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Accidents · NTSB DCA17LA182 · Final report

Bombardier INC CL 600 2C10 accident near Denver, Colorado, July 2, 2017

On July 2, 2017 at about 7:19 pm local time, a 2010 Bombardier INC CL 600 2C10, registered N796SK, was substantially damaged in an accident during taxi (from runway) near Denver, Colorado (Denver International Airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 59 people were on board or involved. The weather was conditions the NTSB did not record.

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The fuel supply tube fitting pulling out of the left engine’s operability bleed valve (OBV) during the landing rollout, allowing fuel to leak and contact hot engine cases, which ignited a fire that caused thermal damage to the engine pylon. Contributing to the fitting pullout from the OBV was an undetected progressive environmental control system (ECS) support link wear condition that allowed excessive OBV movement relative to the engine, and the lack of alignment instructions in the base engine assembly drawing and the lack of maintenance tasks to assess the operational condition of the ECS links.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 2, 2017 · about 7:19 pm local time
Place
Denver, Colorado · Denver International Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 59 people were on board or involved.
Weather
conditions the NTSB did not record
Aircraft
Bombardier INC CL 600 2C10 700C, built 2010
Registration
N796SK · registry record · serial 10300
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

After the scheduled air carrier flight touched down on the runway, a left engine undercowl fire occurred. The fire occurred after leaked fuel accumulating inside the engine core compartment (a fire zone) ignited from contact with a hot engine surface. The fuel accumulated inside the core compartment because the nacelle drainage system was overwhelmed by the release of about 34 gallons of fuel during the landing roll, at which time the high rates of ventilation through the nacelle were reduced. The leak occurred during landing when the removal of fuel leakage depends in part on gravity drainage. A nacelle drainage capability assessment found that the core compartment contained about 20 gallons of fuel at the time of ignition. After engine shutdown, fuel draining from the core compartment was no longer carried overboard by the fan exhaust, and the fuel pooled in the fan duct. Some of this fuel drained to the ground through the transcowl drain holes. The fire became uncontrolled when it escaped the fire zone and spread to areas where expelled/drained fuel had accumulated in the nacelle and on the ground. The draining fuel led to a fire on the ground and on the underside of the left pylon. The fire was extinguished by airport rescue and firefighting personnel. On-site investigation found that a rosan -05 to -06 expander fitting had pulled out from the fuel supply port of the operability bleed valve (OBV), which is part of the left engine’s environmental control system (ECS). Also, two ECS support links (which attach and support the ECS hardware, including the OBV, to the engine) were found severely worn. Metallurgical examination of the OBV upper housing fuel supply port found evidence of advanced thread wear and fatigue damage, consistent with side-to-side fitting cyclic movement and insufficient remaining threads to prevent the fitting in the upper housing from pulling out. Modal testing demonstrated that ECS link wear can shift the OBV natural operating frequency into the engine operating frequency range, significantly increasing the fuel tube loads into the fitting. OBV design evaluation testing found that fitting joint preload loss permits relative motion to occur between the fitting and upper housing port threads, initiating upper housing thread wear and leading to upper housing thread failure and fitting pullout. The rosan -05 to 06 expander fitting with the cast aluminum housing lacked the design margin to maintain sufficient preload against engine vibration loads and fitting pullout. A review of CF34-8 maintenance engineering sheets and field maintenance documents found that rod end alignment instructions critical to preventing ECS support link wear were not provided in the base engine assembly drawing and that the ECS support links were not part of any scheduled airplane- or engine-level maintenance. As a result, maintenance personnel did not inspect for wear caused by poor rod end alignment. Worn or misaligned ECS support links increase fuel tube fitting loads and can result in fitting pullouts.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Fire/smoke (non-impact) during taxi (from runway) defining event
  2. Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during landing (landing roll)

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine bleed air system › (general) › Inadequate inspection
  • Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Nacelles/pylons structure › Nacelle/pylon misc structure › Failure
  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine bleed air system › Compressor bleed valve › Capability exceeded
  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine bleed air system › Compressor bleed valve › Design

The aircraft

  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Ge CF34-8C5B1 (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Ge CF34-8C5B1 (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground
  • Operator: Skywest Airlines INC

The flight

  • Departed from: KASE Aspen CO
  • Destination: KDEN Denver CO
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 34R, 12,000 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Cabi1
Flight crew2
Passengers56

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

11 documents, released by the NTSB on May 26, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.