for the Earhart facility. Operational audits to focus on the correct positioning of aircraft while maintaining the safety buffer zones. Explore opportunities to locate Aeromag tower personnel in elevated positions.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Airbus A321-231 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Ground collision during standing (engine(s) operating) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Ground crew
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 23,145 hours in all; 13,128 in this make and model; 125 in the last 90 days; 0 in the last 30 days; 18,077 as pilot in command; 634 on instruments
- Last flight review: February 1, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 10,533 hours in all; 1,494 in this make and model; 3,528 as pilot in command; 20,705 on instruments
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme
- Maximum gross weight: 205,000 lb
- Seats: 206
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Iae V2533-A5 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Iae V2533-A5 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Jetblue Airways CORP
Weather at the time
- Light: dawn
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 4,000 ft
- Temperature: 29°F (-2°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
- Altimeter: 30.32 inHg
- Observation at 6:54 am from KBOS
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 4 | |||
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 204 |
The factual record for the Airbus A321 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Ground collision during taxi defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Flight crew
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 11,970 hours in all; 9,500 in this make and model
- Last flight review: February 1, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 16,000 hours in all; 9,500 in this make and model
- Last flight review: June 8, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme
- Maximum gross weight: 205,000 lb
- Seats: 246
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 5: Iae PW1133GA-JM (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 6: Iae PW1133GA-JM (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Jetblue Airways CORP
The flight
- Flight plan: none
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 4 | |||
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 148 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
6 documents, released by the NTSB on July 18, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Aeromag Employee Statement | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 2 | Flight Crew Statements Flight 551 | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Flight Crew Statements Flight 777 | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 - N956JT | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 - N2157J | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 6 | Cockpit Voice Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report | PDF, 10 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.