Boeing 767-322 accident near Houston, Texas, July 29, 2023
On July 29, 2023 at about 3:34 pm local time, a 1991 Boeing 767-322, registered N641UA, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (flare/touchdown) near Houston, Texas (George Bush Intcntl/Houston airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 202 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The first officer’s improper control inputs after the airplane touched down. Contributing to the severity of the damage was the flight crew’s lack of recognition that the speedbrakes were not armed, which led to their delayed deployment.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 29, 2023 · about 3:34 pm local time
- Place
- Houston, Texas · George Bush Intcntl/Houston · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 202 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Boeing 767-322, built 1991 · all 767-322s on the register
- Registration
- N641UA · registry record · serial 25091
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
After a stabilized approach, the main landing gear of United Airlines flight 702 touched down and the nosewheel contacted the runway harder than expected. The airplane then bounced, and the first officer (the pilot flying) reacted by pulling the control yoke aft to keep the nosewheel from impacting the runway a second time. The first officer applied the thrust reversers, the speed brakes deployed, and the nosewheel bounced a second time. Subsequently, the nosewheel impacted the runway a third time and, the airplane began to decelerate normally. The abnormal nosewheel impacts with the runway resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. Although the first officer stated he held aft pressure on the control column during the initial touchdown, flight data showed that he also made nosedown column inputs during the landing sequence. These nose-down inputs contributed to the nosewheel abnormally impacting the runway. Normal operation of the speedbrakes includes deployment during initial main gear touchdown, if the speedbrakes are in the armed position and the thrust levers are at idle. The only indication that the speedbrakes are armed is a demarcation line located on the control stand. If they do not automatically deploy during main gear touchdown, the pilot monitoring (in this case, the captain) announces the abnormal operation and slowly raises the speedbrake handle to the up position while the pilot flying slowly lowers the airplane’s nose to the runway. In addition, the speedbrakes will automatically deploy if the airplane is on the ground and either thrust lever is moved to the reverse idle detent. However, the speedbrakes were not armed before landing and after the airplane’s first bounce, data showed the speedbrakes automatically deployed with the first officer’s application of the thrust reversers, as designed. The deployment of the speedbrakes with the thrust reversers was while the nosewheel was still in the air. This likely contributed to the second abnormal runway contact of the nosewheel and the subsequent damage to the airplane. It is also likely that neither flight crewmember noticed that the speedbrakes were not armed before landing. Crew Performance De-rotation is the lowering of the aircraft’s nose gear to the runway following touchdown on the main gear during landing. The first officer’s nose-down column inputs were contrary to United Airlines’ procedures and training. The first officer’s training records showed inconsistencies in airplane handling as recent as a few months before the accident. He received an unsatisfactory performance rating and, upon re-evaluation, a satisfactory rating with a condition to recheck after 90 days (instead of 9 months). This was due to, among other things, marginal performance with landings. According to the check airman who completed the first officer’s second evaluation, the purpose of the recheck was to ensure, due to the first officer’s previous “struggles,” that his “proficiency is up to standards”. The first officer had accumulated about 129 flight hours in the accident airplane make and model. Due to the satisfactory performance rating on the first officers second evaluation, the investigation was unable to determine if the first officers training inconsistencies contributed to the accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Hard landing during landing (flare/touchdown) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Copilot
- Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training › Initial training › Operator
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 23,000 hours in all; 5,500 in this make and model; 142 in the last 90 days; 40 in the last 30 days; 15,000 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: June 12, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,001 hours in all; 129 in this make and model; 129 in the last 90 days; 1,998 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: May 5, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 126,184 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, January 26, 2023
- Maximum gross weight: 350,043 lb
- Seats: 213
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: P&W PW4060-3 (turbofan); 77,326 hours total
- Engine 2: P&W PW4060-3 (turbofan); 91,272 hours total
- Operator: United Airlines INC
The flight
- Departed from: EWR Newark NJ at 12:00 pm
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 08R/, 9,402 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 220° at 5 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 25,000 ft; scat at 2,500 ft
- Temperature: 86°F (30°C), dew point 73°F (23°C)
- Altimeter: 30.14 inHg
- Observation at 9:53 am from KIAH, 1 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KIAH 291453Z 22005KT 10SM SCT025 BKN250 30/23 A3014 RMK AO2 SLP204 T03000233 51012 $
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 7 | |||
| Flig | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 193 |
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number DCA23LA384.
