Pacific Aerospace LTD 750XL accident near Butler, Missouri, June 14, 2026

The NTSB's narrative preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record

On June 14, 2026, about 1125 central daylight time, a Pacific Aerospace Limited 750XL airplane, N221BN, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Butler, Missouri. The pilot and 11 passengers sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 local parachute jump (skydiving) flight. On the day of the accident, the operator had planned to conduct 8 parachute jump flights. The operator’s landing zone (LZ), a flat grass field, was located at the Butler Memorial Airport (BUM), Butler, Missouri. All the flights were planned for the parachutists to land at the LZ at BUM. At 0730, the manager of the operation obtained a fuel sample from their fuel truck that they had staged at BUM. The Jet A fuel sample was clean with no sediment or debris observed. Also at 0730, the pilot arrived at the operator’s facility, he completed the preflight of the airplane with no issues reported. He also researched and posted the various wind speeds and directions on a whiteboard in the operator’s building for the various loads (see figure 1). According to the operator, the pilot utilized ForeFlight for his preflight planning work. Figure 1. Image depicting the various wind speeds and directions on a whiteboard, for the different altitudes that the pilot researched and posted on the morning of the accident, located in the operator’s building at BUM. At 0920, the first flight of parachutists, which included the pilot and 9 passengers, departed in the airplane. They conducted their parachute jumps successfully, and the airplane landed back at BUM. At 1032, the second flight of parachutists, which included the pilot and 10 passengers, departed in the airplane. They conducted their parachute jumps successfully, and the airplane landed back at BUM. At 1055, the manager of the operation assisted the pilot with refueling the airplane. According to the manager, 15 gallons of Jet A fuel were added to the left-wing fuel tank, and 45 gallons of Jet A fuel were added to the right-wing fuel tank. The total fuel quantity was documented by the pilot on a personal clipboard. At 1125, the third flight of parachutists departed. A review of security video footage from a nearby aerial application operation hangar at BUM showed the airplane takeoff about mid-field from runway 36. During the initial climb, the airplane began a gradual turn to the left (to the west). A security video showed the airplane continuing to turn to the left, with both wings eventually becoming approximately perpendicular to the ground (see figure 2). The airplane then impacted a flat grass field in a nose down profile and a postimpact fire ensued. A search revealed no ADS-B data or track data for the accident flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Figure 2. Image depicting the security video footage screenshot showing the airplane in flight shortly before impacting terrain (security video footage courtesy of BCS Aerial). The airplane is annotated inside the red circle. The accident site was located about 445 ft to the west of the southern end of the operator’s LZ, near a north to south running barbed wire fence on BUM property. A postimpact fire consumed the wreckage. Figure 3. Image depicting the wreckage at the accident site, with various airplane components labeled. Several airplane components were moved to facilitate the initial emergency response. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed that all major structural components of the airframe were identified at the accident site; however, they had sustained significant thermal damage. Both the elevator and the rudder control systems sustained significant thermal damage. Measurements were obtained for the length of the flap gearbox jack screw extension, the length of the pitch trim actuator extension, and the length of the roll trim actuator extension to potentially determine the respective system positions at the time of the impact. The yaw trim system sustained significant thermal damage. The cockpit, the cabin, and the airframe fuel system all sustained significant thermal damage. The left and right direct aileron cables were removed and were transported to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for examination. The Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-34 turboprop engine displayed contact signatures to its internal components characteristic of the engine developing power at the time of the impact. There were no indications of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures to any of the engine components that would have precluded normal operation. The four-blade controllable-pitch composite propeller was destroyed during the impact sequence. A postaccident sample from the operator’s fuel truck found the Jet A fuel sample to be clean with no sediment or debris present. Multiple damaged GoPro cameras (of various models) were recovered from the accident site and were transported to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory. The wreckage was recovered from the accident site, and it was transported to a secure location. A postaccident review of the operator’s Burble Drop Zone Management software showed that the airplane met the weight and balance limitations for the accident flight. According to the Pilot’s Operating Handbook and Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand-Approved Flight Manual AIR 2825, the airplane has a maximum takeoff weight limitation of 7,500 lbs. According to the operator, the pilot utilized a small personal clipboard to record load notes and fuel load calculations, however, that clipboard was not identified in the wreckage. The airplane was configured with two seats in the cockpit (the pilot seat on the left side and the copilot seat on the right side), and the cabin of the airplane had two benches installed for the parachutists to utilize. According to the operator, the parachutists would have sat rearwards, straddling their respective benches, with a latched restraint system (a lap belt). The airplane was not equipped with a crashworthy voice or data recorder, nor was it required to be. The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate (airplane single engine land rating with an instrument rating). The pilot had accumulated over 4,100 total flight hours and his most recent flight review was on October 5, 2025. According to the operator, the pilot worked as a contractor, and this was his second consecutive jump pilot season working for them. During the first jump pilot season (which typically occurs from April to October for that geographic area), the pilot operated both the Cessna 182 series and the Cessna 208 series airplanes. The operator reported that they did not have any pervious concerns with the pilot, he was safety oriented, and he was also conservative with his decision making as a jump pilot. Parachute jump flights, which are revenue passenger-carrying operations, are conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. These operations do not require FAA-issued operating certificates, FAA-issued operations specifications, and FAA-approved training and maintenance programs.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

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