Cessna 172 and Cessna 172 mid-air collision near Grand Prairie, Texas, January 29, 2019
On January 29, 2019 at about 7:29 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Cessna 172 (N565SP) and Cessna 172 (N52243), were involved in a mid-air collision near Grand Prairie, Texas (Grand Prairie Muni airport). No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of the pilots of both airplanes to see and avoid the other airplane while entering the airport traffic pattern in visual meteorological conditions. Contributing to the accident was the tower controller's failure to recognize the proximity of the airplanes to each other, to issue a safety alert to the pilots of either airplane, and to establish a landing sequence for the airplanes.
The failure of the pilots of both airplanes to see and avoid the other airplane while entering the airport traffic pattern in visual meteorological conditions. Contributing to the accident was the tower controller's failure to recognize the proximity of the airplanes to each other, to issue a safety alert to the pilots of either airplane, and to establish a landing sequence for the airplanes.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- January 29, 2019 · about 7:29 pm local time
- Place
- Grand Prairie, Texas · Grand Prairie Muni · map
- Type
- Accident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Cessna 172 S, built 2000 · all 172s on the register
- Registration
- N565SP · registry record · serial 172S8489
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
- Aircraft 2
- Cessna 172 S, built 2002 · all 172s on the register
- Registration
- N52243 · no longer on the register · serial 172S9145
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative for the Cessna 172 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The flight instructors/student pilots of two Cessna airplanes, N565SP and N52243, were each returning from local instructional flights. The N565SP pilot contacted the tower and reported being near the southern tip of a lake, about 10 miles south of the airport; the tower controller instructed the pilot to enter a left downwind for runway 17. About 45 seconds later, the N52243 pilot contacted the tower and reported being 7 miles south of the airport; the tower controller also instructed that pilot to enter a left downwind for runway 17. Radar data indicated that, about this time, the airplanes were within about 0.1 nautical mile laterally and 100 ft vertically of each other. The flightpaths of the airplanes remained in close proximity for about the next 58 seconds (1.6 miles), with the airplanes' altitudes remaining within 100 ft of each other. About 30 seconds after the N52243 pilot contacted the tower, the N565SP pilot requested verification of the assigned transponder code. During the tower controller's transmission response, an audible conflict alert could be heard in the control tower cab. The controller did not issue a safety alert or advise either airplane's pilots that another airplane was in the same proximity. About 20 seconds later, the controller instructed the N52243 pilot to start a turn toward the northeast corner of the lake. The airplanes then collided, and the N52243 pilot declared an emergency. The N565SP pilot subsequently transmitted that an airplane had "hit us from the back" and that there had been a collision. The pilots of both airplanes maintained control of the airplanes and landed; both airplanes sustained substantial damage during the collision. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed. Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.113 requires that, when weather conditions permit, "vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft." The pilots of both airplanes did not maintain an effective traffic scan as they entered the traffic pattern, nor did they exercise the vigilance necessary to see and avoid the other airplane. In addition, Federal Aviation Administration Joint Order 7110.65 indicates that a controller should give first priority to "separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts." The tower controller did not recognize the proximity of the airplanes to each other, provide a safety alert to the pilots of either airplane, or establish a landing sequence that provided proper airplane spacing to the runway.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Cessna 172 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The flight instructors/student pilots of two Cessna airplanes, N565SP and N52243, were each returning from local instructional flights. The N565SP pilot contacted the tower and reported being near the southern tip of a lake, about 10 miles south of the airport; the tower controller instructed the pilot to enter a left downwind for runway 17. About 45 seconds later, the N52243 pilot contacted the tower and reported being 7 miles south of the airport; the tower controller also instructed that pilot to enter a left downwind for runway 17. Radar data indicated that, about this time, the airplanes were within about 0.1 nautical mile laterally and 100 ft vertically of each other. The flightpaths of the airplanes remained in close proximity for about the next 58 seconds (1.6 miles), with the airplanes' altitudes remaining within 100 ft of each other. About 30 seconds after the N52243 pilot contacted the tower, the N565SP pilot requested verification of the assigned transponder code. During the tower controller's transmission response, an audible conflict alert could be heard in the control tower cab. The controller did not issue a safety alert or advise either airplane's pilots that another airplane was in the same proximity. About 20 seconds later, the controller instructed the N52243 pilot to start a turn toward the northeast corner of the lake. The airplanes then collided, and the N52243 pilot declared an emergency. The N565SP pilot subsequently transmitted that an airplane had "hit us from the back" and that there had been a collision. The pilots of both airplanes maintained control of the airplanes and landed; both airplanes sustained substantial damage during the collision. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed. Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.113 requires that, when weather conditions permit, "vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft." The pilots of both airplanes did not maintain an effective traffic scan as they entered the traffic pattern, nor did they exercise the vigilance necessary to see and avoid the other airplane. In addition, Federal Aviation Administration Joint Order 7110.65 indicates that a controller should give first priority to "separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts." The tower controller did not recognize the proximity of the airplanes to each other, provide a safety alert to the pilots of either airplane, or establish a landing sequence that provided proper airplane spacing to the runway.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Cessna 172 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during enroute (cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Instructor/check pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Student/instructed pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot of other aircraft
- factor Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Task monitoring/vigilance › ATC personnel
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › ATC personnel
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 655 hours in all; 635 in this make and model; 100 in the last 90 days; 50 in the last 30 days; 581 as pilot in command; 400 on instruments
- Last flight review: August 14, 2018
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Dual student
- Certificate: student
- Flight time: 64 hours in all; 64 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 6,774.8 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, December 11, 2018
- Maximum gross weight: 2,299 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming IO-360-L2A (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: GPM Grand Prairie TX at 6:30 pm
- Destination: GPM Grand Prairie TX
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 35, 4,001 ft by 75 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 110° at 6 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 41°F (5°C), dew point 18°F (-8°C)
- Altimeter: 30.31 inHg
- Observation at 7:50 pm from GPM, 6 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
The factual record for the Cessna 172 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during enroute (cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Instructor/check pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Student/instructed pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot of other aircraft
- factor Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Task monitoring/vigilance › ATC personnel
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › ATC personnel
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 600 hours in all; 330 in this make and model; 60 in the last 90 days; 38 in the last 30 days; 450 as pilot in command; 65 on instruments
- Last flight review: October 30, 2018
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Dual student
- Certificate: student
- Flight time: 8 hours in all; 8 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 8,227 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, December 4, 2018
- Maximum gross weight: 2,299 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming IO-360-L2A (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: GPM Grand Prairie TX at 6:30 pm
- Destination: GPM Grand Prairie TX
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 35, 4,001 ft by 75 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.