Textron Aviation INC 510 and Raytheon HAWKER accident near Houston, Texas, October 24, 2023
On October 24, 2023 at about 8:20 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Textron Aviation INC 510 (N510HM) and Raytheon HAWKER (N269AA), were involved in the same accident near Houston, Texas (William P Hobby Airport). No one was hurt; 7 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The takeoff by the flight crew of N269AA, without a takeoff clearance, which resulted in a collision with N510HM that was landing on an intersecting runway. Contributing to the accident was the N269AA crew’s expectation bias and distraction.
The takeoff by the flight crew of N269AA, without a takeoff clearance, which resulted in a collision with N510HM that was landing on an intersecting runway. Contributing to the accident was the N269AA crew’s expectation bias and distraction.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 24, 2023 · about 8:20 pm local time
- Place
- Houston, Texas · William P Hobby Airport · map
- Type
- Accident · collision on the ground
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 7 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Textron Aviation INC 510, built 2016
- Registration
- N510HM · no longer on the register · serial 510-0468
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
- Aircraft 2
- Raytheon HAWKER 850XP
- Registration
- N269AA · no longer on the register · serial 258800
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative for the Textron Aviation INC 510 final · quoted from the NTSB record
A Raytheon Hawker 850XP, N269AA, operated by DuPage Aerospace, collided with a Textron Aviation Inc 510 Citation Mustang, N510HM, at the intersection of runways 13R and 22 at William P. Hobby Airport (HOU) in Houston, Texas. N510HM was rolling after landing on runway 13R, and N269AA was on its takeoff roll on runway 22. About the time of lift-off, the left wingtip of N269AA struck the left side of N510HM’s tail cone, resulting in substantial damage to N510HM. N269AA continued its takeoff, and during initial climb advised the HOU air traffic control tower (ATCT) that they needed to return to the airport. The local control (LC) controller provided vectors to runway 13R, where N269AA landed uneventfully. About 4.5 minutes prior to the collision, the LC controller cleared N510HM to land while it was on a 9-mile final. About 2.5 minutes before the collision, N510HM reported a 4-mile final. About 2 minutes prior to the collision the LC controller cleared N269AA to “line up and wait” (LUAW) on runway 22. The pilot monitoring (PM) correctly readback the clearance with “line up and wait uh, two two uh, six nine Alpha Alpha”. During post-accident interviews, the PM recalled hearing the LUAW clearance and a subsequent clearance for takeoff, and the pilot flying (PF) recalled hearing only a clearance for takeoff. However, a review of the certified air traffic control voice recordings revealed that there was no takeoff clearance issued to N269AA (or other airplanes) at that time. This discrepancy was likely due to the pilots’ expectation bias, a cognitive phenomenon where individuals perceive what they expect to hear or see and act accordingly. Both Hawker pilots recalled that near the time of the LUAW clearance, the programmed V-speed references were no longer displayed on their instruments. They discussed the issue, and the PM began re-entering data into the flight management system to restore the speeds. The PF stated he felt “a little bit rushed” due to the perceived takeoff clearance and he did not want to delay on the runway. The crew discussed the speeds and elected to proceed with the takeoff. This activity may have distracted the pilots and exacerbated their expectation bias. Additionally, when the LC controller issued the LUAW clearance, they did not provide a traffic advisory to either airplane, which is a required procedure. A traffic advisory would have provided more context and awareness for both crews about the location and activity of the other airplane. However, the PM correctly acknowledged the LUAW clearance, which should be sufficiently clear that a delay was required before takeoff could commence, regardless of the reason. Therefore, it is unlikely that the lack of a traffic advisory contributed to the outcome. The N269AA crew taxied onto the runway and began the takeoff without a clearance from the ATCT. The ATCT controllers observed its movement and the Airport Surface Detection Equipment – Model X (ASDE-X) in the ATCT sounded a warning of a perceived collision. The LC controller twice instructed N269AA to stop and hold position but received no response. The pilots recalled that as they began the takeoff roll, two events occurred. First, they noticed that the rudder bias system had activated, which they resolved by adjusting the thrust such that both engines were set to similar power setting. The PF did this, and the rudder bias system deactivated. Second, the elevator trim warning system activated, and the PM then adjusted the pitch trim (by rolling it nose down about 1/16 inch) which extinguished the warning. These activities likely distracted the pilots and prevented them from recognizing the instructions from the LC controller to stop. They continued their takeoff roll, and both pilots recalled that they did not see N510HM until about 1 second before the collision. According to the chief pilot of DuPage Aerospace, company policy and training (and as part of every takeoff briefing) specify that takeoffs should be aborted for “any fault or failure” below 80 knots. He elaborated that if a fault were indicated on the annunciator panel [which is where the elevator trim warning system indictor is displayed], “then you should be aborting.” He further stated that “it depends what the fault or failure is” and described that if the elevator trim warning activated during takeoff, while the trim setting was very near either end of the takeoff range, that he would re-trim the airplane and then move the throttles back into the takeoff position and make sure the warning did not reactivate. If it were to reactivate, he would then abort the takeoff. Similarly, the PM noted during his interview that the elevator trim warnings are common in the Hawker, particularly when the trim setting was at or near the very aft mark of the [takeoff range] of the trim indicator. He said that typically a slight roll forward of the trim wheel would extinguish the light. This suggests there is some discrepancy or exceptions between the operator’s policy and at times, the in-practice procedures, with regard to conditions that warrant an aborted takeoff. In this case, the elevator trim warning (and the activation of the rudder bias) was temporary and easy to quickly remedy, though it happened to occur at a critical time as ATC was attempting to stop the takeoff roll. Separately, the chief pilot stated that it was company policy (and an element of the before start checklist) to test the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) prior to every flight. After the accident, the CVR was found to be inoperative due to activation of the impact or G switch, which interrupts electrical power to the CVR and its control unit in the cockpit. This can occur for several reasons, including hard landings or during maintenance operations. Review of the recording revealed audio consistent with maintenance activities. The CVR does not record date and time, however it likely became inoperative at some time prior to this crew’s pairing, which began two flights prior to the accident flight. Post accident testing of the CVR and the impact switch revealed they operated as designed. The flight crew should have been aware of the CVR’s nonoperational status during the before start checklist prior to the accident and the two previous flights, had they 1) pressed the CVR test button and 2) noticed that none of the indicator lights on the CVR control unit had illuminated, because the control unit (and CVR) were not powered. Normally, the indicator lights show the progress of the self-test, and whether the test passes or fails. However, during normal operation (no faults, and not in self-test mode) none of the indictor lights on the cockpit voice control unit are illuminated. Therefore, the control unit would look the same if 1) the CVR was running normally, or 2) if it was completely unpowered by the activated inertial switch. The only methods for the flight crew to determine if the unit is functioning are to use the self-test function, or by monitoring the audio through the headset jack on the control panel. Since the CVR was inoperative, the relevant crew conversations that would have provided additional insight to the investigation were not captured. This demonstrates the importance of properly testing the CVR before each flight.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Raytheon HAWKER final · quoted from the NTSB record
A Raytheon Hawker 850XP, N269AA, operated by DuPage Aerospace, collided with a Textron Aviation Inc 510 Citation Mustang, N510HM, at the intersection of runways 13R and 22 at William P. Hobby Airport (HOU) in Houston, Texas. N510HM was rolling after landing on runway 13R, and N269AA was on its takeoff roll on runway 22. About the time of lift-off, the left wingtip of N269AA struck the left side of N510HM’s tail cone, resulting in substantial damage to N510HM. N269AA continued its takeoff, and during initial climb advised the HOU air traffic control tower (ATCT) that they needed to return to the airport. The local control (LC) controller provided vectors to runway 13R, where N269AA landed uneventfully. About 4.5 minutes prior to the collision, the LC controller cleared N510HM to land while it was on a 9-mile final. About 2.5 minutes before the collision, N510HM reported a 4-mile final. About 2 minutes prior to the collision the LC controller cleared N269AA to “line up and wait” (LUAW) on runway 22. The pilot monitoring (PM) correctly readback the clearance with “line up and wait uh, two two uh, six nine Alpha Alpha”. During post-accident interviews, the PM recalled hearing the LUAW clearance and a subsequent clearance for takeoff, and the pilot flying (PF) recalled hearing only a clearance for takeoff. However, a review of the certified air traffic control voice recordings revealed that there was no takeoff clearance issued to N269AA (or other airplanes) at that time. This discrepancy was likely due to the pilots’ expectation bias, a cognitive phenomenon where individuals perceive what they expect to hear or see and act accordingly. Both Hawker pilots recalled that near the time of the LUAW clearance, the programmed V-speed references were no longer displayed on their instruments. They discussed the issue, and the PM began re-entering data into the flight management system to restore the speeds. The PF stated he felt “a little bit rushed” due to the perceived takeoff clearance and he did not want to delay on the runway. The crew discussed the speeds and elected to proceed with the takeoff. This activity may have distracted the pilots and exacerbated their expectation bias. Additionally, when the LC controller issued the LUAW clearance, they did not provide a traffic advisory to either airplane, which is a required procedure. A traffic advisory would have provided more context and awareness for both crews about the location and activity of the other airplane. However, the PM correctly acknowledged the LUAW clearance, which should be sufficiently clear that a delay was required before takeoff could commence, regardless of the reason. Therefore, it is unlikely that the lack of a traffic advisory contributed to the outcome. The N269AA crew taxied onto the runway and began the takeoff without a clearance from the ATCT. The ATCT controllers observed its movement and the Airport Surface Detection Equipment – Model X (ASDE-X) in the ATCT sounded a warning of a perceived collision. The LC controller twice instructed N269AA to stop and hold position but received no response. The pilots recalled that as they began the takeoff roll, two events occurred. First, they noticed that the rudder bias system had activated, which they resolved by adjusting the thrust such that both engines were set to similar power setting. The PF did this, and the rudder bias system deactivated. Second, the elevator trim warning system activated, and the PM then adjusted the pitch trim (by rolling it nose down about 1/16 inch) which extinguished the warning. These activities likely distracted the pilots and prevented them from recognizing the instructions from the LC controller to stop. They continued their takeoff roll, and both pilots recalled that they did not see N510HM until about 1 second before the collision. According to the chief pilot of DuPage Aerospace, company policy and training (and as part of every takeoff briefing) specify that takeoffs should be aborted for “any fault or failure” below 80 knots. He elaborated that if a fault were indicated on the annunciator panel [which is where the elevator trim warning system indictor is displayed], “then you should be aborting.” He further stated that “it depends what the fault or failure is” and described that if the elevator trim warning activated during takeoff, while the trim setting was very near either end of the takeoff range, that he would re-trim the airplane and then move the throttles back into the takeoff position and make sure the warning did not reactivate. If it were to reactivate, he would then abort the takeoff. Similarly, the PM noted during his interview that the elevator trim warnings are common in the Hawker, particularly when the trim setting was at or near the very aft mark of the [takeoff range] of the trim indicator. He said that typically a slight roll forward of the trim wheel would extinguish the light. This suggests there is some discrepancy or exceptions between the operator’s policy and at times, the in-practice procedures, with regard to conditions that warrant an aborted takeoff. In this case, the elevator trim warning (and the activation of the rudder bias) was temporary and easy to quickly remedy, though it happened to occur at a critical time as ATC was attempting to stop the takeoff roll. Separately, the chief pilot stated that it was company policy (and an element of the before start checklist) to test the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) prior to every flight. After the accident, the CVR was found to be inoperative due to activation of the impact or G switch, which interrupts electrical power to the CVR and its control unit in the cockpit. This can occur for several reasons, including hard landings or during maintenance operations. Review of the recording revealed audio consistent with maintenance activities. The CVR does not record date and time, however it likely became inoperative at some time prior to this crew’s pairing, which began two flights prior to the accident flight. Post accident testing of the CVR and the impact switch revealed they operated as designed. The flight crew should have been aware of the CVR’s nonoperational status during the before start checklist prior to the accident and the two previous flights, had they 1) pressed the CVR test button and 2) noticed that none of the indicator lights on the CVR control unit had illuminated, because the control unit (and CVR) were not powered. Normally, the indicator lights show the progress of the self-test, and whether the test passes or fails. However, during normal operation (no faults, and not in self-test mode) none of the indictor lights on the cockpit voice control unit are illuminated. Therefore, the control unit would look the same if 1) the CVR was running normally, or 2) if it was completely unpowered by the activated inertial switch. The only methods for the flight crew to determine if the unit is functioning are to use the self-test function, or by monitoring the audio through the headset jack on the control panel. Since the CVR was inoperative, the relevant crew conversations that would have provided additional insight to the investigation were not captured. This demonstrates the importance of properly testing the CVR before each flight.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Textron Aviation INC 510 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Runway incursion veh/AC/person during landing (landing roll) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Pilot of other aircraft
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,000 hours in all; 300 in this make and model
- Last flight review: March 3, 2022
- Medical certificate: Class 3
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Seats: 7
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: P&W Canada PW615F-A (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: P&W Canada PW615F-A (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Green Circle Demolition, LLC
The flight
- Departed from: FTY Atlanta GA at 5:46 pm
- Runway 22, 7,602 ft by 150 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 150° at 17 knots, gusting 27
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 3,500 ft
- Temperature: 84°F (29°C), dew point 68°F (20°C)
- Altimeter: 29.95 inHg
- Observation at 2:53 pm from KHOU
Weather report (METAR): KHOU 241953Z 15017G27KT 10SM SCT035 SCT055 29/20 A2995 RMK AO2 PK WND 17030/1924 SLP146 T02940200
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 3 |
The factual record for the Raytheon HAWKER from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Navigation error during takeoff defining event
- Runway incursion veh/AC/person during takeoff
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Pilot
- Environmental issues › Task environment › Pressures/demands › Equipment/operational › Effect on personnel
- Environmental issues › Task environment › Pressures/demands › Equipment/operational › Compliance w/ procedure
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 28,000 hours in all; 3,800 in this make and model
- Last flight review: September 24, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, flight engineer
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 24,000 hours in all; 300 in this make and model
- Last flight review: September 24, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Seats: 15
- Landing gear: retractable
- Operator: Whitmore Holdings LLC
The flight
- Departed from: HOU Houston TX at 8:20 pm
- Destination: UES Waukesha WI
- A second pilot was aboard
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
33 documents, released by the NTSB on October 14, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.